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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
LIVING ON THE EDGE: 
SMALLHOLDER GROWERS’ 
RESPONSES TO A CHANGING 
TOBACCO ECONOMY IN MALAWI
             
 This dissertation explores how smallholder tobacco growers in Lilongwe, Malawi,
experience and respond to fluctuating and declining incomes, and to a generally unstable 
market as a result of changes in the global tobacco industry. Policy makers and scholars 
have for a long-time debated on the question of how smallholder farmers are going to 
adapt to future institutional and structural changes in global agriculture. Studies on rural 
livelihood restructuring have revealed that processes of economic globalization 
have disrupted state marketing institutions, and undermined regulatory frameworks, 
causing shocks to livelihoods of smallholders across the world. These livelihood shocks 
affect smallholders’ capacities to engage in traditional risk management practices, 
leaving them vulnerable to future changes in global agriculture. Some studies have called 
for the strengthening of state and non-state institutions to assist smallholders recover from 
livelihood crises that result from market shocks. However, the role of these institutions in 
shaping the perception risk and awareness of the changes smallholders face, which in turn 
shapes their responses to current and future crises, has not been adequately investigated.
 Tobacco farmers in Malawi have in recent years experienced unstable markets 
marked by fluctuating and declining incomes, at the same time that the global tobacco in-
dustry is experiencing institutional and structural changes resulting from the anti-smoking 
lobby, and changing consumption and production patterns. This ethnographic study exam-
ined the perception of risk to long-term viability of tobacco farming and adaptive responses 
among smallholder tobacco growers. Fieldwork revealed that most growers consider the 
on-going market instability as just one of the risks farmers must deal with and that they 
employ a repertoire of coping strategies rather than long term adaptive strategies. I argue 
that smallholders view the current market instability through the lens of exploitative and 
inefficient tobacco institutions which preclude them from taking a long-term view about 
their livelihoods. 
KEYWORDS: Rural Livelihoods, Smallholders, Tobacco Growers, Perception of Risk,
                         Livelihood Restructuring.
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          Living on the Edge: Smallholder Growers’ Responses to a Changing
Tobacco Economy in Malawi
Chapter 1: Introduction
 In this dissertation I explore the ways in which smallholder tobacco farmers at 
Kumala village in Lilongwe, Malawi, experience and respond to fluctuating prices and 
declining incomes, as well as general instability in the tobacco market as the tobacco 
industry undergoes restructuring. The question of how smallholder farmers and producers 
are going to adapt to future global structural change has been at the center of discussion 
among policy makers, development analysts and academics since the late 1990s (Carletto 
et al 2008; FAO 2012; Goodman and Watts 1997). Small farmers are said to be more 
vulnerable to market fluctuations and structural change as they often have fewer resourc-
es to cope with the changes (Lyon 2011; O'Brien and Leichenko 2002; Ramisch 2014). 
Tobacco farmers in Malawi demonstrate this vulnerability at a time when producer prices 
are fluctuating and declining, and the global tobacco industry is experiencing institu-
tional and structural changes. In recent years a number of factors, including the global 
anti-smoking lobby, changing consumer tastes, increased competition from other tobacco 
producing countries, and industry consolidation at the global level (Geist, Otanez and 
Kapito 2008; Manduna 2003) have destabilized the tobacco industry in Malawi and glob-
ally. The rapidly evolving world tobacco market has resulted in fluctuating and declining 
prices for Malawian tobacco farmers.
 My interest in this phenomenon started in 2011 following a tobacco market season 
that saw growers receive some of the lowest prices in recent times. Official statistics put 
the national average price for Burley tobacco in 2011 at $1.13/kg compared to averages 
above $1.70 in the mid-2000s (data sourced from Tobacco Control Commission). 
Tobacco growers at Kumala remember 2011 as the "80 cents" season (most growers 
received 80 cents per kilogram for Burley, the type of tobacco commonly tobacco grown 
by smallholders). Before this crisis, other authors (Jaffee 2003; Jaffee and Nucifora 2005) 
had already started warning that the state of the tobacco industry was in gradual decline 
and was headed for disaster. Since the 2011 price debacle, the instability of tobacco 
2
          markets has been a headline in popular discourse as well as policy-making circles. Re-
cords show that the national economy has also taken a hit with tobacco revenue declining 
from an all-time high of $471.6 million in 2008 to $275.9 million1 in 2016 (See Appendix 
Four: AHL Final Weekly Tobacco Sales Update 12/20/2016).
 Following what I considered to be a disastrous tobacco season among 
smallholders, I wanted to know about the farming populations' knowledge and experience 
of risks, and their responses to market shocks in the short term. From these discussions, 
I hoped to gain insights on how farmers react to long-term market shocks resulting from 
structural and institutional change. In this study I define risk as the probability that some 
event is going to cause harm (Oliver-Smith 1996; Tucker et al 2010), and perception of 
risk as an individual's cognition about the possibility of an event to cause harm (Frank et 
al 2011). For working purposes, the risk event was the possibility of abrupt cessation of 
tobacco trade as a result of low demand for tobacco products globally. Tucker et al
(2010) note that perception of risk is influenced by social and cultural norms of what is 
harmful, and the individual's tolerance of anticipated harm. Studies on livelihoods adap-
tation show that smallholder farmers and rural populations in general are accustomed to 
risks and can proactively deal with variability and change in their livelihoods. My 
respondents exhibited impressive knowledge about their physical and ecological 
environment, and they had a repertoire of flexible responses, especially to weather 
variability. In early 2015, during the course of the study rainfall was erratic. Prolonged 
rains alternated with dry spells and people feared that tobacco, which lacks resilience to 
such variability, was likely going to be affected. This gave me a chance to have 
conversations with people on how they perceive and respond to variable weather 
conditions. They related that while they could do nothing about the tobacco except
replant, resources and rains permitting, they had risk management strategies for food 
crops like maize. They exhibited remarkable knowledge about the different qualities of a 
range of seed varieties, including length of growing season and taste. They use this
knowledge to spread risk by planting varieties of different maturity lengths on different
1 Data sourced from AHL based on 2016 final sales week ending December 20, 2016.
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          plots. In the worst case scenario, when they realize that rains are going to fail completely, 
those who are able, rush to their dimbas2 to plant food crops in order to avert hunger.
 Studies also show that rural populations have demonstrated adaptability to long 
term change resulting from structural and institutional stressors such as scarcity of land, 
loss of access to environmental resources, changing property institutions, weak 
agricultural markets and oppressive state policies. Adaptive options include migration and 
multilocal livelihoods (Ramisch 2014), occupational diversification of livelihoods away 
from the farm, wage labor, entrepreneurship (Archambault et al 2014; Ellis
2000, 1998; Scoones 1998; Sick 1997), and through crop diversification (Ellis 2000; Sick
2014). At Kumala, as in other tobacco growing communities in Malawi, continued 
fluctuation of prices has made tobacco farming a game of chance where one loss wipes 
out gains from years before. Yet not many smallholders are keen to get off the tobacco 
bandwagon, and many more want to join. This prompted me to investigate growers’ 
perception of risk of long term viability of tobacco livelihoods in view of declining 
demand in western countries as a result of global anti-smoking initiatives. I hypothesized 
that growers who perceived the on-going market instability as a prediction about the
long-term viability of tobacco livelihoods would be more likely to make crucial adaptive 
changes than those who saw this as part of normal risks of a farmer’s life.
     1.1 Overview of the Argument
 In this dissertation I examine the paradox of a relative lack of diversification away 
from tobacco following a spate of price fluctuations culminating in the 2011 season when 
farmers in Kumala received the lowest prices in living memory. Specifically, I ask 
questions about smallholders’ perception and responses to uncertain viability of tobacco 
farming in the long term, and the role of institutional context in shaping growers 
perceptions of a crisis, and choices for adaptation.  The central questions driving my 
research are how do smallholder tobacco growers in Lilongwe experience and respond to 
market instability and structural change in the industry? And what role do institutions in 
the tobacco industry, such as market and regulatory institutions as well as tobacco 
2 Dimbas are small plots of land found in wetlands along rivers where in the dry season people grow 
mostly horticultural crops using hand irrigation techniques.
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          companies, play in shaping the perceptions of long term viability of tobacco among 
smallholder growers. I examine smallholders’ perception of risk and response to market 
instability through the lens of (i) tobacco as a liberalized but still most significant export 
crop with implications for household and broader rural and national economies, and (ii) 
the involvement of state and non-state institutions that manage the tobacco industry 
following decades of neoliberal restructuring.
Tobacco
 I examine tobacco with regard to its place in the national economy and in the 
national imagination, as well as its place in the livelihoods of family households and 
communities. Since colonial times tobacco has been designated as a crop of strategic im-
portance to the economy. Both the colonial and postcolonial governments were careful to 
ensure that only farmers who had the ‘technical know-how’ to produce the best leaf were 
permitted to grow the most lucrative types of tobacco. This was to ensure that Malawian 
tobacco maintained a good name on the global markets.
 Four types of tobacco are grown in Malawi; Burley, Flue-cured, Northern 
Division Dark Fired (NDDF) and Southern Division Dark Fired (SDDF). Burley the light 
air-cured tobacco primarily used for cigarette production is by far the most common type 
of tobacco in Malawi. It is primarily grown by smallholders on family farm plots using 
family labor. Burley’s major attraction is that it fetches higher prices as compared to the 
dark- fired varieties. In addition, it is relatively easy to cure as compared to Flue-cured 
tobacco. Burley only requires a shed with open sides where the tobacco leaf is hung to 
allow the air to cure it. Flue-cured tobacco (also known as Bright leaf tobacco) is the 
most profitable but it is also capital and labor intensive. It requires brick curing barns 
with flue pipes to carry heat from the outside into the barn. The cost of curing barns, fuel 
wood and labor are beyond the reach of most smallholder growers and as such it is only 
grown by estates and well established smallholders who may be supported either by state 
owned parastatals or by leaf companies. The aromatic dark-fired varieties (NDDF and 
SDDF) are mostly used in smoking pipes and they have the longest history with smallholders. 
These were the types smallholders were allowed to grow prior to the liberalization of 
5
          Burley. They are heavy flavor varieties cured through direct fire heat but intense process-
ing requirements and low prices make them less desirable to smallholders. In my field 
site Burley was the only type of tobacco grown.
 When in the early 1990s government liberalized the lucrative Burley tobacco in 
concert with the general liberalization of the economy to allow smallholders to 
participate, Burley was hailed by government and its development partners as a panacea 
that would end poverty for millions of smallholders in Malawi (Orr and Mwale 2001). A 
number of researchers undertook studies on smallholder tobacco production in Malawi 
to investigate the effects of economic liberalization in general, and the liberalization of 
tobacco in particular on the welfare of smallholder farmers (Harashima 2008; Orr 2000; 
Orr & Mwale 2001; Peters 2006; Takane 2006). These studies documented the effects of 
liberalization on individual farmers and the rural sector as a whole. Peters (2006) found 
that incomes of households that had adopted Burley rose by 59% between 1986 and 1997, 
in large part because of the contributions from tobacco incomes. Orr & Mwale (2001) 
noted that liberalization of Burley had stimulated livelihood diversification and 
stimulated demand for rural trade and services via increased smallholder incomes. It had 
also promoted investment in rural areas. They further noted that liberalization had 
reduced circular migration of smallholders who used to work as sharecroppers on 
tobacco estates. Other researchers noted that Burley growers had a large proportion of 
income from agriculture as well as high income from non-farm sources (Harashima 2008, 
Takane 2006). Orr (2000) noted that a high proportion of Burley growers planted hybrid 
maize and applied commercial inorganic fertilizer to it, and concluded that liberalization 
had had an impact on the adoption of new technologies in maize farming. Although these 
authors noted that Burley was a profitable crop for smallholder farmers, they concluded 
that it was not a panacea for poverty reduction in Malawi. Orr (2000), Peters (2006) and 
Harashima (2008) found that Burley was grown by better-off households; households 
with enough land, labor and access to capital. They further noted that although Burley 
would reduce poverty, it could not necessarily improve food security and nutrition as 
framers of the liberalization process had hoped. In the Malawian context, high per capita 
expenditure did not necessarily result in increased expenditure on food (Orr 2000).
6
          If tobacco was popular among policy makers and donors, it was even more 
popular among farmers. Thousands of farmers who had been growing the laborious and 
less remunerative dark-fired tobacco varieties took to Burley. In 1990 the number of 
registered Burley growers was 8,707 (large and small estates), but by the time 
liberalization went into full swing in 93/94, 30,549 smallholders in 1,318 clubs had 
joined. Today, even as growers lament that tobacco sales are not as good as they were, 
they still point to brick and iron-roofed houses they built when tobacco was still good 
money. They reminisce about the livestock, the motorcycles and other consumer goods 
acquired through tobacco farming. Many think those days are coming back.
 Although tobacco retains the aura of a money maker, recent thinking has begun 
to question the notion of tobacco profitability. In a multi-country study to understand 
the economic and institutional factors that promote tobacco production, Makoka et al 
(2016) assessed the profitability of production between independent growers and growers 
contracted to tobacco leaf companies. They observed that the cost of family labor is not 
included in profit calculations propagated by the tobacco industry. They noted that when 
labor costs are included, independent farmers made a loss of $37/acre as opposed to a 
profit of $417/acre when labor was excluded. Contract farmers made a modest profit of
$224.3/acre with labor costs included, as opposed to $630.10/acre when labor costs were 
not factored in. In the wake of declining revenue and market instability, analysts have 
focused on the institutional set-up of the tobacco industry. Koester et al (2004), World 
Bank (2004), Prowse (2011) and UNCTAD (2011) employed the global value chain 
approach to explore the context and institutional structure of the tobacco industry in 
Malawi to unveil factors that hinder profitability of tobacco among smallholder growers. 
These studies found that the industry is poorly regulated due to capacity challenges by 
regulatory agencies. They also noted that monopolistic tendencies in a market dominated 
by three giant leaf buying companies and illegal collusion among leaf buyers made for 
an uncompetitive industry that disadvantaged smallholder growers. These macro-level 
factors have implications on the livelihoods of the smallholders.
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          In this study I sought to add to this critical approach towards tobacco by exploring the 
lived experiences of tobacco growers as they deal with uncertainty and declining 
incomes. This is the side of tobacco that has only recently begun to be discussed. In my 
conversations with tobacco growers at Kumala, many growers related that they had gone 
through the experience of receiving low prices at the tobacco market. From these, I 
wanted to know why they still kept growing tobacco, a cash crop that had become unpre-
dictable over the years. Key to this was understanding the economic role of tobacco in the 
household and in the community but also understanding the cultural meanings associated 
with tobacco farming. Also important was understanding how production is organized 
within the household, how growers internalize loss, and how they sustain their farming 
livelihoods after making losses at the tobacco market. Ultimately, I wanted to get at 
considerations that go into long-term decision making processes. Do the recurrent 
experiences of loss lead to increased adaptive capacities to help them resist or manage 
future market shocks?
Institutions
 I also explore growers’ perceptions through the lens of tobacco and the 
institutional arrangements around it. Tobacco is a commodity grown in a national 
context where for a long time, state institutions played a heavy role in financing, 
production, marketing and regulation of commodities. With tobacco, alongside other 
commodities designated as special crops, the state dictated where and how it was grown, 
and it provided the marketing and regulatory infrastructure; both institutional and 
physical. Prior to liberalization of the economy and of the tobacco sector, a dedicated 
state owned financial institution, Smallholder Agricultural Credit Administration (SACA) 
financed smallholder production of tobacco, and another state owned company, 
Agricultural Development Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), collected smallholder 
produced tobacco, provided transport and storage and sold it at a state owned auction 
market. The paternalistic state not only shielded smallholders from the vagaries of 
global markets, it also ensured that the reproduction of rural livelihoods was dependent 
on specific state institutions (Bair and Hough 2012). Domestic liberalization mandated 
8
          by structural adjustment programs (SAPs) led to trade liberalization, and withdrawal of 
the state from a lot of areas including banking and agricultural marketing (Dorward and 
Kydd 2004). Eakin (2006) and Leichenko and O’Brien (2008) note that farmers’ exposure 
to market risks is heavily influenced by the institutional context of production. Studies on 
rural livelihoods under economic restructuring note that the disruption of state marketing 
institutions and undermining of regulatory frameworks under economic liberalization 
caused shocks to the livelihoods of small producers and growers across the world. These 
disruptions affected smallholders’ capacities to engage in traditional risk management 
practices and left them vulnerable to future changes in global agriculture (Bonnano 1994; 
Goodman Watts 1997; Preibisch et al 2002; Swinnen 2007; Tucker et al 2010). Post 
liberalization, tobacco farmers in Malawi find themselves needing to interact with 
familiar and new institutional players including clubs, cooperatives, regulatory 
institutions, financiers, and leaf companies. All these acting in lock step, albeit with 
divergent interests, influence the livelihoods of growers and their communities. The 
only difference this time is that there is no paternalistic state to guide the small growers 
through these interactions.
 Some studies on economic restructuring and livelihood crises have highlighted the 
role of state and non-state institutions in the recovery process. In the case of developing 
countries, authors of these studies have called for the strengthening of state and non-state 
institutions to assist small farmers and producers cope and recover from the ensuing 
livelihood crises (Babin 2012; Bacon 2005). Furthermore, they have called for
the incorporation of smallholder growers and producers in global value chains such as
fair trade and organic farming networks (Fernandez 2014; Oxfam 2006;UNCTAD 2013). 
Although these authors recognize the role of institutions in facilitating the recovery of 
small producers, they neglect their role in shaping the perception risk and awareness of 
the changes they face, which in turn shapes their responses to current and future crises.
This approach further neglects the historical and political dynamics of the way state and 
non-state institutions relate to smallholders, and how these dynamics influence or restrict 
the roles institutions can play to help with the recovery process (Eakin et al 2006). 
Besides, the uncritical call for the incorporation of small producers into global value 
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          chains neglects the asymmetric power relations between smallholders and global agri-
business. For this study, I sought to explore smallholders’ experiences with the key 
institutions with which they interact regularly, including regulators, leaf companies, 
growers’ clubs and associations. I also explored the institutions’ approach to the on-going 
livelihoods crisis. My aim was to understand their take on the crisis, and what role they 
were playing to help smallholders recover from it. I wanted to delve into the institutional 
narratives surrounding the market instability and the declining prices. I wanted to know 
what signals smallholders were getting about the future of tobacco from the market and 
regulatory institutions. While government, leaf companies and growers associations were 
uniformly clear in their pronouncements about the bright future of tobacco, their narra-
tives about the predicament of smallholder growers were framed to push responsibility 
for the crisis towards the grower. Pronouncements about the future of tobacco told the 
farmer to keep growing, and yet prices did not match that rhetoric. This divide between 
the state and the industry on one hand, and the smallholder on the other, complicated my 
efforts to understand the livelihood crisis, leading me on a quest to explore the dynamics 
of state and smallholder relations. This investigation highlighted the marginal position of 
the grower in the global tobacco commodity chain, and the role of state institutions acting 
in concert with private actors in shaping smallholders’ perceptions of risk and awareness 
of long-term changes in the industry.
     1.2 Theoretical Framework of the Study
This study calls for linking the ongoing structural changes in the agricultural sector both 
at national and global level to the lived experiences of tobacco growing households and 
their communities. I utilize two theoretical frameworks; the agrarian political economy 
and the livelihoods approach, to understand changes in the agrarian sector and the 
mediating factors that shape the responses to change among tobacco growers.
 I draw on scholarship from agrarian political economy to understand the 
livelihood crisis among tobacco growers at Kumala which is happening in concert with 
changes in the structure of global agriculture. I employ the political economy approach 
to understand how the development of capitalism is unfolding in the agricultural sector, 
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          especially the changes wrought by processes of neoliberal agrarian restructuring that call 
for the liberalization of international trade in food and agricultural goods, deregulation of 
domestic agricultural markets, privatization of agricultural parastatals, and the 
introduction of new property rights regimes in a bid to increase productivity and 
integrate rural producers into global markets (Akram-Lodhi 2007; Bair and Hough 2012). 
In addition, I use the political economy approach to understand how changes resulting 
from these dynamics are further changing social dynamics in the rural areas. I further 
use the agrarian political economy approach to frame my discussion on the organization 
and workings of the institutions of the tobacco industry in Malawi, to highlight how key 
institutional actors access power and wealth through rent seeking and other practices, 
and how they collaborate to maintain the existing institutional set-up, and perpetuate the 
growing of a crop whose long-term viability is in doubt. This approach allows me to shed 
light on a hierarchy that separates growers from the elites of the industry, and how in turn 
the industry elites shape reality for the growers (Martinez-Novo 2004). It also allows for 
an examination of how the activities of global players articulate with national processes
to shape livelihoods of smallholder farmers (Browning 2013; Reynolds 1994).
 In addition to the agrarian political economy approach, I also employ the 
livelihoods approach to understand the role of tobacco industry institutions in shaping the 
adaptive capacities of smallholder farmers. The livelihoods approach describes the ways 
in which people employ different types of capital (i.e. natural, economic, human and 
social) in any given historical, ecological and institutional context to make a living. It 
offers a dynamic perspective from which to study livelihood adaptation- the continuous 
process of changes to livelihoods which either enhance existing wealth and security or 
reduce vulnerability and poverty (Davies and Hossain 1997). The livelihood approach is 
particularly suited to this study because it pays attention to institutions as mediators of 
access to resources for livelihood adaptation (Leach et al 1999). Tobacco leaf companies
together with market and regulatory institutions are key actors in the tobacco value chain. 
These institutions’ interactions with smallholders are key in shaping growers 
understanding of whether the market instability they are experiencing represents a 
short- term down-turn in the market, or a long-term shift in the structure of the industry. 
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          This perception and awareness of changes that vulnerable people face ultimately shapes 
perception of available pathways towards adaptation.
 Furthermore, the livelihoods approach provides concepts with which to evaluate 
the outcomes of responses of local populations to changing social, economic, 
demographic and environmental conditions. I use the concept of sustainability to evaluate 
the outcomes of responses to an unstable market in terms of their contributions to 
enhancing well-being for the tobacco growing households and for the community at 
large. Sustainability, which refers to the ability of a social or environmental system to 
withstand and recover from shocks (Scoones 1998), can be usefully employed to evaluate 
the effects of interventions on the long-term wellbeing on the environment and on social 
systems. I think about enhancing sustainability through promotion of wholesome 
adaptation, reduction of exposure to shocks, and enhancing a community’s internal 
capacity to respond to shocks. Specifically, I use the concept of livelihood adaptation 
to examine processes of adjustment to cropping systems and economic enterprises that 
enhance incomes as well as reduce vulnerability - which refers to a particular group’s 
exposure to shocks and internal capacity to respond to shocks (Chambers 2006). Further 
to this, I employ the concept of human capabilities to examine if current responses to an 
uncertain tobacco market enhance the community’s internal capacity to respond to this 
and future crises. Human capability speaks to increased humans’ potential to act and be 
in their environment, which ultimately allows people to perceive and respond to changes 
in their environment (Sen 1997). By employing the concepts of adaptation, vulnerability 
and human capabilities, I unpack and address the broader concept of sustainability.
 In chapter three I elaborate on the theoretical frameworks as I employ them to 
examine the institutional context of tobacco production in Malawi as it relates to the live-
lihoods of smallholder growers.
     1.3 Overview Methods
 I employed an ethnographic approach to study the local dynamics of tobacco 
farming in Kumala, a tobacco growing village near Mitundu trading center in Lilongwe 
district, Malawi. The village is one of several nested between two large tobacco estates 
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          previously owned by Press Agriculture, where many people from the area, including 
those from Kumala, worked as laborers or tenants. Here they got immersed in tobacco 
culture and the fine arts of setting, harvesting and curing Burley tobacco. When Burley 
was liberalized for smallholders, these laborers and tenants rushed to lease out parcels 
of land and strike out on their own. In this way Burley replaced dark-fired tobacco as the 
key cash crop for the community. At Kumala I studied the economic rationality of
tobacco farming as well as the cultural meanings attached to this crop. I also explored the 
local collective memory of dealing with market shocks to understand how locals view the 
current instability in the tobacco market.
 The location of Kumala at the periphery of Lilongwe city, which is the center for 
marketing, processing and administrative functions of the tobacco industry, best 
exemplifies the marginalization of growers in relation to the industry at large. For me the 
relatively close distances allowed me to traverse the sites of production and the board 
rooms of institutions that govern the production and marketing of tobacco. I also visit-
ed the tobacco auction floors to acquaint myself with the marketing process, the quality 
preferences of buyers, and growers’ experiences of the marketing process. During my 
interactions with respondents I was always aware of my privilege and burden as a native, 
but western educated researcher (Alcade 2007). Being a local, I could connect with the 
locals easily, but wearing the hat of a researcher meant that often times my respondents 
had expectations of immediate gratification from me. As a native researcher there were 
aspects of farming and village life that my respondents expected me to know. My 
questions on such matters brought incredulous looks and laughter in some cases.
 As a researcher I was also cognizant of my position with regards to the tobacco 
industry. Throughout my professional life, including as a Portfolio Officer in an agricul-
tural lending institution and as a Program Manager in a Non-Profit Organization focused 
on issues of economic justice, I have been tuned into the controversies surrounding the 
tobacco industry, including allegations of exploitation of tenants, child labor and 
environmental degradation. During fieldwork I was always aware of the danger of falling 
into a methodological and scientific populism-a populism that would make me throw out 
the pursuit of empirical rigor for findings that confirm my perceptions (de Sardan 2015). 
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          I remained cognizant that the use of sound methodological procedures of investigation 
and the pursuit of empirically founded interpretations, are the only means of 
transforming my exploration of a subject I was passionate about into an instrument of 
knowledge. I aimed to achieve empirical rigor by developing unbiased data collection 
instruments, and sampling both growers and non-growers. I included in my samples those 
growers who were prosperous and were passionate about growing tobacco as long as it 
remained a legal crop, as well as those who were struggling to make a living out of 
tobacco. Finally, I checked my interpretation about local social and economic dynamics 
with agricultural extension development officers at regional offices.
 
     1.4 Findings in Brief
 Findings indicate that most growers realize that the tobacco market is erratic, as 
evidenced by unstable prices and ever changing demands from the industry. They also 
realize there are fundamental changes in the industry as evidenced by the greater 
involvement of tobacco leaf companies in financing the production of the crop. While 
growers deploy their repertoire of strategies to cope with an unstable market, not many 
can tie structural changes to the long-term viability of the crop. Many have a positive 
outlook to the long-term prospects of the crop. This could be tied to the actions of the 
tobacco companies in creating a positive outlook as well as the failure of market 
institutions to play a key role conveying the appropriate signals to growers.
 The enduring presence of tobacco among smallholders is by and large due to the 
amount of money it brings in a good season. But the hit and miss nature of tobacco 
farming, the experience of loss at the hands of a fluctuating and unstable market and the 
often painful road to recovery, suggests that other factors do contribute towards the 
centrality of tobacco farming in this area. At Kumala tobacco is ingrained into young 
people’s imaginations of growing up and independence, and it conjures notions of 
security and status among older men. Smallholders view the current market instability 
through their lens of their relationship to the State and its institutions on one hand, and 
tobacco leaf companies on the other. Smallholders’ consciousness of marginalization 
in relation to the state (“who are we?”) formed from years of experience of the State’s 
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          treatment of smallholders and self-blame in the face of uncertainty contribute to a state of 
inertia where smallholders are preoccupied with the short-term rather than the viability 
of tobacco based livelihoods in the long-term. The presence and actions of tobacco leaf 
companies obviate the need for long-term planning to adapt to a future of uncertainty 
and reduced incomes. The study also found that unstable tobacco market and declining 
incomes have set in motion processes of migration and stratification of land ownership. 
These processes are interlinked and they are likely to cause palpable changes on the rural 
social landscape.
Limitations of the Study
 The study’s single-site design precluded a potentially rich cross-site comparison 
which affects the generalizability of the results for several reasons. Kumala village is 
in many ways a typical Malawian village but it has some unique differences that may 
not make it representative of other villages. This being an area in close proximity to the 
Mozambican border it represents opportunities for work and trading across the border, 
dynamics that may not be available in other equally stressed areas. Limitations of time 
and resources prevented a robust design that would have allowed a comparison of two or 
more sites with different dynamics.
 The second limitation is minimal data on labor migration. Questions about 
family members involved in labor migration were not included in the initial census as the 
researcher only stumbled on this phenomenon well after the study had already began. By 
that time, it was already the beginning of the growing season and many labor migrants 
had already left. This made it difficult to establish the extent of labor migration from the 
area. Although case study households were asked about members involved in labor 
migration on the second cycle of interviewing, which allowed me to interview a few 
returning migrants, it is difficult to generalize their experiences to the whole community.
 Nevertheless scholars (de Sardaan 2015; Stake 1994) argue that in-depth small scale 
studies with attention to historical processes not only reveal context, depth and specificity 
of a phenomenon, but also help researchers work through the epistemological question of 
how much can be learned from a specific context, and how much of that can be 
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          extrapolated to other contexts.
 As a further limitation, data on income is based on self-reporting which might be 
unreliable. Indeed some respondents were uncomfortable to show their income.
Delimitations
 Other aspects of the topic were beyond the scope of this study. I did not 
investigate other areas of the rural sector impacted by a declining tobacco economy such 
as trade and services. In addition, I did not directly investigate the impact of a declining 
tobacco economy on other welfare aspects including poverty, food security and nutrition.
     1.5 Overview of the Dissertation
 Going forward, the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter two provides the 
historical context of tobacco production in Malawi and the involvement of the state in 
agriculture. The development of the state and agriculture in Malawi are intertwined and 
the state’s handling of agriculture shaped and reinforced class and labor relations. 
Chapter two lays the foundation for a discussion on how state-smallholder relations 
influence farmers’ perception of risk and the adaptive responses available to them.
 Chapter three elaborates on the theoretical frameworks employed in the study. 
Here I discuss how I draw on scholarship on agrarian political economy to understand 
changes in global agriculture, but also how these influence changes the rural economy. To 
compliment my understanding on how structural change in agriculture impacts the 
livelihoods of rural producers, I draw on livelihoods literature to bring to the fore the 
context that mediates growers’ livelihoods with a focus on key trends such as market 
instability, but also the institutions that help smallholders cope and recover from 
livelihood shocks. In this chapter I also discuss my approach to this ethnographic study 
and the methods I used to collect data.
 Chapter four introduces my field site at Kumala as well as the community and
the farm families whose stories are told in this dissertation. I discuss Kumala as a place in 
contradiction to centers where marketing and policy decisions affecting rural livelihoods 
are made. I further discuss the residents of Kumala, their livelihood activities, the 
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          households and the social organization for production. I also discuss the central role of 
tobacco in reproducing the household and the community.
 Chapter five describes the institutional setting of tobacco production, marketing 
and regulation in Malawi. Here I discuss the key actors in the tobacco establishment and 
their interests, power relations in the industry, as well as their attitudes and actions of 
key actors in relation to the current tobacco market instability. The chapter highlights the 
social relations in the industry, especially the separation between the tobacco 
establishment and the growers, and the mechanisms including rents and other means of 
surplus extraction that allows for the maintenance of a large and opaque institutional set 
up to the disadvantage of the growers.
 Chapter six discusses the structural changes that the tobacco industry has gone 
through in recent years. It highlights the ways in which global processes such as trade 
liberalization, anti-smoking public health initiatives, and changing production and 
consumption patterns have altered the tobacco industry. In this chapter I also highlight 
how these changes have translated into the local industry in Malawi, and among 
smallholders.
 Chapter seven describes growers’ responses to key questions, and integrates these 
with results from the other data chapters to provide a picture of growers’ perceptions of
the current market instability, and of the long-term viability of tobacco livelihoods. It 
describes the specifics of how smallholders view the state, a how its institutions are 
managing the tobacco industry, and how these views shape growers perception of the 
fortunes of tobacco based livelihoods. 
 Chapter eight is the conclusion chapter that ties together discussions on 
smallholders’ experiences of market instability in the short term and their perception of 
long-term viability of tobacco to the role of tobacco market institutions in shaping risk 
awareness. It also ties the persistence of tobacco farming to the place of tobacco in the 
household in the village economy as well as the socio-cultural meanings attached to 
tobacco farming at Kumala.
 Ultimately, this dissertation addresses the broader question, can rural farm 
families perceive and respond to global changes in agriculture? And if they do respond, 
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          what are those responses going to look like? Specifically, this study investigates the link 
between perception and adaptation. Are growers who correctly perceive risk likely to 
dedicate resources and time to respond to future threats to their livelihoods? What role 
does the social, cultural and economic context in which play to allow options for 
smallholders to respond in a sustainable manner? In Malawi, state institutions and 
policies have long influenced farm livelihoods. The state and its institutions protected 
producers from the vagaries of the world market, and ensured the reproduction of rural 
life. This dissertation investigates if, with the state institutional apparatus dismantled, 
smallholders can perceive long term threats on their own and make corresponding 
decisions. I argue that the involvement and then disorderly withdrawal of the state from 
smallholder agriculture, and the actions of leaf companies and other agents in the 
tobacco industry act in concert to reduce the capacity of smallholders to respond to 
long-term threats. The next chapter explores the history of the state and smallholders in 
Malawi to foreground this discussion.
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          Chapter Two: History and Context of Tobacco Production and Marketing in Malawi
     2.0 Introduction
 In order to understand contemporary dynamics of tobacco dependent livelihoods 
in Malawi, we need to grapple with the long history of tobacco in Malawi and its role in 
the making and entrenchment of the state as an overlord over economic and political lives 
of Malawians as we know it today. Tobacco underpins Malawi’s economy. It generates 
60% of foreign earnings and it contributes 13% of total GDP (NSO 2012). But tobacco is 
more than economics. It is a commodity whose tentacles traverse the political, social and 
economic lives of Malawians. Tobacco has also structured the physical landscape through 
environmental processes (Geist et al 2007; Tobin et al 1998) as well as the social 
landscape through, among other things, labor migration (CFSC 2015; Kafundu 2005). 
Most importantly for this study, production and marketing of tobacco generates 
livelihoods for thousands of smallholder farmers like the ones at Kumala and other 
tobacco growing communities. As smallholders at Kumala go through the motions of 
preparing for the growing season, as they tend to their tobacco, and as they take their 
tobacco to the market, they do so under the auspices of state regulation and policies that 
go back in history. These policies and regulations, shaped over decades within 
specific notions of roles and attitudes of the state towards smallholders, have in turn 
shaped relations of smallholders towards the state. Such policies and regulations 
determine what types of tobacco smallholders are allowed to grow, what resources and 
support they have access to, who they sell their crop to, and how much they get paid for 
it. The relations between the state and the smallholders forged under these interactions 
have long shaped smallholders understanding of the influence of the state in ensuring 
the smooth functioning of the tobacco industry, and along with that, the notions of what 
smallholders consider to be threats and risks to their tobacco based livelihoods.
 In this chapter I outline the history of tobacco in Malawi to show the role of 
tobacco in making the state, and structuring the political and social landscape of the 
country. Through an account of the development of tobacco as a key commodity crop, 
and the key events along the way, I highlight the origin of the policies and regulations
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          used by the state to manage the industry from infancy up to the present. I further highlight 
how the state’s management of tobacco structured labor and class relations. Ultimately, 
the goal is to show how these divisions influence smallholders’ perceptions
of the source of instability in the tobacco market and the causes of declining tobacco 
incomes. The chapter also illustrates the development of Malawi’s tobacco industry in 
a global context. On its way to becoming the dominant industry in Malawi, tobacco has 
had to contend with, and sometimes benefited from, political and market processes in the 
British empire and beyond. I end the chapter with a discussion of the state of tobacco in 
Malawi at present, and the contemporary issues surrounding tobacco farming.
     2.1 A Brief History of Tobacco Production and Marketing in Malawi
 Tobacco has a very long history in Malawi. From the pre-colonial era, tobacco 
believed to be of American origin, introduced by the Portuguese in the 1500s, was 
already being grown and consumed in Nyasaland, the present day Malawi. This was 
Nicotiana rustica, a wild type of tobacco famed for its high nicotine content. Locally 
known as “labu,” it was widely consumed as snuff and was used for communal 
pipe- smoking among different ethnic groups across the country. Tobacco was also a 
common article of trade between the Kazembe Kingdom, the largest pre-colonial political 
entity in present day Zambia (see figure 2.1), and west of Nyasaland (Rangeley 1957). 
Modern day tobacco farming was introduced by John Buchanan, a Scotsman who came 
to Nyasaland as an employee of the Blantyre Mission of the Presbyterian Church, when 
he planted the first tobacco crop of the commercial type Nicotiana tobacum in Blantyre 
township in 1889. In 1893 Buchanan made the first recorded export of tobacco to Britain. 
This forty pounds of sun cured tobacco packed in a local hardwood cask, carried by barge 
down the Shire and Zambezi rivers to the east coast of the continent was the beginning 
of an enormous industry on which the economy of the future nation of Malawi would be 
built (Wilshaw 1994).
 Buchanan’s pioneering experiment with tobacco was soon followed by other 
individuals and companies. Ross Stark and Robert Hynde started a 1737 acre Songani 
Estate in Zomba and produced their first crop in 1893, and the following year they 
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          exported 2000 pounds of tobacco to a firm in Salisbury, present day Harare, Zimbabwe.
Other companies included the Blantyre and East Africa Company who had tobacco 
estates in Zomba and Chiradzulu districts, British Central Africa Company in Blantyre 
and the Africa Lakes Company who started growing tobacco at their estates in 
Mulanje (Wilshaw 1994 and Rangeley 1957). Other individual settlers also developed 
estates in the districts of Blantyre, Zomba, Chiradzulu, Mulanje and Thyolo, an area 
generally called the Shire Highlands (see figure 2.2). Besides exports, the beginning of 
tobacco farming also sparked a significant domestic industry. In 1893, when the first 
export was made 6,720 pounds of processed tobacco were consumed locally (Rangeley 
1957, Wilshaw 1994).
Figure 2.1: Map of Africa and Milawi
Source: REPDC Green. http://repdc-green.com/page_id1094
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          Figure 2.2: Map of Malawi
Source: Maps of the World http://www.mapsofworld.com/malawi/
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          The rise of tobacco as a commodity was rooted in colonialism and state building 
as I elaborate later in this chapter. While the beginnings of the tobacco industry in 
Nyasaland owe a lot to private initiative, the rise of the crop was very much in line with 
the aspirations of the administration of the newly declared protectorate for a white settler, 
plantation based agriculture to propel the economy of Nyasaland. Initially the 
government, together with settler farmers - including Buchanan himself - looked to
coffee as the crop that would build the economy of the protectorate. Between 1890 -1900 
coffee was Nyasaland's major export after which it declined and cotton took its place up 
until 1905, when it too declined. Thereafter, the colonial administration started to pay 
serious attention to tobacco, and tobacco assumed the mantle of the key export crop. 
Initial attempts to find major export markets were thwarted by lack of knowledge of 
curing, and lack of reliable and affordable means to transport bulk tobacco to the coast 
from a land locked country. During inquiries for exports, Nyasaland tobacco received 
favorable responses but was deemed not ready for the market for lack of proper curing 
(Wilshaw 1994). In 1902, Blantyre and East Africa Ltd invited two Americans from 
Virginia to teach the company's farm supervisors proper techniques for curing flue-cured 
tobacco (Rangeley 1957). The crop of that year received favorable reviews on both the 
export market and domestic market. The completion in 1907 of the Railway from Nsanje 
at the southern tip of the country to Blantyre, then the center of tobacco production and 
processing in Nyasaland, was quickly followed by the arrival in 1908 of Imperial 
Tobacco Company (ITC) who set up a buying station in Limbe, a few miles from
Blantyre. ITC were initially only interested in Bright leaf tobacco (Flue-cured). But the 
arrival of ITC also brought with it divisions and alienation within the industry. ITC 
favored some settler growers over others, and demanded that only white settlers grow 
flue-cured tobacco as it was deemed too technical for African growers (Prowse 2010, 
Wilshaw 1994). This race and class based alienation would go on to  plague the industry 
for a very long time.
Africans and Tobacco
 Native Africans were not bystanders during the development of the tobacco in-
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          dustry as they quickly embraced this opportunity to grow a familiar crop on a commercial 
scale. The involvement of Africans in tobacco had significant economic and social 
ramifications. This section draws closely on Wilshaw’s (1994) account of the 
development of tobacco in Malawi.
 Africans in Nyasaland were closely involved in tobacco farming as laborers and 
tenants on settler tobacco estates, and as growers in their own right. As early as 1898
Hynde and Stark experimented with use of African tenants on their estates to take 
advantage of indigenous knowledge of growing and curing tobacco. They gave seeds to 
the tenants, and the company purchased the leaf. Soon after, local populations in the Shire 
highlands were growing tobacco as independent producers. Imperial Tobacco records 
indicate that in 1910 the company sent home to Britain native grown sun and air cured 
tobacco. The Blantyre East Africa Ltd, following in the footsteps of Hynde and Stark, 
resuscitated tenant farming. The company offered seed and instruction and the tenants 
grew both flue-cured and fire-cured tobacco. In 1917/18, government records showed that 
half a million pounds of African grown tobacco was produced that year (Wilshaw 1994).
 The surge in African involvement in tobacco farming accelerated when tobacco 
was introduced to the central province. In 1920 two settler growers, Andrew F. Barron
and Roy. J. Wallace who already had established tobacco estates in Zomba ventured to 
the central province. Lured by good soil and abundant labor, they obtained land at 
Mbabzi and Lingadzi, west of Lilongwe, the present day capital of Malawi. Here Barron 
set up an estate to grow flue-cured tobacco to sell to Imperial Tobacco Company. In 1922 
he invited Africans to grow fire-cured tobacco (also known as dark-fired) as tenants on 
his estate, and shortly after this expanded into an out-grower scheme that attracted native 
growers from the southern region. Barron gave seedlings to Africans living around his 
estates at Mbabzi, and he employed teams of instructors to advise them on production. In 
the first year, the scheme worked with 900 growers and realized 50 tons of tobacco which 
had to be head carried by porters from Lilongwe to Imperial Tobacco’s factory in Limbe, 
a distance of 200 miles. In a short time his scheme grew and expanded to the districts of 
Dowa and Kasungu. Owing to the lack of road infrastructure, he had to build a network
of roads to facilitate his scheme. With that, the production of African fire-cured tobacco
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          grew (Wilshaw 1994). The number of growers in the central region expanded from 900 in
1923 to 33,000 in 1926. Tobacco production from Lilongwe and Dowa districts soared 
from 24 tons, in1924, to 195 tons 1925, 890 in 1926 and 1244 tons in 1927. By 1932 the 
two districts were producing 3,879 tons; more than 50% of total tobacco production in
the country (Mc Cracken 1983). In 1927, another settler Inaco Conforzi leased 5000 acres 
in Lilongwe, around Namitete and initiated a visiting tenancy, which drew an estimated
4000 visiting tenants, mostly from the south. Here, tenants on his scheme grew sun cured 
tobacco which he transported for processing at his factory in Thyolo, in the southern 
region, and then for export to Belfast (Wilshaw 1994).
 The success of Barron and these early pioneers changed Nyasaland tobacco 
forever. Soon other settlers came to the central province to grow tobacco, and in time 
the locus of production in the country shifted from the southern province to the central 
region. Barron’s success attracted middlemen who came to buy tobacco grown by locals 
contracted to Barron without making any investment (Wilshaw 1994). The arrival of 
middlemen spurred production among African growers who found a way to pay hut tax 
without having to work for anyone (McCracken 1983). I elaborate more on the hut tax in 
this chapter under the section on Alienation of Labor. For Africans in the central region 
tobacco brought high income, and with it, affluence. There was demand for consumer 
goods in the local economy. Growers could now afford to buy goods like bicycles, 
hitherto prized possessions of teachers and government clerks. Inflation also became a 
problem. Prices for goats and chickens rose five times. The rise in numbers of 
growers and the resulting unplanned increase in production also brought with it problems 
of over-production and declining leaf quality as a result of using inferior seed and lack of 
adequate supervision. The government moved in and created the Native Tobacco Board 
(NTB) to regulate production and marketing of native tobacco (McCracken 1983; Prowse 
2010). This was the beginning of a long legacy of formal regulation and control that 
continues to shape the production and marketing of tobacco up to the present.
Malawi Tobacco on the Global Stage
 Malawi’s tobacco industry has always been affected by, and has had to respond to 
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          global political and market processes. To begin with, the spread of tobacco to Malawi
was through trade contacts with the Portuguese, and later through colonialism. As it 
matured, the industry had to contend with changing consumer tastes and preferences. 
Global patterns of tobacco consumption have undergone changes at various times, and 
with them, production and marketing patterns. The cigarette has not always been the most 
popular way of consuming tobacco. Before becoming the dominant form of tobacco 
consumption that we know today, the cigarette competed with the pipe, cigars, chewing 
and snuff which were all dominant forms of consumption at one time or the other. The 
adoption and incorporation of flue-cured tobacco popularized the cigarette in the
1860s (Goodman 1994). Changes in the nature of the tobacco crop and changes in 
marketing and manufacturing at global level have been associated with changes in labor 
organization for cultivation of tobacco. Flue-cured tobacco (also known as Bright 
tobacco), a distinct yellow color and light aroma leaf became highly sought after, and 
prices were consistently higher above the darker varieties (Goodman 1994 ). In 
Nyasaland, the lucrative and capital intensive flue-cured tobacco was exclusively grown 
on settler estates using direct wage labor. Africans grew sun, air and fire cured types. 
With the discovery of Burley consumer tastes changed, and for some time in the 1940’s it 
became the most lucrative type of tobacco in Nyasaland. Burley is an air cured, 
relatively low resource but labor intensive variety, suited for smallholder farmers. This 
was predominantly grown using the tenancy system in Nyasaland (Prowse 2010). Most 
settler growers in Nyasaland switched to Burley which was again designated as an 
exclusive crop for settler farmers. ). I discuss the tenancy system in more detail later in 
this chapter under the section Malawi Tobacco Today. 
 On the global market Nyasaland’s tobacco had to compete with primarily 
American produced tobacco as well as other tobaccos produced in the British empire. 
Initially at a disadvantage owing to low yields and high freight rates, the granting in 
1919 of the Imperial Preference (preferential access to the British market) gave a boost 
to Nyasaland tobacco and it was now able to compete with US tobacco, compensating 
for high freight rates and leading to a dramatic increase in the land area under production 
(Rangeley 1957). In 1927, the price of flue-cured leaf on the global market fell due to 
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          overproduction in Zimbabwe and Canada, and low demand in the UK. Estates became 
insolvent and many settlers went out of business. The decline of estates was a boon in 
estate tenant production. Tobacco produced by tenants rose from one million pounds in
1929 to five million pounds in 1939, and the number of tenants tripled. This growth in 
tenants occurred because of the market uncertainty - the remaining settler farmers wanted 
to share the risk of production with tenants (Prowse 2010).Today Malawi exports tobacco 
to 70 countries and Malawian growers compete with growers from key Burley producing 
countries like Brazil and the United States of America (Ortanez and Graen 2014).
     2.2 Tobacco, the State, and Smallholders
 Agriculture in general, and export crops like tobacco in particular, have been 
closely tied to state building processes under both the colonial and post-colonial 
governments. The production and marketing of export commodities structured relations 
between the state and smallholders, and shaped the distribution of surplus and risk from 
monetized and export oriented agriculture. Understanding the relationships between state 
and smallholders in historical and contemporary times requires attention to the role of 
state and non-state institutions in Malawi’s tobacco production. These institutions, both 
historically and in the current era, represent the interests of the land owning and trading 
classes. Thus, these institutional dynamics shape smallholders’ perception of risk and the 
long term viability of tobacco based livelihoods, as well as their responses to the 
on-going market instability.
 In this section, I trace the rise of tobacco from colonial times to illustrate the role 
of commodities in building both the colonial and post-colonial state and structuring 
relations between the state and smallholders. I draw on scholarship on social and 
economic histories of commodities in anthropology in the tradition of Sidney Mintz’s 
Sweetness and Power (1985) and Eric Wolf’s Europe and the People Without History 
(1982). After these pioneering works, other authors (Carney 2001; Norton 2008; 
Pendergrast 1999; Smith 2005) have adopted the historical approach to commodity 
systems to document how the production, trade and consumption of internationally traded 
commodities such as coffee, tea, sugar, rice and tobacco shaped the social, economic and 
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          political systems of both producing and consuming societies. These studies have shown 
that commodities can be used to show the interconnections of the local and the global,
and that they can be profitably used to study processes of globalization (Sick 2011) . 
Through trade, labor and other processes, commodities facilitated connections between 
local peoples and global polities in diverse forms of relationships, and facilitated the 
diffusion of knowledge systems across distant polities. In this chapter I focus on how 
these commodities were implicated in the colonial enterprise, and how the specific 
characteristics of the crops, production methods, processing and marketing left a 
distinct imprint on the social relations of production (Goodman 1994). For example, 
sugar and tea, commodities that require intensive capital for processing, were amenable 
to plantation production. Commodities like tobacco that require relatively low capital for 
production and where initial processing is less technically demanding, were amenable to 
production on small family holdings (with some exceptions to the relatively short lived 
American slave tobacco plantations), and other production arrangements like the tenancy 
system (Goodman 1994).
 These studies show the role of commodities in state building as well as in 
providing the foundations of economically viable countries. Furthermore, they show the 
role of colonial administrations as well as merchant and plantation owning classes in 
managing production and marketing of commodities, which led the structuring of labor 
and class relations between and among the native populations. Specifically, these studies 
highlight the division and alienation between the natives and their white colonial masters 
who used race as an organizing principle for colonial economic and consumer 
practices (Mintz 1985). At this point it is worth pointing out two of the key characteristics 
of tobacco as a commodity that we need to bear in mind as we think about tobacco in the 
colonial and post-colonial context: (i) tobacco does not benefit from economies of scale 
and as such small and large farm operations co-exist, and (ii) tobacco is labor intensive 
and it creates a tobacco culture among growing communities (Goodman 1994). But not 
all tobacco types are equally resource and labor intensive. As such, in the case of Malawi, 
it is easy to separate small-scale growers of low resource tobaccos from big scale growers 
of resource and technically intense tobaccos.
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          In Malawi the centrality of tobacco to the economy has been tied to processes of 
state building for over a century. The fortunes of tobacco shaped relations between the 
state and smallholders through the governance regime of institutions and regulations that 
governed the production, and marketing of the crop. Drawing on historical and 
contemporary sources, I outline the growth of agriculture and the policies and events that 
shaped the relationship between the state and smallholders. Both the colonial and 
post- colonial state actively maintained a division based on either race or class and 
alienated smallholders. The approach of the colonial and post-colonial state towards the 
management of smallholder agriculture was to "regulate and control," characterized by 
arbitrariness in decision making, and a lack of transparency which facilitated the 
exploitation of smallholders by elites and by the state itself. This historical perspective 
is useful in understanding how smallholders' view of the state, and how a consciousness 
of their own marginalization in national and agricultural development processes is used 
to interpret the causes of the current market instability and the livelihood crisis among 
tobacco farmers. I argue that the dynamics of relations between smallholders and the state 
precludes the promotion of adaptive capacities of smallholders.
 In the following sections I discuss the mechanisms employed by the state to 
control production and marketing of smallholder crops, including use of legislation and 
the creation of commodity marketing boards. Following other authors (Ng’ong’ola 1986; 
Prowse 2010), I discuss four phases in the history of agriculture in Malawi. The first 
phase covers the colonial period from the time Britain declared Nyasaland (Malawi) a 
Protectorate. The second phase starts after independence from 1964 when the new 
Malawi Government took over up to 1979; a period that coincided with phenomenal 
economic growth driven by the agricultural sector. The third phase is from 1981, the 
dawn of the era of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), in which agricultural policy 
came within the purview of International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The fourth stage
starts from 1994 when multiparty politics was introduced, and with it, a different but even 
more politicized intervention in agriculture by the State.
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            2.2.1 The Colonial State and Agriculture
 Export oriented agriculture has been widely implicated in the entrenchment of 
the colonial system. In a bid to make colonies self-sustaining, Britain and other colonial 
powers worked to develop plantation crops like coffee, sugar, tobacco and tea (Rotberg
1983; Shillington 2012; Vail 1983). In the same vein, the colonial government in
 Nyasaland considered agriculture the engine of growth, given that Nyasaland had no 
mineral deposits worth exploiting. At the time Nyasaland was declared a British 
Protectorate in 1891, coffee was the major export crop grown by a small settler 
community. Realizing the need to generate taxes for the administration of the 
Protectorate, the colonial government promoted export crops such as tea, cotton and 
tobacco, in addition to coffee. Furthermore, believing in the supremacy of European 
plantation agriculture, the government of Sir Harry Johnston, the first Governor of 
Nyasaland, was keen to attract a white settler community to stay in Nyasaland and 
practice plantation, export oriented, agriculture which would drive the economy 
(Malekano 1999). One characteristic of the role of the colonial state in agriculture was its 
commitment to a dual system of agriculture, one oriented towards settler plantation 
agriculture, and the other towards smallholders. Once smallholders had adopted cash 
cropping, the state maintained separate systems to regulate production and marketing of 
crops grown on estates and those grown by smallholders. In the early years of the 
protectorate, most of the settler farmers were under-capitalized to successfully undertake 
agriculture on the scale desired by government. But through the powerful Chamber of 
Commerce and Agriculture, they pressured the colonial government to facilitate
profitable production of plantation agriculture, and allow them to have monopoly over 
local trade (Chipeta 1986). The government was only happy to oblige, and thus began a 
series agricultural policies and interventions to promote settler agriculture, most of which 
came at the expense of smallholders. The most notable interventions are the alienation 
of land, and extraction of native labor; the two key areas which shaped the relationship 
between peasants and the state from the early days of the Protectorate up to
independence.
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          Alienation of Land
 The earliest intervention of the colonial government was through alienation of 
land from local African populations, accomplished through the conquest and pacification 
of Yao, Chewa and Ngoni chiefs. Harry Johnston alienated over 3 million hectares of 
native land between 1891 and 1894 which was given to companies and individual settlers 
(Chipeta 1986). Most of the alienated land was in the Shire Highlands especially the
 districts of Thyolo and Mulanje where settlers opened up tea and coffee estates. 
Unalienated land was designated Crown Land (also called African Trust Lands), 
meaning it belonged to the State and ultimately, to the Queen of England (Malekano 
1999, Kandawire 1977). The development of estates in the Shire highlands resulted into 
severe land shortages for the local population, further compounded by the arrival of 
Lhomwe immigrants from Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). This land shortage 
became a source of unrest among the local African population and together with other 
grievances culminated in an uprising in 1915, and ultimately gave birth to the 
independence movement. Settler farmers and companies resisted efforts of the colonial 
government to ease the pressure of land among the locals. Baker (1993) details how at 
one point the colonial government sought to buy back idle land from the British Central 
African Company (BCAC) to resettle the displaced natives, a move that was resisted by 
the company.
Extraction of Labor
 In addition to giving white farmers land, the colonial government enacted a 
number of laws and regulations to create a labor reserve for settler farmers. From 1892, 
the government imposed a hut tax on men and a poll tax on women to ensure that instead 
of working on their own farm plots for subsistence, locals would find paid employment 
on settler estates, earn a wage and pay their taxes (Vail 1982). To further ensure 
availability of labor for the settler farmers, and to solve the problem of landless 
immigrants from Portuguese East Africa who were flooding into the southern province, a
system called thangata was promoted in favor of settlers. The system required that male 
heads of households living on settler estates due to shortage of land provide labor to the 
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          estates in lieu of rent. Thangata was associated with excesses of labor mistreatment of 
locals by settlers. For example, household heads were required to work one month in 
a year in lieu of rent and another month of work for the hut tax- tax levied on a hut or 
a household. Often estate owners would arbitrarily extend the period up to six months 
(Kandawire 1977). The fortunes of commodity crops was linked to labor relations in the 
Protectorate. The growth of the tobacco industry after the First World War, boosted by the 
Imperial Preference led to increased production of flue-cured tobacco. This increased the 
need for native labor and with it, the excesses of estate owners with thangata.
 The move to tax natives triggered two key processes that affected local 
agriculture and the social fabric of the country at large. Firstly, apart from pushing locals 
into wage labor, the imposition of taxes also pushed natives into commodity agriculture 
where they began to grow crops for sale. Mostly, the locals grew food crops for sale to 
meet increased demand from a growing population in the Shire Highlands (McCracken 
2012). Those who were able, took to commercial production of dark and sun fired 
tobacco which they sold to settler farmers and later to approved markets when these 
became available (Rangeley 1957, Wilshaw 1994). Thus through trying to promote 
plantation agriculture at the expense of the subsistence of local populations, the 
colonial government inadvertently triggered the growth of peasant commodity 
agriculture. Secondly, following the imposition of taxes some natives began to migrate 
to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa to take advantage of higher wages 
in mines and plantations there. Nyasaland settler farmers were locked in a competition 
for labor with labor recruiters from those two countries. The poor working conditions on 
settler estates in the Shire Highlands made it difficult for them to attract enough locals 
willing to work for them. Under pressure from the settlers, the government moved in to 
stem the flow of cross border migration and ensure labor supply for local plantations. 
The government decreed that natives on plantations must enter into written contracts 
with their employers for a period of 6 months which was later increased to 12 months to 
ensure that local natives stayed with and supplied labor to the settler farmers for a longer 
period (Chipeta 1986).This decree was not very successful at keeping the locals at home, 
and the migration train that followed ultimately shaped the social relations, the economy 
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          and ultimately the politics of the country in fundamental ways.
A Note on Local Resistance
 Although local resistance to policies and interventions of the government is 
peripheral to the story of the growth of tobacco production in Malawi, it is important to 
recognize that Africans were not just helpless pawns in the colonial economic system. 
Local populations protested through everyday forms of resistance and in some cases, 
overt organized rebellion to the various policies of land alienation, taxation and forced
 labor recruitment. Africans resisted forced labor through absenteeism, desertions, 
frequent changes of place and name, voluntary unemployment, and through migrating to 
South Africa or Zimbabwe. To protest against land alienation and the resulting land 
shortages, locals encroached on reserved forest lands, deliberately violating forestry law. 
In addition, to protest against government policies that sought to curtail African 
involvement in the cash economy by encouraging Africans to only grow maize and other 
food crops, Africans grew cotton and other types of tobacco which eventually forced the 
colonial government to establish markets to cater to African growers. Ultimately, the 
policies of the colonial government and the treatment of the locals by settler farmers 
gave rise to resentment among locals culminating into the 1915 Chilembwe. In the 1950s 
Africans rioted against forced agricultural practices in several districts in the central and 
southern regions and orchestrated violence against chiefs seen to be in colluding with 
the colonial government. The government’s failure to satisfactorily resolve these issues 
meant that for a number of years trouble was brewing and this led to the birth of the 
independence movement (Chipeta 1986, Malekano 1999, Mulwafu 1999). While 
acknowledging these forms of resistance, I emphasize the policies of the government to 
highlight the relations between the state and smallholders shaped the agricultural sector.
Regulation and Control
 Another key element of the colonial government’s dual agriculture strategy was 
the exclusion of natives from lucrative crops; limiting their production so they did not 
compete with the settlers. The government limited the participation of Africans in the 
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          production of lucrative crops such as flue-cured and burley tobacco, and plantation crops 
such as tea. From 1908 African natives were prohibited from growing flue-cured tobacco 
which was exclusively reserved for estates. In 1908 when the Imperial Tobacco Com-
pany started buying tobacco from Nyasaland, the company decreed that it would only 
buy flue- cured tobacco from white growers, as it was deemed too technical for African 
growers (Wilshaw 1994). When Burley became the most lucrative variety in the 1950s, 
Africans were again forbidden from growing the crop (Prowse 2010). They could grow 
other tobacco varieties including the dark-fired and oriental varieties, but not flue-cured 
and Burley.
 Over the years, as African participation in agriculture and production of cash 
crops grew, some settlers realized that there was money to be made buying and selling 
native produce. The state also realized the benefits of letting peasants grow some cash 
crops (Ng’ong’ola 1986). With diverging interests among settlers, and with native pro-
ducers and entrepreneurs beginning to assert themselves, the state realized that it could 
not continue to exert control by decree. It resorted to more sophisticated ways of con-
trolling and regulating smallholder agriculture through legislation.
Legislation
 In this section I draw on the work of Ng’ong’ola (1986) to discuss how the 
colonial government enacted laws to regulate the production and marketing of native 
crops. Legislation focused on registration of growers, licensing of traders, exporters and 
their trading premises and the establishment of commodity marketing boards. The 
legislation on production and marketing of native produced crops was to control quality, 
increase production and stabilize growers’ incomes. On close examination, this 
legislation was meant to further the duality of agriculture and to separate the country 
along racial lines. Some pieces of legislation related to control of production. Through 
such legislation the colonial government shaped the social and physical landscape of 
agriculture in Nyasaland. Through the Department of Agriculture, the government 
decided which crops should be grown, where and by whom. An example is legislation 
governing the use of Crown lands, the class of land inhabited by African natives. No 
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          export crops like flue-cured tobacco, coffee and tea could be grown on such lands.
 Some pieces of legislation focused on control of marketing. The colonial 
government kept a tight grip on exchange and distribution processes in the agricultural 
sector. Legislation was enacted to ensure that only Europeans and Asians had 
exclusive rights to buy and sell produce (legumes, maize etc) produced by Africans on 
crown land. This was to forestall the growth of an African merchant class that could 
challenge the settlers’ monopoly on the market. Some aspects of legislation controlled 
how much money flowed into the native economy. The cotton export ordinance of 1910 
restrained unlicensed buyers from offering high prices for cotton produced by Africans 
as a way to discourage independent African production. The 1912 Food Crops Ordinance 
empowered the Governor to restrict settler estate owners from trading in native food 
stuffs. The stated objective of the ordinance was to protect Africans from selling all their 
food which would lead to hunger. The Tobacco Ordinance of 1926 created the Native 
Tobacco Board, an institution that shaped the development of the tobacco industry from 
then on (Wilshaw 1994).
 Analysts note that legislation failed to meet objectives of stabilizing incomes or 
restricting exploitative activities of intermediate traders. In some cases the 
implementation of legislation was outright disastrous. For example, the Maize Control 
Board Ordinance of 1946 prohibited the sale and disposal of surplus maize without the 
authorization of the Board. The implementation of this ordinance restricted trading, 
and reduced the availability of maize supplies on the market as growers withheld their 
produce. When three years later the rains failed, the poor sighted activities of the Board 
resulted in the infamous Nyasaland famine of 1949. The lasting legacy of this trend to 
control via legislation is that legislation formulated under a paternalistic gaze of the state 
gave blanket powers to administrators allowing them to impose, from time to time, “any 
set of rules  and regulation they saw fit to promote agriculture” (Ng’ong’ola 1986, 24). 
This is a legacy that continues to plague the management of agriculture even under the 
modern state.
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          Commodity Marketing Boards
 The colonial government also set up an institutional structure to control the 
production and marketing of peasant economic crops. The commodity boards had 
exclusive responsibility over production and marketing processes for particular 
commodities including supply of inputs, collection, transportation, storage, processing 
and resale of commodities (Ng’ong’ola 1986). Some of the notable commodity boards 
in Nyasaland included the Maize Control Board, the British Cotton Growers Association 
and the Native Tobacco Board. I dwell on the Native Tobacco Board and the Maize 
Ordinance Board to highlight the extent of their activities and the control they exercised
 over the affairs of native agriculture, their inept policy making and the hostility they 
evoked among the local African populations.
 McCracken (1983) has outlined the controversial role of the Native Tobacco 
Board (NTB) in stifling the growth of tobacco production among natives in Nyasaland. 
The Tobacco ordinance of 1926 created the Native Tobacco Board to supervise and assist 
native growers. This became necessary in the wake of Barron and Wallace’s success with 
tobacco out-grower schemes in the central province. The NTB was created to regulate 
production and marketing of native tobacco but in effect it became a tool used by 
settlers like Barron to promote their own interests and to control peasant production. The 
NTB reduced the number of markets where buyers could buy African produced tobacco. 
Whereas previously buyers could pitch up wherever they liked and proceed to buy 
tobacco from smallholders, the NTB reduced these to eight places in the central province 
and further reduced them to three by 1933. In the 1932-33 growing season, the NTB 
expanded efforts to limit the actual acreage of tobacco Africans could grow to only half
of previous year’s production. But this regulation was not even-handed. At this time the 
world economy was in depression and it made sense to cut production of tobacco. 
Instead, the NTB allowed settler production to increase even as it was forcing cuts in 
smallholder production (McCracken 1983).
 Other than controlling native production, the commodity boards were also 
mechanisms for the extraction of surplus from smallholders. In 1931, the British Cotton 
Growers Association (BCGA) was granted an exclusive right to buy cotton produced by 
36
          Africans with a condition to remit half of its profits to the government (Ng’ong’ola 1986). 
Tobacco followed the same route. In 1937, the NTB established an auction market and 
took on the monopoly of buying all African produced tobacco which it sold to 
major exporters on auction on behalf of the smallholders. This put a stop to the 
activities of intermediate traders. Initially the NTB supported itself with a tax levied on 
every pound of African grown tobacco. With the introduction of the auction market the 
tax was abandoned. Instead, the NTB collected their revenue from a “working margin” 
which was the difference between the price NTB received on the auction market and the 
price it paid to growers. This was a mechanism for extracting surplus from the peasants. 
For example, in 1938, the NTB pocketed 44.27% of the proceeds from tobacco it sold 
on auction on behalf of smallholders. The next year, 53% of proceeds from smallholder 
tobacco sales went to the NTB. This means that the grower only received 47% of the 
proceeds from his tobacco. Throughout the 1930s falling prices caused discontent among 
African growers. Between 1935-39 average smallholder earnings from tobacco declined 
by half (McCracken 1983). Meanwhile the NTB was flush with money and began to take 
on financial responsibilities that would normally be the responsibility of government, 
including funding a research station, building a European hospital in Lilongwe, and 
paying salaries of a mini-civil service (McCracken 1983). In 1937 a record production of 
native tobacco was followed by a collapse of prices. There were riots and smallholders 
abandoned production en masse.
 The above section outlined the policies and interventions the colonial state used 
to control African agriculture. In the process these policies and interventions shaped the 
views of smallholders towards the state. At the very least, the peasants saw the state as an 
entity consumed with putting controls on their ambitions for self-improvement through
the accumulation of wealth. In addition, the state portrayed itself as a self-serving entity 
that only came to smallholders when it needed to fulfill its own goals. Although the 
colonial state implemented policies to suppress peasant agriculture, when it suited the 
purposes of the state, it moved with energy to promote specific crops for Africans. When 
settler agriculture faltered with the fall of flue-cured tobacco prices in 1927, the 
government turned to peasants to boost production of dark-fired tobacco as an export crop 
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          (McCracken 1983). In another example, Kerr (2010) describes the efforts of the colonial 
government to promote groundnuts as a cash crop in the northern province following 
a decline in hut tax revenues. It was envisaged that growing groundnuts would enable 
women left behind by migrating husbands to pay hut tax.
 At worst, smallholders viewed the state as actively antagonistic towards them. 
The exploitative practices and heavy handedness of commodity boards such as the NTB 
and the Maize Control Board towards African farmers at times resulted in unstable 
production of tobacco and maize. The activities of the government’s agricultural
apparatus including commodity boards were resented by Africans for their part in forcing
 the implementation of measures focused on soil and water conservation. Natives were 
ordered to build bunds (embankments used to control the flow of rain water), channels 
and other earth works to arrest increasing rates of soil erosion. The harsh enforcement 
of these measures created ill feelings among the native populations towards the colonial 
government (Mulwafu 1999). The Maize Control Board was the focus of intense hostility 
among African nationalists for its part in restricting trade on food items and creating 
conditions that led to mass starvation. The colonial state’s role in agriculture also 
exemplifies arbitrariness in decision making and flip-flopping on policy matters. For 
example, when the NTB took a monopoly over native produced tobacco it prevented 
intermediate traders from buying native produced tobacco. When after a few years it ran 
into financial difficulties, the intermediaries were allowed back on the market. The 
monopoly experiment of the British Cotton Growers Association only lasted one year,
and when the association ran into financial trouble, intermediaries were allowed back into 
cotton marketing. The overzealous control of the Maize Control Board to restrict trading 
and curb the activities of intermediate traders led to a famine, and intermediaries were 
again allowed back. Such arbitrariness in policy matters was inherited by the post-
colonial state and plagues the country to this day. Understanding this history of arbitrary 
policy intervention helps shed some light on lack of diversification and growth in the 
agricultural sector.
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            2.2.2 The Post-Colonial State and Agriculture
 Historians note that after independence, the new government never made a real 
break with the policies of the colonial government (Vail 1982). The new government fol-
lowed the same dual strategy in agriculture where estates were encouraged to grow export 
crops to drive economic growth, and smallholder agriculture was meant to ensure food 
security for the population. The government favored estate agriculture and did everything 
to promote the subsector. The only thing that had changed was an increase in elite Afri-
cans owning estates.
Land Alienation
 Local land alienation continued as it did under the colonial government. In 
addition to facilitating allocation of land to senior civil servants and party officials (the 
new elite in independence era), thereby transforming customary land into estates at the 
expense of villagers, government owned companies ventured into estate agriculture. 
Milner (2005) notes that the new government never undertook land reforms but the 1967
Land Act reaffirmed the land tenure arrangements that existed in colonial rule. General 
Farming owned by President for Life Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Press Agriculture, owned 
by Press Corporation and ADMARC, the parastatal tasked with agricultural development 
in the country, all bought and invested heavily in estates (Van Donge 2002). Estates and 
tobacco production quotas were given to senior party officials, senior civil servants and 
other political supporters as reward for support to the ruling Malawi Congress Party 
(MCP) (Geist et al 2007). Financial institutions in which ADMARC held large stakes 
provided credit on easy terms to estates to facilitate production of tobacco (Kydd and 
Christiansen 1984).
Legislation
 The independent government also continued with restrictive legislation. The 
special crops Act of 1972 made it illegal for any person to grow, sell, barter or buy any 
special crop without a valid license from the Minister of Agriculture, a portfolio held by 
President Hastings Banda himself. An amendment to the Act gave the Minister 
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          discretionary powers to reject applications for permits without need to explain reasons for 
his decision (Ng’ong’ola 1986). Special crops included Burley and flue-cured tobacco, 
tea, coffee and other plantation crops (Van Donge 2002). Furthermore, up until the late 
1980s, government controlled trade and exchange in the agricultural sector. All 
tobacco grown in Malawi was (and still is) required to be sold on markets designated by 
the Tobacco Control Commission (TCC). While major export crops such as tobacco and 
tea had specialized auctions that catered to large estates, all smallholders had to sell to 
ADMARC. The government specified prices at which buyers could buy farm produce 
from smallholders (Smith 1995).
Commodity Marketing Boards
 The post-colonial government built an even more formidable institutional 
infrastructure for managing production and marketing and directing investment into 
agriculture. These included marketing boards with links to banks, private institutions and 
quasi-governmental agencies. Specialized crops like flue-cured tobacco, tea and coffee 
were grown and marketed under parastatals. Farmers Marketing Board, successor to the 
Agricultural Produce Marketing Board became the Agricultural Development and 
Marketing Corporation (ADMARC). It became the best known of all agricultural 
institutions that controlled the marketing of all smallholder produce (Van Donge 2002). 
ADMARC was given a mandate to make profit and the strategy was to accumulate
surplus at the expense of smallholders to invest in other areas of the economy 
(Ng’ong’ola 1986). ADMARC paid monopoly prices to smallholders, which in the 1970s 
amounted to 50% indirect tax of smallholder produce (Green 1997). Profits from the 
control of such exchange were largely invested in the estate sector. ADMARC only 
invested 4% of its profits into the smallholder sector while 66% was pumped into the 
estate sector (Kydd and Christiansen 1984). In addition to the produce market, the 
government also controlled the input markets as this was considered a strategic area.
 This dual agricultural strategy, and the control over smallholder agriculture did 
little to alter the structure put in place by the colonial government. It continued with the 
exclusion of smallholders from lucrative opportunities. The powers vested in the Minister 
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          of Agriculture to make decisions at will without having to answer to anyone continued
the legacy of arbitrary decision making started by the colonial government. Most 
importantly, actions of the independent state show that it had no misgivings in acting to 
further the interests of political and business elites by facilitating their access to land and 
finances to help them exploit opportunities in the lucrative tobacco industry. When the 
proposal to liberalize the production of Burley to allow smallholders to participate was 
floated by donors, opposition came from senior MCP officials, senior civil servants and 
also notably, from TAMA, the association that represents the interests of middle and large 
estates. The reason given was that Burley was too technical for the smallholders (Prowse 
2010). Prowse notes ironically that these interest groups used the same excuse used by 
Imperial Tobacco Company a hundred years earlier to deny Africans access to lucrative 
flue-cured tobacco.
     2.3 Reform in the Tobacco Industry: The Era of Structural Adjustment Programs 
           (SAPs) 1980-1994
 The dual agriculture strategy seemed to work fine for the first 15 years post-
independence as GDP grew at a respectable 5 % per annum (Harrigan 2003). From 1970 
the number of estates rose from 229 to 22,000 in mid 2000s. Meanwhile smallholders lost 
land and suffered unfavorable terms of trade (Whiteside 2000). As the 1980s approached, 
the high path to economic growth was disrupted by external shocks beginning with the 
oil crises and the resulting decline in terms of trade for commodities on the world market 
(Chilowa 1998; Milner 2005). Finding itself in budget deficits and in need of Balance of 
Payment (BoP) support, the Malawi government invited the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank to help. Thus began a long series of reforms - the Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Due to the centrality of agriculture in the economy, 
agriculture came within the purview of the IMF and the World Bank and most of the 
initial reforms to liberalize the economy were targeted at the sector. The thrust of the 
SAPs was twofold (i) to get the state out of agricultural marketing -which mostly required 
the scaling down of ADMARC’s activities, and (ii) to get prices right for smallholders. 
The biggest development was in the tobacco sector where production of Burley was 
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          liberalized to allow smallholders to participate.
 Liberalization had been pushed by donors3 primarily to change the structure of 
Malawian agriculture and change focus from estates to smallholders (Van Donge 2002) as 
it was clear that an agricultural and economic strategy reliant on estates had not 
benefited everyone (Kydd and Christiansen 1984). When production of Burley was 
liberalized in the early 1990s, thousands of smallholder farmers took to the crop. 
Liberalization allowed smallholders to take advantage of opportunities for earning decent 
income from agriculture and some segments of smallholders flourished (Orr and Mwale
2001; Peters 1997). Smallholders were required to organize themselves into clubs in
order to access the tobacco auction floors. In 1990/91, 7,600 smallholders were allowed 
to grow tobacco on a pilot basis (Zeller et al 1998). By 1993/94, 30,000 smallholders 
were organized into 1,318 clubs (Van Donge 2002). Jaffee (2003) estimated that 300, 000 
smallholders were growing tobacco in 2003.
 The liberalization of Burley succeeded in altering the structure of Malawian 
agriculture from one driven by estates, to one driven by smallholder family farms. 
According to data from the Tobacco Control Commission, 43,024 tobacco clubs were 
registered as growers in 2013 up from 17,252 in 2000 (TCC 2014). Using a conservative 
estimate of 15 members per club, this suggests that over 600,000 smallholders grew 
tobacco as club members in 2013. Meanwhile estates growing tobacco declined from 
over 60,000 in 2000 to around 14,000 in 2013. On the other hand, liberalization also 
dismantled the institutional infrastructure which had been put in place to coordinate 
production, marketing, and investment in agriculture, leaving the state with fewer 
mechanisms with which to direct the development of the sector. In the same vein, 
liberalization also destroyed state apparatus for surplus extraction and patronage in 
agriculture. But liberalization did not end exploitation of smallholders. Liberalization
merely ushered in a new era where instead of the state, it was tobacco leaf companies 
that became more powerful. They infiltrated the state and began to dictate the pace of the 
industry.
3 This term refers to development agencies, multilateral institutions, and some countries that provide 
budgetary support, development aid, and technical support to Malawi.
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            2.4 Multiparty Democracy and Populism in Agriculture 1994 to Present: 
           Subsidies Under a Neoliberal Order
 In 1994 came multi-party democracy and with it more reforms and intervention 
in agriculture by the State. While liberalization also destroyed the state’s apparatus for 
surplus extraction and patronage in agriculture, and replaced the state with leaf
companies as the chief extractors of surplus, the state was not completely pushed out of 
agriculture. In an era of popular politics, the government found other means to continue 
using agriculture for a politics based on clientilism and patronage by politicizing food 
security. The government of President Bakili Muluzi built its legitimacy and populist 
appeal based on availability of maize. It started a “starter pack” program which 
provided small quantities of seed and fertilizer to poor farmers to ensure food self-
sufficiency. Harrigan (2003) notes that although the “starter pack” program could be 
justified using rational fear arising from declining maize production over a four year 
period, it was ultimately the work of a government seeking legitimacy by ensuring food 
security following years of a detached dictatorial state. This kind of intervention would 
also be appealing to the government and the population in general following the negative 
impacts of economic liberalization on the welfare of the poor (Chilowa 1998).
 The government of Bingu wa Mutharika who came after Muluzi, instituted a 
much bigger Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP), against the wisdom of liberalization 
preached by the IMF and the World Bank. The program won huge following among 
Malawians as well as development agencies abroad4. The two Presidents after him have 
both maintained the subsidy program despite mounting criticism that the program is not 
meeting its welfare functions of a safety net, as it has not shown any demonstrable effects 
on reducing poverty among vulnerable individuals (Lunduka et al 2014). Other critics 
note the impact of such a wieldy program on the national budget. Between 2011 and 2013 
the budgetary allocation of the subsidy program amounted to 75% of the entire budget 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, and 54% of all allocations to the entire agricultural sector. 
Critics argue that by taking this much funding, FISP crowds-out other priority programs 
4 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/world/africa/02malawi.html?_r=0
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          in the sector (Cisanet n.d)5. In a candid exchange with civil society delegates on the bene-
fits of the subsidy program in relation to its cost, the Minister of Finance stated that there 
was no way that program was going to be closed: “Where do you think the votes will 
come from?” he asked (National Budget Consultations with Civil Society, March
2016). The state’s pronouncements about having the welfare of smallholders at heart 
through programs like these are called into question by tobacco growers, who compare 
the state’s preoccupation with populist welfare programs to a perceived lack of 
commitment to protect their livelihoods where it matters.
     2.5 Tobacco in Malawi Today
 Today tobacco remains an important crop to Malawi. In addition to 
generating 60% of exports and 10% of GDP, tobacco also generates up to 23% of the 
tax base (UNCTAD 2011, Jaffee 2003) and employs 1.6 million out of a workforce of 5 
million people (UNCTAD 2011). A large proportion of arable land is devoted to tobacco 
165,577 hectares in 2010 up from 41,763 hectares in 1961 (FAOSTAT). It has been said 
that no country devotes as much proportion of land to tobacco than does Malawi, and no 
other country is as dependent on one crop for foreign exchange as is Malawi (Tobin and 
Knausenberger 1998).
Figure 2.3: Allocation of Land to Tobacco in Malawi 1961-2009
Source: FAOSTAT http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC/visualize
5 http://www.cisanetmw.org/index.php/38-fisp-beneficiaries-want-programme-discontinued-commercial-
price-of-fertilizer-reduced
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             2.6 Key Issues in Tobacco Discourse in Malawi
 As I discuss the viability of tobacco livelihoods and the effect on smallholder 
livelihoods, it is important to be cognizant that there are other related conversations that 
are putting pressure on the tobacco industry and are gradually making tobacco a pariah 
crop.
Labor Violations in Tobacco Production
 The tobacco industry in Malawi has had to contend with labor activists who decry 
the deplorable working conditions of tenants. In Malawi tobacco is produced through 
three labor regimes; family labor, wage labor and the tenancy system. For growers on an 
acre or less, family labor is the most commonly used labor arrangement. But even here 
where a household does the bulk of the work, they may still require the assistance of
wage labor at peak times. Wage labor comes in two arrangements, casual labor and fixed 
wage contract. Labor in tobacco is a very important fixture of the village economy and I 
elaborate more about it in chapter four. Here I dwell on the tenancy system to highlight 
the conversation about labor conditions which is another controversy surrounding 
tobacco in Malawi.
The Tenancy Labor System in Tobacco Production
 The tenant system has been the bedrock of tobacco production in Malawi 
(Mwasikakata 2003, CFSC 2015). Although it is not the most prevalent form of labor 
arrangement in the study area, it merits extensive treatment as it in many ways, 
characterizes the exploitative face of the tobacco industry in Malawi. Tenancy labor is a 
social relation in which tenants and their family members are employed to produce 
tobacco on a plot allocated by the leaseholder or farm owner (Kanyongolo and Mussa
2015).The land owner provides land, farm inputs, food rations and other necessities to the 
tenant to enable him to grow tobacco. These expenses are deducted against future profits. 
In some cases the costs are higher than the profits, necessitating the tenant to stay and 
farm again next year, a practice which constitutes debt bondage (Kanyongolo and Mussa
2015).
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          Today 77% of tenants originate from the most densely populated and land scarce 
districts in the southern region such as Machinga, Mangochi, Phalombe and Zomba, and 
move to tobacco growing districts such as Kasungu, Dowa, and Lilongwe in Central 
Province, and Rumphi and Mzimba in the north (Kanyongolo and Mussa 2015). Tenants 
cite poverty, food insecurity, lack of resources to buy agricultural inputs, and lack of 
alternative employment opportunities as the primary factors that pushed them into 
tenancy labor (Kanyongolo and Mussa 2015). For landlords, the tenancy system helps
them get through low liquidity. Tobacco farmers generally lack the cash to pay for labor 
and other services during the growing season. Due to the nature of the business of 
farming, farmers typically have money at the end of the season. With the tenancy system, 
the payment for services is deferred to the end of the season after farmers have sold their 
crop. Secondly, tenancy system brings in a larger pool of labor as opposed to direct labor. 
In the tenancy system, the landlord expects wives and children of tenants to work as well. 
Wives, relatives and children of a tenant all help with farm work and perform similar 
tasks as the tenant. In this way, the tenancy draws on a vast pool of labor, but only a small 
proportion of which is remunerated. This serves to hide the real cost of growing tobacco. 
Landlords further prefer tenants as they are said to be more dedicated than wage 
laborers. For tenants, remuneration depends on the quality of the tobacco they produce. 
Most tenants are veterans of the crop and sometimes they know tobacco farming better 
than their landlords. Furthermore, tenants work without requiring too much supervision, 
and since payment is at the end of the season, rarely do tenants abandon work at the peak 
of the season. Rather they patiently work to achieve good quality. In addition, tenants 
assist landlords with other chores including harvesting and shelling maize and 
groundnuts, cutting poles, and building sheds; something a wage laborer would not do 
(Phiri 2004). Most importantly for landlords and for the tobacco industry as a whole, 
tenants bear the most risk associated with crop failure. If tobacco output is low, landlords 
recover the cost of inputs first before they get around to paying their tenants. This is a big 
advantage for them as they can take risk on the back of a vulnerable group of people who 
stand to lose everything should the crop fail. The biggest advantage for the 
industry though, is that the tenancy system is cheaper than direct labor. The net take home 
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          for tenants is much lower than direct wage labor. Kanyongolo and Mussa (2015) showed 
that in 2015 tenants on average received a daily wage of MK142 (less than 50 cents a 
day) against the minimum daily wage of MK 551-about a dollar at that time (Kanyongolo 
and Mussa, 2015). This cheap labor is what has built and sustained the tobacco industry 
in Malawi. The following are the key ways in which tenants are exploited by landowners.
Overcharging the Tenants for Items They Take on Credit
 At the end of the season, the landlord deducts the cost of all the inputs, services, 
cash advances, food rations and other items advanced to the tenant from his tobacco r
evenues. In this most unbalanced of exchanges, tenants are usually not told the costs for 
the services inputs and advances until the end of the seasons and costing is at the 
discretion of the landlord. In a study conducted for the ILO and the Ministry of Labor and 
Manpower Development in Malawi, from a sample of 18 estates only on two
large scale estates did tenants have information on how much they were being charged 
for inputs, rations and other services. The study found that a substantial number of  the 
10 medium-scale estates in the sample do not pre-specify tenant charges for individual 
inputs and that 95% of the tenants are not provided with a written or any other record of 
their deductions  (Kanyongolo and Mussa 2015). Studies and observations have revealed 
that farmers pragmatically cost their inputs at the end of the season in line with actual or 
expected results from the sale of the tobacco at the auction floors (CFSC 2015). Table 2.1 
below shows the proportion of deductions from tenants’ revenue as reported by 
Kanyongolo and Mussa (2015). In large estates over half of tenants’ pay goes to paying 
for inputs, services and advances. It is unsurprising that there are times when a tenant 
ends up owing more than he was able to produce and ends up getting nothing for a year’s 
worth of labor. At the end of the marketing season tenants usually ask their peers how 
their tobacco fared at the markets. Those who didn’t get anything respond saying 
“tinaluza - we lost”. This just goes to show the precariousness of tenancy work.
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          Table 2.1: Share of Tenant Deductions per Capita Gross Payment
  Estate Size     Mean
  Small      23.97
  Medium     51.96
  Large      52.08
  Total      40.49
Source: Kanyongolo and Mussa (2015,18)
Low Wages
 Despite the heavy work they do, tenants get very low wages and in some cases 
they are not paid at all. The latter scenario happens if the grower made losses at the
tobacco market. Furthermore, tenants are ostensibly paid according to how much they 
produce and the quality of their produce. This is where landlords further exploit tenants 
by cheating and not adhering to agreed prices where an agreement existed. They may 
declare the grade of tobacco to be lower than it actually is to avoid paying premium 
prices. The study done for ILO and Ministry of Labor found that in 2015, annual pay for 
tenants in medium estates translated to an average monthly pay of MK15, 204 ($32.5 in 
2015) while for tenants in small estates, the annual pay translated to MK9,003 per month 
($19.2 in 2015). If one takes into account the fact that for each tenant, several 
familymembers work on the farm, the pay per individual is indeed very low (Kanyongolo 
and Mussa 2015).
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          Table 2.2: Tenant Average per Capita Net Earnings
  Estate Size        MK
  Small      31,693.19
  Medium     36,506.57
  Large      31,025.91
  Total      34,014.14
Source: Kanyongolo and Mussa (2015, 19).
This data in Table 2.2 shows that in 2015 after a hard year of labor, and after all 
deductions are made, the highest paid tenants carted away MK36,506.57 ($78) and the 
lowest paid tenant carts away MK31,014.14 ($66). The tenants on large estates get more 
rations and additional service like use of tractors for plowing. Hence more is deducted 
from them.
Denying Tenants of Basic Necessities and Basic Rights
 Interviews with tenants revealed that sometimes, especially at the peak of the 
hunger season (between December and February) they can go without food because the 
landlord doesn’t have the food to give them. Food rations are often insufficient. Tenants 
are given 50kg bag of maize per family for 15 days regardless of family size. Tenants 
have been known to go hungry for several days when rations run out forcing them to go 
and work somewhere else for food rations. Some tenants reported being denied leave to 
go to the hospital when the season is at its peak. Wives of tenants are expected to 
continue working like everyone else when they get pregnant up until they are due to 
deliver. Elsewhere, a study by CFSC found that there is limited access to amenities for 
health and education of tenants accentuated by the difficulty and cost of transport and the 
lack of communications infrastructure. Tenants have to travel more than two kilometers 
to the closest medical service and school for the children (CFSC).
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          Work Overload
 From observations in Kumala tenants bear the brunt of tobacco growing. At the 
peak times during planting, weeding and harvesting work starts from dawn to dusk. These 
are time sensitive farm operations that need to be finished as quickly as possible. 
Tenants do much of the physically demanding work which included hoeing to prepare the 
nurseries, manual hauling of tobacco and handling of dangerous pesticides. For planting, 
weeding, and harvesting, while family labor is there to help, the tenant is the main labor. 
The family may go back to the village for lunch and to rest; coming back in the 
afternoon. The tenant has got to keep working all day. After the tobacco has been 
harvested and hauled into the homestead, the tenant works even late into the night tying 
the tobacco leaves together for hanging in the barn for curing. Studies from elsewhere 
have reported that tenants are given impossibly huge parcels of land to cultivate which 
necessitates them to involve children, wives and relatives (Phiri 2004).
Deplorable Living Conditions
 Furthermore, studies from other parts of the country have revealed that living 
conditions for tenants in general are deplorable with poor housing, poor drinking 
water, and insufficient food. CFSC found that the most prevalent form of housing is 
where tenants live in small one-roomed hut made of mud, tobacco stalks or grass which 
they build on their own. The study found that 88% of tenants who work in tobacco estates 
stay in traditional houses which are essentially made from poor wall and roof materials. 
Over half of the tenants stay in houses where over 7 people use one room for sleeping 
(Kanyongolo and Mussa 2015).
Child Labor
 Malawi has been cited internationally for the high prevalence of child labor on 
tobacco estates (US Department of Labor 2014, ILO nd, Otanez et al 2007) and the 
tobacco tenancy system is strongly linked to increased use of child labor, as landlords 
prefer tenants with wives and children as a cheap pool of labor. A 2006 International 
Labor Organization (ILO) study found extensive use of child labor on tobacco estates. 
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          Children who work alongside their parents and perform similar tasks including hazardous
labor and handling chemicals (ILO 2006). Otanez et al (2007) estimated that there were
78,000 children working on a full or part time basis in tobacco. Forty-five per cent of the 
child workers were between 10–14 years old and 55% were between 7–9 years old. The 
actual number of children working in Malawi’s tobacco sector is much higher because the 
number of child workers in all economies is underestimated (Otanez et al 2007). Children 
working alongside their parents are in many cases routinely denied education. Landlords 
put pressure on their tenants and demand that their children help them with
farm chores. Interviews with landlords during preparatory work for this study in Kasungu 
revealed that they are not keen to have their tenants send their children to school. They 
realize that if the children remain uneducated, chances are they will remain on the farm 
and become tenants themselves.
Workers Health
 Tobacco requires heavy application of pesticides and tenants routinely lack 
protective wear, and end up inhaling the pesticides. In tobacco growing areas children 
are used to perform such tasks such as weeding, tying together green tobacco leaves for 
curing. Tying green leaves exposes children to green poisoning where nicotine finds its 
way into the blood stream through the skin. It is a painful and paralyzing experience but 
neither the health system nor the tobacco industry is doing much to address it.
Tobacco and the Environment
 Tobacco has been blamed for the degradation of the environment in Malawi. 
Tobacco culture practices such as topping6 and de-suckering7 are responsible for the rapid 
exhaustion of soil nutrients (Geist et al 2007). Tobacco depletes 10 times as much 
nitrogen, 24 times as much potassium and 36 times as much phosphorous as cassava. 
In Malawi rotating tobacco with other crops has become necessary to maintain fertil-
ity (Tobin & Knausenberger 1998). Tobacco requires heavy applications of pesticides 
6 The removal of tobacco flowers
7 The removal of unproductive tobacco leaves
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          and fertilizers both of which affect water quality. Run off from pesticides and fertilizers 
contaminates water sources. In addition, tobacco nurseries require plenty of water thereby 
reducing water available for other uses (Tobin & Knausenberger 1998). The most 
visible environmental damage from tobacco production is on the forests. Curing of 
tobacco requires large amounts of firewood, usually taken from customary land (Geist et 
al 2007). Flue-cured varieties require a lot of wood to generate heat which is channeled 
through flue pipes into the barn to cure the leaf. Air-cured varieties like Burley also 
require a lot of wood to build curing sheds which have to be repaired or even
replaced every year. Geist et al (2007) relate that tobacco causes 5% of deforestation 
annually in developing countries but in Malawi this rate is higher at 26%, and net 
deforestation caused by tobacco estates outside their boundaries is likely to be at 10,000 
hectares per year. They further assert that between 1972 to 1991 when the land under 
tobacco more than doubled from 54,000 to 117,000 hectares, national forest cover 
declined from 45% to 25%. Both the World Bank and the World Health Organization 
have called upon Malawi to diversify from tobacco over concerns of deforestation and 
loss of soil fertility (Tobin & Knausenberger 1998).
Tobacco and Food Insecurity
 Tobacco farming has been implicated in producing food insecurity and 
malnutrition in developing countries like Malawi. Masanjala (2006) reported that in 
Malawi, tobacco adoption by smallholder farmers in the mid-1990s increased total 
household income but significantly decreased caloric intake. He further observed that a 
majority of children in his sample were stunted. Other studies on the nexus between 
agricultural commercialization and welfare outcomes have reported the increased risk 
of food insecurity for small farmers who divert a portion of their land away from food 
production, thereby reducing the amount of food available to the family. Such farmers are 
also at risk when there are unfavorable rains and prices of staples increase due to price 
shocks (Murray et al 2009, Wood 2011). In a study on the connection between tobacco 
farming households and malnutrition, Murray et al (2009) noted that tobacco production
in a household in the year or year after birth and exposure to staple price shocks lowers 
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          child for age z-scores by 1.27-implying a 70% drop in Z scores. Other investigations have 
revealed rampant food insecurity among tenants in tobacco estates. Tenants in Malawi 
have to depend on food from their landlords and when food runs out in the hunger season, 
landlords have been known to let their tenants go hungry (CFSC 2015).
     2.7 Conclusion
 Tobacco has been called Malawi’s “green gold”. This epithet came because of 
tobacco’s role in the economy, but as this chapter illustrates, the story of tobacco in 
Malawi also underscores social and political dimensions of Malawi as a nation. In this 
chapter I have demonstrated that the so-called success of the green gold came at a high 
cost, and it was inscribed on the bodies of thousands of farm families and workers, as
well as on the environment. For all the wealth it has created for the elites, the 
professional classes, and the leaf companies, tobacco has brought numerous problems to 
society at large. The resolution of these problems is integral to discussions on the future 
of smallholders tobacco based livelihoods. The state is key to this process. The state’s 
involvement in agriculture has a legacy of arbitrariness, inconsistencies, paternalism and 
marginalization of smallholders which still characterize the administration of the sector 
today. Even in an era of liberalization, the government still maintains tight control over 
exchange in the agricultural sector through domestic trading regulations and export bans. 
Depending on levels of production of a specific crop the government issues bans to 
prohibit trade or export if production is deemed to be below a certain threshold (see 
Chilowa 1998). The haphazard manner in which such regulations are applied creates 
uncertainty among players in the agricultural sector. On occasion, traders with orders to 
supply produce to international markets have been unable to fulfill their tenders because
of these haphazard trade bans. This is not just a hollow policy discussion for bureaucrats 
and consultants from development agencies. The matter of export licenses and trading 
permits came up as an impediment for villagers who want to diversify away from tobacco 
as I elaborate in chapter seven.
 The modern day Malawian State is still beholden to the interest of the elites. As an 
example, even after agreeing to open the tobacco sector to intermediate buyers as part of 
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          the liberalization agenda, the government reversed the decision and banned 
intermediate traders at the insistence of the tobacco sector (Van Donge 2002). In addition, 
the state uses its security apparatus to restrict tobacco growers from crossing borders to 
sell in neighboring countries, even when it is clear that leaf buyers on the auction market 
are depressing prices. Ironically, the same companies that pay low prices on the 
Malawian auction also operate in neighboring countries from which they are happy 
to buy smuggled Malawian tobacco. To smallholder farmers this amounts to the State 
denying them the opportunity to make good income. The heavy handedness with which 
smugglers are hounded and punished has earned the State resentment from smallholders.
 The historical relationship of the state towards smallholders is critical for 
understanding the plight of smallholder tobacco growers today. Years of direct extraction 
of surplus from smallholders, and policies aimed at facilitating exploitation of 
smallholders by elites and leaf companies have prevented wealth building among 
smallholders and undermined their resilience. The dynamics of state-smallholder
relations characterized by paternalism and heavy handedness, inconsistent policies and 
interventions, and the state’s orientation towards pleasing elites, forms the background 
through which smallholder tobacco growers view market instability in the tobacco 
industry both in the short-term and the long-term. 
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          Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework and Research Methods
     3.0 Introduction
 In the previous chapter I described the long history of structural forces in 
Malawi’s engagement with tobacco, and the kinds of responses farmers had to the 
inconsistent, and often contradictory policies and interventions. To traverse the local and 
global dimensions of this study, I use concepts from two theoretical perspectives, 
agrarian political economy and the rural livelihoods approach (see figure 3.1). Whereas 
the agrarian political economy approach provides a robust framework for understanding 
the ‘structural’ and institutional aspects of restructuring of the agricultural industry across 
multiple scales, the livelihoods framework provides a scaffold for understanding the lived 
experiences of tobacco growers, and their communities.
 In this chapter I outline the analytical frameworks I employ to understand the 
restructuring of global agriculture, the effects on rural communities and responses of 
smallholder producers. I start with a review of literature from agrarian political economy 
on the development of agrarian capitalism and the neoliberal restructuring of agriculture. 
From the livelihoods perpective, I discuss literature on the impacts of commodity mar-
ket instability arising from neoliberal restructuring on smallholder livelihoods, as well 
as literature on the role of state institutions and non-state actors in assisting smallholders 
recover from a livelihood crisis. I also discuss the research questions, the research design 
and the data collection methods employed in this study.
Figure 3.1: Theoretical Framework
Source: Author’s Model
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            3.1 Agrarian Political Economy and the Globalization of Agriculture
 I draw on scholarship from agrarian political economy to make sense of processes 
and dynamics of change in global agriculture, and how these dynamics affect relations 
of production and other aspects of the rural landscape in Kumala. I focus on scholarship 
around two classical agrarian questions relevant to this study; the nature of peasants, and 
the paths of agrarian transition to capitalism (Byres and Bernstein 2001; Byres 2016).
On the Peasantry
 From the very early years of agrarian political economy scholarship, scholars 
have sought to understand the social and political character of the peasant, either for 
political purposes (Byres 1986), or to better understand issues of social and economic 
development in poorer countries (Bernstein and Byres 2001). This scholarship has been 
framed around inquiry on the essence of peasants as a defined social or political 
category, and inquiry on the continued existence of peasants as the development of 
capitalism unfolds (Byres 1986; Byres 2016). Following the lead of Alexander Chayanov 
who considered peasant households as rational, gain maximizing and loss minimizing 
unitary farming enterprises, one school of thought regards peasants as a coherent group 
defined by an internal economic logic, the structure of which only changes as a result of 
demographic processes of generational change (Donham 1999; Shanin 2009). Others see 
peasants, not as a well- defined group, but rather a politically and 
economically differentiated group (Byres 1986). This school of thought posits that 
peasant differentiation comes through separation of peasants from means of production 
through violent dispossession (Narotzky 2016). Throughout the development of capitalist 
relations, scholars have documented the dissolution of the peasantry into; a rich peasantry 
with expanded production, use of wage labor, and deeper integration with the market, a 
middle peasantry just barely able to maintain simple reproduction and a poor peasantry 
who are unable to reproduce themselves through farming, and must rely on wage labor to 
survive (Akram-Lodhi 2005; Bernstein 2015). Some of the devices of dispossession have 
included neoliberal land reform policies crafted to enforce private property rights, induce 
efficient farming, and redistribute land through market based allocation. These policies 
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          have resulted in conflict, social differentiation and the rise of new patronage politics 
(Akram-Lodhi 2007, Narotzky 2016). Processes of privatization and formal registration 
of land titles have increased peasants’ risk and liabilities, indebtedness, dispossession 
and new forms of land concentration (Narotzky 2016). Land grabs driven by processes of 
land accumulation in response to food, energy, climate change and financial crises have 
changed peasants’ access and control over land (Li 2011; Zoomers 2010).
 Still on the question of the peasantry, scholars have sought to understand the 
continued existence of peasants through the spread of capitalist relations of production. 
Inquiry has focused around the questions: why does the capitalist mode of production 
coexist with precapitalist modes of production? And, how does this coexistence affect 
social formations? (Byres 1986; Byres and Bernstein 2001). Some scholars argue that 
peasants still exist because they are resilient and refuse to be integrated into market ori-
ented production (Cronin 2005; Scott 2008). Still other scholars suggest that peasants still 
persist precisely because the continued development of capitalism depends on the 
presence of the peasantry (Banaji 2016; Bernstein 2015).
On Transition to Capitalism
 The other classical concern of agrarian political economy scholars has been on the 
processes or paths of agrarian transition to capitalism. A transition to capitalism would 
ensure transformation to capitalist relations of production and the rise of capitalist 
industrialization based on an ongoing process of capitalist accumulation (Byres 1986). 
Capital accumulation is key to the development of capitalist relations as it separates 
producers from their means of production, creating “free laborers” who can be turned into 
an urban proletariat to drive industry, and allow for the generation of surplus that gives 
sustenance to capitalist industrialization through provision of food, raw materials and 
financial surpluses (Byres 1986, 2016).
 Traditionally, scholars have explored the development of capitalism by studying 
the trade of agricultural commodities. These are commodities produced either through 
plantations worked by slave or wage labor or those commodities produced by peasants. 
Scholars have also explored the development of capitalism by studying the development 
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          of industrialized agriculture (Banaji 2016). In the wake of economic liberalization, 
scholars are investigating the development of capitalism through studying
the effects of trade liberalization and shifts in global trade patterns of agricultural 
commodities. The concerns of agrarian political economy include the increasing 
concentration of global corporations in both agricultural input and output markets
through mergers and acquisitions and the resulting economic power of fewer corporations 
commanding large market shares, new organizational technologies deployed by these 
corporations through commodity chains, and the combination of market power and 
organizational technologies deployed by corporations to shape and constrain choices of 
farmers and consumers (Bernstein 2015).
 Harris-White (2015) notes that industrial capitalist transformation has 
proceeded along four trajectories: (i) domination of capital, (ii) contract farming, 
(iii) vertical integration between agriculture and industrial capital, and (iv) expansion of 
industrial agriculture. In the age of trade liberalization, scholars note the increased 
involvement of transnational corporations (TNCs) in global agriculture. Deregulation and 
regional free trade agreements have created space for globalizing agriculture and food 
systems (Goodman and Watts 1994, McMichael 1995, Ewert and Du Toit 2005). TNCs, 
with new forms of corporate organization via enhanced vertical integration and 
coordination, took advantage of a changing global economic architecture to become the 
driving force behind the restructuring of global food systems. As a result of these 
organizational technologies, emboldened TNCs have pushed agricultural globalization 
through expansion into new territories for markets and cheap labor. With their global 
investments, advanced transportation and processing facilities, TNCs now control the 
production and distribution of agricultural commodities, shaping and constraining both 
production practices and consumption choices (Goodman and DuPuis 2002; Goodman 
and Watts 1994, Phillips 2006; Pimbert et al 2001). In addition, TNCs have shaped the 
governance of global agriculture through instituting private quality, safety and other 
regulatory standards (Ouma 2010; Ponte and Gibson 2005).
 Scholars of agrarian political economy note that agriculture is increasingly 
governed by non-agricultural sectors. Financial actors are increasingly getting involved in 
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          supermarkets, land investments, commodity and value chains (Isakson 2014; Martin and 
Clapp 2015). Ghosh (2010) notes that speculation by financial actors including hedge
funds, pension funds and investment banks who trade in commodity futures were 
implicated in exacerbating the 2008 global food crisis. The involvement of non- 
agricultural sectors requires that corporations institute direct and formal mechanisms of 
control such as vertical integration for the control and subordination of small producers. 
Contract farming is one such means of control (Banaji 2016). Contract farming, an 
arrangement in which corporations enter into agreements with farmers to grow and 
supply specific volumes and quality of a commodity which the corporation undertakes to
buy at an agreed price, has become a major phenomenon in global agriculture (Oya 
2012). It represents the new phase of development of capitalism at Kumala. Following 
years of rising costs and lack of reliable financing for farmers, leaf companies have come 
in to provide financing as well as technical support to growers. Growers relate that it is 
difficult to produce tobacco without support from leaf companies. In the short time that 
contract farming has been practiced at Kumala, it has reshaped tobacco production as
well as social life in the area. In addition to programs run by government extension 
services, farmers now have to spend considerable time attending to programs by leaf 
companies. Narotzky (2016, 19.6) notes that “contract farming expresses social relations 
that tie farmers and their livelihoods to agro-industrialism through contractual 
obligations”. Mainstream approaches to agriculture and development have extolled the 
role of contract farming in modernizing agriculture and connecting rural producers to 
global value chains (WDR 2008, UNCTAD 2009).
 Critics argue that contract farming usurps the independence of farmers and turns 
them into nothing more than laborers for the corporations (Little and Watts 1994; Oya
2012; Prowse 2012). Although framed along a neoliberal logic that promotes the virtues 
of the market, contract farming exhibits non- market behavior as producers are taken out 
of the open markets and boxed into a corner from which they are unable to take 
advantage of higher prices on the open market without defaulting on their contract 
(Narotzky 2016; Raynolds 2004). In addition, contract farming creates dependency,
making producers reliant on corporations for their livelihoods. Growers are obliged to use 
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          seed, fertilizer and other inputs supplied or prescribed by the corporations and adhere to 
specific quality standards. Furthermore, growers are held captive with little or no room to 
negotiate price terms for their produce (Narotzky 2016). As owners of capital, 
corporations use a range of means to tie peasant producers to suppliers of inputs, 
finance and the consumption of goods creating conditions of bondage and servitude of the 
peasant to capital (Harris-White 2016). As with other forms of transition to capitalism, 
the involvement of TNCs in local agriculture has exacerbated inequalities as shown by 
increased social differentiation among rural populations where at the top, a small 
minority of the rural population is connected to global agriculture and appears to be 
progressing. At the bottom is a large proportion of the  rural population struggling for 
survival while in the middle are family farmers growing undifferentiated commodities 
with low and declining returns (Akram-Lhodi 2005; Pimbert et al 2001).
 Kumala is not new to capitalist production and exchange. Farmers of Kumala are 
accustomed to growing for the market since historical times when such production was 
controlled by the state up until when the economy was liberalized. However, contract 
farming represents a new phase of the development of capitalism as companies now take 
direct control over production. The political economy approach, with its focus on social 
relations of production, power, dynamics of production, and changes in social formations, 
informs my understanding of the evolving dynamics between leaf companies and tobacco 
growers. It also shapes my interpretation of the changing relations among the residents 
themselves, especially the developing dynamics that are leading to land consolidation and 
inequality of land ownership among the residents of Kumala.
     3.2 The Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Framework
 I employ the sustainable rural livelihoods framework, also known as the 
sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) (see figure 3.2 below), to discuss the dynamics 
of making a living among rural populations, and to describe how the global, national and 
local political, economic and social processes mediate local livelihoods, including 
shaping the perception of risk and inclination towards livelihood adaptation among 
smallholder tobacco growers. In addition to exploring factors the mediate local 
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          livelihoods, I also draw on the livelihoods approach to evaluate the local responses to 
changing tobacco market conditions in terms of their ability to enhance wellbeing, reduce 
vulnerability and enhance households and community’s internal capacities to respond to 
current and future crises. I use the concepts of livelihood adaptation, sustainability, 
vulnerability and human capabilities to provide a framework for such an analysis.
Figure 3.2: The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
Source: Scoones 1998: 4.
 The livelihoods framework helps researchers explore how rural people use their 
skills, knowledge and resources in a particular environment to make a living. A livelihood 
“comprises capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources), and
activities required for making a living” (Conway and Chambers1991,1). Livelihood 
making is dependent on possession and ability to creatively use assets (Ellis 1988, 2000). 
Assets, both tangible (resources and stores) and intangible (claims individuals and 
households can make on other people, and access to resources) are categorized into five 
types of capital; natural capital (refers to soil, air and other environmental services), 
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          economic /financial capital (cash, credit, debt, and productive assets for pursuing a 
livelihood strategy), human capital (knowledge, skills that people have as well as the 
physical health to perform labor functions) and social capital - the networks social 
relations and affiliations which people draw on to pursue different livelihoods (Scoones 
1998,8). The different levels, types and quality of assets certainly come into play as 
smallholders at Kumala experience and respond to uncertainty and impoverishment from 
failing markets. High income households with diverse income streams, access to 
information, finances and networks are not completely impoverished by low tobacco 
prices. Even where they make losses they may still be asked by friends to join clubs and 
are loaned money to repay their debts. Low income and middle income households risk 
the most to grow tobacco, and stand to lose the most when prices are low. For low income 
households, physical labor is their most readily available capital and they use it to make a 
livelihood through natural resource extraction through joining the labor migration circuit. 
Education is decidedly a valuable form of capital at Kumala. Household heads with 
post-primary education stand a good chance of finding employment. Equally important, 
those household heads that were able to discern the long term viability of tobacco and 
purposely go into entrepreneurship or make a concerted effort to diversify into other 
crops had at least ten years of education.
    3.2.1 Concepts for Evaluating Livelihood Responses to an Unstable Tobacco 
             Market
 The livelihoods approach will enable me to examine local responses to an uncer-
tain tobacco market as well as the implications of this uncertainty on the livelihoods of 
individual tobacco growing households and the community at large. I examine household 
responses to an uncertain market with a view to understanding whether adjustments of 
livelihood activities lead to enhanced wellbeing through stabilizing or enhancing in-
comes, but also through enhancing the abilities of households to withstnd future shocks. 
To do this, I employ the concepts of livelihood adaptation, sustainability, vulnerability 
and human adaptation. I discuss these concepts below.  
62
          Livelihood Adaptation
 The concept of livelihood adaptation, the continuous process of change to 
livelihoods which either enhance existing wealth and security or reduce vulnerability
and poverty (Davies and Hossain 1997), is a key contribution from livelihood studies that 
illustrates that rural populations are aware of, and actively engage with their conditions 
of existence in pursuit of better lives. Scholars of rural livelihoods make a distinction 
between adaptation and coping, both of which are household risk management strategies. 
Coping strategies are a sequenced set of responses, largely involuntary, which households 
faced with a crisis follow with the objective of maintaining consumption and preserving 
key household assets that would permit them to resume their previous livelihood 
strategies (Corbett 1988, Davies 1996). On the other hand livelihood adaptation is 
thought of as a voluntary, preplanned risk management strategy in which households 
diversify their income portfolios to anticipate and ameliorate any threats to wellbeing 
(Ellis 2000, Ellis 1998, Adams et al 1998). This distinction also presents a 
methodological challenge for researchers as the criteria for classifying specific activities 
either as coping or adaptation strategies may be blurred, given that in some cases, what 
may start out as short-tem coping mechanism may end up becoming the norm - which 
may then need to be classified as a long-term adaptation.  Fieldwork for this study was an 
opportunity for me to observe the complexity of processes of adaptation and challenge or 
enforce the intellectual need for separating the concepts of coping and adaptation. 
  Options for livelihood adaptation often include livelihood diversification- the 
process by which households construct a diverse portfolio of activities and assets in order 
to subsist and to improve their standard of living (Ellis 2000, Scoones 1998). The term 
diversification needs to be interrogated and placed in context for Kumala. To begin with, 
the farm families at Kumala already undertake diverse livelihood activities to secure their 
lives. Secondly, even where tobacco growers invest in other enterprises, these enterprises 
are connected to tobacco. A disastrous tobacco season requires that other enterprises and 
assets be deployed to subsidize tobacco production. In the worst case scenario, this can 
even bring down a household with a diversified livelihood portfolio if assets need to be 
sold. In this study, I use the term diversification to mean ‘diversify away from tobacco- a 
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          conscious decision to quit tobacco farming and ensure a household’s livelihood activities 
are not dependent on tobacco. Adaptation is a complex, imprecise, back and forth process 
that requires several factors to come into play. It requires that rural populations perceive 
the risks they face, decide the likely effects of livelihood failure, and commit resources 
and capacities in response to perceived risk. This process is made more difficult as rural 
populations experience multiple sources of stress and sources of change simultaneously 
(Tucker et al 2010). Ultimately, for this study, I pick out and evaluate instances of crop 
or economic diversification and any other forms of adaptation on their ability to stabilize 
and enhance incomes and position households for increased well-being.
Sustainability
 The livelihoods approach is particularly useful for its emphasis on sustainability 
of livelihoods which allows for evaluating the effects of livelihood decisions on
well-being in the long-term. This concept has often been used to highlight issues related 
to management of the resource base on which livelihoods are built but I emphasize the
social aspect of sustainability where a livelihood is said to be sustainable when it can 
cope and recover from shocks and stresses, maintain or enhance its capabilities while not 
undermining its natural resource base (Conway and Chambers1991; Scoones 1998). I use 
sustainability as a guiding concept for broadly evaluating whether the manner in which 
smallholder tobacco farmers are coping with unstable markets and other 
vulnerabilities enhances their capabilities to weather future livelihood crises. I use the 
concept of vulnerability which focuses on exposure and recovery to shocks, and the 
concept of human capabilities which focuses on internal capacity to recover from shocks 
as a way to talk about sustainability. Declining incomes and a falling rural economy are 
having discernible effects on households through reduced upward mobility and reduced 
accumulation of wealth. While the precise long-term impacts of these processes are 
unknown, the concepts of vulnerability and human capabilities will help me frame a 
discussion on the possible consequences of household and community responses, to 
instability in the tobacco market.
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          Vulnerability
 I employ the concept of vulnerability to denote a particular group’s exposure to 
shocks as well as lack of internal capacity to respond to shocks (Chambers 2006). I draw 
on the notion of vulnerability to describe a condition of marginalization which depicts the 
position of smallholder producers in relation to national and global entities and processes. 
Vulnerability is a widely employed concept in the livelihoods literature. It has allowed 
researchers and others to look beyond lack of material well-being among rural
populations in order to capture the sense of insecurity and defenselessness. It has roots 
in political ecology literature which has demonstrated that the relationships people have 
with their environment, and the social, political and institutions that sustain such relation-
ships, are implicated in creating conditions of vulnerability among marginalized popu-
lations (Oliver-Smith 2004). The concept has also found a home in livelihoods literature 
drawing on Sen’s entitlement approach and famine studies (Ellis 2000; Watts and Bohle 
1993). In all these traditions, vulnerability refers to a high degree of exposure to risk, 
shocks and stress (Chambers 2006). Stresses are defined as cumulative and predictable 
pressures such as declining labor markets and declining real wages, whereas shocks  are 
sudden events that effect whole communities such as human illness, collapse of a market 
etc (Conway and Chambers 1991). Authors note that vulnerability has dual characteris-
tics: exposure to external threats and failure of internal coping capabilities (Chambers 
2006; Ellis 2000). Writing on vulnerability in Southern Africa, Ellis (2006) used the term 
“living on the edge” to describe the state of being vulnerable (Ellis 2006, 393). Earlier 
livelihoods studies on vulnerability in Southern Africa reveal that failures of politics and 
governance (Francis 2002), reduced access to natural resources (Amwata et al 2016; 
Kakota et al 2012; Mills et al 2013; Nunan 2010), and the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
(Bryceson and Fonseca 2006; Masanjala 2007) have led to deteriorating livelihoods and 
increased proneness to food insecurity and poverty even from minor disturbances in the
daily or seasonal sequences of life. Scholarly work under political ecology has showcased 
the ways in which local populations negotiate vulnerabilities as they make livelihoods in 
the context of state sponsored projects and shifting global politics and markets (Bebbing-
ton and Batterbury 2001; Bebbington 2004; Cliggett 2005, 2014; Watts and Peet
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          2004; Perreault 2001). More recent works highlight the multiple risks arising from the 
interplay between local and global economic, political and social processes, and how 
locals cope with such risks on a daily basis (Sick 2014, Brooks 2010, Clausen 2010, 
Leichenko and O’Brien 2008). Findings point towards the importance of putting people 
and their perception of risk at the center of studies on vulnerability. Hilhorst and Bankoff 
(2004) observe that ultimately, vulnerability is about the people, and that understanding 
their perceptions and knowledge about their risks is key to understanding their actions. 
They note that “perception is not knowledge, and neither does knowledge always lead to 
change, but perception is important in understanding why people exhibit behaviors which 
make them to be vulnerable, as well as understanding the actions they take to improve 
their lot” (Hilhorst and Bankoff 2004,4).
 I use the concept of vulnerability in the senses of both the entitlement framework 
as well as political ecology approaches. This is to acknowledge that fluctuating prices and 
unpredictable tobacco markets have real effects on tobacco growers’ income and 
well- being, but also to highlight the insecurity and marginalization of smallholder 
tobacco growers in the global tobacco value chain. I explored the local understanding of 
their current predicament by asking about growers’ perceptions of the current market
instability as well as perceptions about the long-term viability of tobacco livelihoods, and 
what adaptive actions they were taking to secure their future. Following the findings, I 
conceptualize vulnerability among smallholder tobacco growers as lack of capability to 
access information on the actual trends and risks. This comes as a result of growers
being entangled in multiple and disparate institutional relations related to tobacco 
production and marketing most of which expose smallholder growers to exploitation and 
ultimately preclude smallholder tobacco growers from making meaningful choices about 
whether they want to continue with growing tobacco and how best to market it.
Human Capabilities
 I also employ the concept of human capabilities which includes the ability to use 
information and other services to respond to changes in the environment (Chambers and 
Conway 1992). The livelihoods approach expands the notion of poverty reduction to go 
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          beyond increased income, to include wellbeing and increased capabilities. Capabilities 
are ways of being; the ability of individuals to realize their potential as human beings 
(Sen 1997). Bebbington (1999) posits that assets (capitals) are not just resources that 
people use to make a living, but they also give the capability to be and to act. As an 
example, education as a form of human capital gives capacity to produce efficiently but
also to engage meaningfully with the world and indeed the capability to change the world 
(Bebbington 1999). Conway and Chambers (1991) note that capabilities include the 
ability to use information and other services to respond to changes in the environment 
(Chambers and Conway 1991). Tobacco growers at Kumala related that they saw the 
declining tobacco prices and unstable market through the lens of inefficient and 
exploitative institutions both at local and national level. They also lament that they lack 
the voice to weigh in on decisions about prices for their tobacco. I use the concept of
capabilities to think around how, as individuals, they can be empowered with information 
to weigh their options and decide if they want to continue growing tobacco or switch to 
other crops. Collectively, I think about capabilities in the sense of enhanced abilities to 
organize and engage in national economic and political processes. These are abilities that 
will allow them to maintain their livelihoods if need be or secure other opportunities even 
in a changing context (Bebbington 2001, 2004).
Exploring the Context of Rural Livelihoods: Shocks, Conditions, and Trends
 The famous quote from Karl Marx, “men make their own history, but not just as 
they please”8 could as well be rephrased as “smallholders make their own livelihoods, but 
not just as they please.” Livelihoods scholarship has long recognized that just having 
assets does not secure anyone a viable livelihood. Translating assets into a livelihood 
strategy is mediated by social, economic, policy, and political processes generally 
referred to as the livelihood context (Ellis 2000). As I illustrate in chapters 5 and 6, the 
current uncertainty and instability of tobacco markets which circumscribe growers’ 
livelihoods is a result of the interaction of complex global and national processes. In 
addition to local geophysical factors such as weather variability, the farm families at 
8 https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm
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          Kumala are making their livelihoods subject to national and global institutional 
frameworks, trade and regulatory processes, as well as market trends including 
changing patterns of tobacco consumption. The livelihoods approach makes it imperative 
that researchers understand the effects of broader political and economic processes and 
how these impact smallholders’ ability to make livelihoods under changing conditions.
The people at Kumala are certainly aware of changing conditions. During interviews 
about their life experiences as farmers, respondents in the middle age group and older, 
cited the demise of Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC) as a defining moment in 
their farming. “After MRFC closed in 1998 I stopped growing tobacco. I had nowhere 
else to get a loan” (Fanwell, October 2014). Active tobacco growers related that the 
coming of leaf companies to the village with contract farming heralded a paradigm shift, 
a time in which they are able to grow tobacco with confidence in the resources and
expertise provided by the companies.Tobacco growers at Kumala also note that a 
fluctuating currency exchange rate hurts their pockets as it contributes to rising prices of 
farm inputs. Furthermore, there are many tobacco growers who would like to be freed 
from the law that forces them to sell only on the auction market. They would like to take 
their tobacco across the borders either to Zambia or Mozambique where many believe 
prices are better. Those who have given a thought to exiting tobacco farming are aware 
that the manner in which government handles produce trading and export licenses greatly 
affects the marketing of their produce. They recognize these actions or non-actions either 
by government or private companies as factors that mediate their livelihoods- as 
conditions that facilitate or hinder their livelihoods making activities. Elements that 
comprise the livelihood context are usually categorized into (i) conditions, trends and 
shocks, and (ii) institutions and organizations. Here I discuss trends and shocks, and in a 
later section below I discuss institutions.
Trends and Shocks
 Trends are slow onset patterns that are largely exogenous to the household and 
community such as population growth, climatic variation, market fluctuations, migration, 
and national and international market trends. Shocks are sudden events with adverse 
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          effects on entire communities, region or even entire countries (Conway and Chambers
1991) such as the commodity market crises I discuss under the section “Global Processes, 
Local Livelihoods: Livelihoods Perspectives on Neoliberal Agricultural Restructuring” 
below. Researchers have employed the livelihoods framework to investigate the impacts 
of changing local, sectoral and national trends on local livelihoods. Bryceson (2002), and 
Bryceson and Johnson (2010) investigated processes of livelihood diversification and the 
formation of new careers as farmers forayed  into the hitherto unfamiliar mining sector 
following the decline of agriculture in Tanzania.
 Angeles and Hill (2009) investigated the gendered effect on livelihoods of 
agrarian change in a peri-urban community in the Philippines. Other researchers have 
explored changes in local livelihoods following increased rural-urban migration (Qin 
2010), the impact of urbanization on rural livelihoods (Qing Tian et al 2016), and the 
impact of creation of new protected areas on local livelihoods (Clements et al 2014). 
Baird and Gray (2014) explored the effect of the change of traditional networks of 
exchange following diversification of Maasai households into agriculture.
 These studies find that new trends may influence new patterns of activity that 
create wealth and well-being for some groups, while pushing others into deeper poverty 
and marginalization. Furthermore, these studies reveal the variation of livelihood 
responses to changes in the livelihood context, and how households combine different 
forms of capital to achieve viable livelihoods. They further reveal that social capital plays 
a key role in opening up access to resources and pathways to successful livelihood 
activities. Although these studies have done a good job describing how rural populations 
react to new trends, fewer studies have attempted to link changing local livelihoods with 
changes to the global context. Influential critiques accuse livelihoods scholarship of 
paying lip service to context (De Haan 2005, Scoones 2009). De Haan (2005) notes that 
many livelihoods perspectives focus on capital and activities and pay little attention
to changes in the structures, processes and institutions that mediate livelihoods. In 
particular, critics charge that livelihoods practitioners’ commitment to the local has 
precluded the livelihoods framework from engaging with shifts in global markets and 
politics (Scoones 2009, Kaag et al 2004). In a further critique greatly relevant to this 
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          study, Scoones (2009) notes that the SLA has failed to grapple with debates on agrarian 
change and transformation of the rural economy. While livelihoods perspectives provide 
rich descriptions of current livelihoods, they fail to consider livelihood pathways into 
the future. In his words, researchers employing the livelihoods perspective fail to ask 
themselves “what happens when contexts are the most important factor over-riding the 
micro-negotiations around access to assets and the finely-tuned strategies of differentiated 
actors?”(Scoones 2009,181).
 In this dissertation I take unstable markets and declining tobacco incomes as key 
trends shaping the future of smallholder farmers’ involvement with the industry in 
Malawi. In my field research, I explored local understandings of this trend and the 
expected responses. Beyond the local context, I delved into the ways in which the 
institutional, social and regulatory context of tobacco production and marketing at the 
global level intersect with the politics around public health, trade regimes and 
motivations for profit making, and how all combine to a create a shift in the landscape in
which smallholder tobacco production takes place. I also examined how trends created 
by the shifting landscape are filtered through the national institutional tobacco apparatus 
and relayed to growers to create specific understandings of trends in the global tobacco 
industry for the Malawian audience. These lines of inquiry provided insights into how 
smallholder tobacco growers, finance experts, policy makers and executives in the tobac-
co industry expect to sustain the industry as the global context changes.
     3.3 Global Processes, Local Livelihoods: A Livelihoods Approach to Neoliberal 
           Agricultural Restructuring
 In this section I discuss impacts of processes of economic globalization on the 
livelihoods of small producers. I draw on two sets of case study literature (the global 
coffee market and tobacco in the US) to explore how the livelihoods approach has been 
employed to study shock events such as crises caused by unstable commodity markets via 
neoliberal restructuring. The discussion illustrates the effects of economic globalization
on farm based livelihoods and the mediating role of state institutions and other private 
organizations. The first set of literature explores coffee and the impacts of institutional 
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          change, fluctuating and declining prices (the coffee crisis) on smallholder livelihoods,
and in broad terms, the social and environmental consequences of globalizing agricultural 
markets (Ambinakudige 2009; Babin 2012; Bacon 2005; Eakin et al 2006; Lyon 2011; 
Rueda and Lambin 2013). Coffee is a very important commodity to the economies of 
several Latin American, African and Asian producing countries. Before the crisis in the 
early 90s, coffee had ensured steady incomes to 25 million growers and farm workers 
in these countries (Oxfam 2006). The dissolution of the International Coffee Agreement 
(ICA), the primary framework for stabilizing the global coffee market ushered in an era
of uncontrolled production and a downward trend on prices paid to coffee growers. 
Oxfam (2006) estimated that from the 1980s to 2006, the peak of the crisis, nominal 
coffee prices paid to growers declined by 70%. The ICA signed in 1962 by both 
producing and consuming countries, stabilized production and marketing by allocating 
sales quotas to producing countries and setting minimum prices (Oxfam 2006; Ponte
2002).
 The dissolution of the ICA came at a time when neoliberal logic ensured that 
state-owned Coffee Boards that oversaw production, marketing and investment in 
producing countries were either dissolved or their mandates reduced to just oversight and 
advisory functions. While these Boards had their share of problems including corruption, 
bureaucratic red tape, patronage and clientilism (see Lele and Christiansen 1989; Smith
1995), when they were functional, they gave producing countries a measure of control on 
the domestic and global coffee scene, and as a result, there was a balance of power 
between producing and consuming countries (Ponte 2002). The dissolution of the ICA 
and the Coffee Boards, combined with corporate consolidation at global level, the 
geographic shift of production, and changes in coffee consumption patterns (Oxfam
2006; Ponte 2002) profoundly restructured the global coffee industry leading to 
uncontrolled production, market volatility, fluctuating prices, and declining terms of trade 
with devastating consequences on national economies of producing countries and on the 
livelihoods of smallholder growers, farm workers and their communities.
 The second set of empirical literature comes from studies on changes in the tobac-
co industry and the livelihoods of tobacco growers in some States in the USA such
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          as Kentucky and North Carolina (Benson 2008; Craig 2005; Kingsolver 2011; Stull 2009; 
Swanson 2001), and in other countries across the globe (see Brezeale 2010 for
Argentina). Like coffee, tobacco is very important to the economies of some States and 
the livelihoods of growers in the USA and other countries. The literature from the US 
examines livelihoods of tobacco farmers after the Master Settlement Act (1998) and the 
dissolution of a federal program that formed the basis of stability in the tobacco industry 
in the US. The Master Settlement Act (MSA), a key part of the resolution of class action 
lawsuit filed by several States against tobacco companies to force them to pay for health 
costs incurred by the States to treat conditions caused by smoking, sought to reduce 
smoking rates by among other things, reducing production of tobacco and clamping down 
on advertising of tobacco products; especially towards the youth.
 On the heels of the MSA came the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of
2004 which ended the federal program that had established quotas for tobacco growers to 
avoid overproduction, and guaranteed minimum prices for tobacco according to quality
and grade. The MSA and the enactment of the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act 
changed the structure of tobacco production and marketing in fundamental ways. 
Following the MSA, national tobacco production quotas were reduced by 30% (Stull
2009), and in Kentucky some farmers had their quotas reduced by as much as 60% (Craig
2005). Reduced production quotas resulted in reduced earnings and most small scale 
tobacco growers became uncertain about the future of their livelihoods. The end of the 
federal program saw a complete phasing out of tobacco quotas, and with it, an end to 
restrictions on volumes and geographical areas of production; the very cornerstones of 
the “most successful agricultural program in the USA” that had provided stability to the 
livelihoods of millions of tobacco growers since the 1930s (Stull 2009,55). In addition, 
following the MSA, tobacco companies began to enter into production and marketing 
contracts directly with individual farmers, by-passing the traditional auction marketing 
channels. Removal of the federal program created room for price swings, and further
decline of the traditional auction system of marketing as tobacco companies increased the 
share of tobacco produced under contract arrangements; giving tobacco companies a 
bigger influence on how tobacco is produced and marketed, and ultimately the prices 
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          growers got for their tobacco. The first season after the MSA, tobacco prices paid to 
growers in Kentucky declined by 22% (Stull 2009). To cushion tobacco growers from the 
impact of the restructuring, States allocated substantial funds from the settlement money 
to help farmers find alternatives to tobacco. From Kentucky’s 3.45 billion payment,
$180m was set aside for agricultural diversification (Craig 2005). To the surprise of some 
authors, even after noting the dismantling of the support framework for tobacco farming 
and experiencing declining tobacco incomes, not many growers have diversified away 
from tobacco (Swanson 2001;Wright 2005).
 The authors of these studies link the instability in the coffee and tobacco 
industries, and the resulting impacts on the livelihoods of growers to neoliberalism and 
globalization. Neoliberal discourse promotes the dismantling of State support to 
agriculture through withdrawal of technical support and credit services (Hausermann and 
Eakin 2008). Processes of globalization- the increased flow of capital, labor, and 
commodities (Craig 2005), and the instigation of competition between commodity 
producers across the globe is implicated in creating instability and vulnerability in the
livelihoods of growers and national economies (Wright 2005). Movement of foreign
labor into tobacco producing regions in the US, largely a sign of distressed livelihoods in 
originating countries, has helped keep tobacco production afloat even as it has resulted 
in increased stigmatization of immigrant laborers. Kingsolver (2011) and Benson (2008) 
observe that earlier in its life, tobacco brought European labor from around the globe to 
Kentucky but now it is Mexicans and other Latin Americans, themselves driven out by 
damage on their livelihoods by free trade agreements like NAFTA, who work tobacco 
fields in Kentucky.
 Authors of these studies call for putting the instability of the livelihoods of  coffee 
and tobacco growers in places like Kentucky, North Carolina, Nicaragua, Guatemala and 
India into the broader global economic processes, but replete with accounts of 
globalization as experienced by growers and workers every day. However, most authors 
have maintained a static separation between the global and the local, where global 
economic processes act on rural people who need to adapt. Some exceptions (Benson
2008, Kingsolver 2011) have done a good job describing how both the local and the 
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          global play out in the same place and time and how producers of commodities position 
themselves as global actors. Kingsolver (2011) notes that “by looking at relationships of 
local and global as dynamic, we can learn about how people construct meanings of both 
the local and global and act on them”(p4). This study builds on this understanding of how 
the global and local processes play out simultaneously by showing how the restructuring 
in the global tobacco industry has led to the introduction of new production and 
marketing processes as well as instability in the market, and yet the resulting livelihoods 
crisis is understood as an entirely local phenomenon. This is because the place of tobacco 
in the Malawian economy and politics was cemented through a specific national 
imagination that harnessed resources including labor, and technical and managerial 
capacities in order to build a national economy through tobacco. As a result,
growers understand the livelihood crisis arising from unstable markets within the context 
of a particular agrarian politics and they respond using politically charged ideological 
pronouncements as well as traditional coping practices.
 Furthermore, most authors have portrayed livelihood crises caused by global 
restructuring as inevitable results of the workings of  global markets; a result of a mis-
match between global demand and supply, and consequently they have paid little 
attention to the underlying structures of production and the role those structures play in 
predisposing some growers to vulnerability. Fraser et al (2014,53) calls these crises “a 
feature of rural existence underpinned by local inequalities in access to land and capital 
shaped by how people’s material circumstances affects their capacity to produce and sell 
commodities. In effect Fraser et al (2014) are saying researchers should not just accept 
volatility of global markets, and boom and bust cycles that affect growers livelihoods as 
a normal aspect of globalization, but rather investigate the ways in which production is 
structured to understand how different categories of growers either benefit or get 
excluded from programs meant to help growers deal with these livelihood crises.
 While Fraser et al (2014) emphasize differentiation in terms of resources such as 
land and capital as a factor for deepening inequalities, I extend this concept to include 
information as a key resource. In effect, I ask how smallholder tobacco growers’ 
positioning in the social and institutional context of tobacco production keeps them in 
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          the dark about the workings of the tobacco industry, thereby keeping them in a state of 
perpetual vulnerability.
     3.3.1 Institutions and Organizations
 The case studies highlight the role of state institutions and other organizations in 
ensuring the success or failure of efforts to recover from the crises as well as stabilizing 
future livelihoods. The livelihoods approach pays particular attention to institutions - the 
behaviors regularized through norms and rules, and through formal and informal 
organizations (North 1990). Organizations - groups of individuals bound together by 
some common purpose to achieve objectives (North 1990), are key institutional actors 
but are differentiated from institutions because they are products of prevailing rules and 
norms, and they are agents of reproduction of the institutions (Challies and Murray
2011). Institutions and organizations are the social structures critical for mediating factors 
for building livelihoods because they encompass the agencies that inhibit or facilitate the 
exercise of capabilities and choices by individuals and households (Ellis 2000,39).
Institutions key in shaping livelihoods in an African rural context include those related 
to the governance of land access, enforcement of property rights, access to markets and 
capital such as land tenure, savings clubs, local and state laws, market arrangements 
and industry regulations (Ellis 2000; Francis 2000). Some institutions mediate access to 
resources even though they are not directly connected to or dependent on the particular 
resource. For example, marriage, kin networks and gender division of labor might 
influence access to environmental resources even though they have other purposes (Leach 
et al 1999). At Kumala land tenure rights are key for gaining membership in tobacco 
clubs which are in turn, key for securing access to relevant permits, and access to 
financial and technical support with tobacco production. But these are highly gendered 
institutions resulting in a gendered division of labor that keeps males in charge of 
tobacco, and relegates women to lesser value crops. Authors of livelihoods studies have 
demonstrated how institutions differentially mediate livelihoods according to class, 
gender and ethnic status through control of access to resources (Angeles et al 2009; 
Leach et al 1999). Angeles and Hill (2009) observed that institutional discourses 
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          perpetuate inequalities by placing constraints on access to resources by marginalized
groups.
 Many writers on institutions and livelihoods have focused on the constraining 
aspect of rules. Hodgson (2006) notes that emphasis on definition of institutions as rules 
has led many writers to focus on the constraining aspect and neglect the enabling aspect 
of institutions. Even constraints can open up possibilities and enable choices and actions 
that would not exist otherwise. Furthermore, studies employing livelihoods perspectives 
have not paid as much attention to the role of institutions in shaping dispositions. 
Jakimow (2012) notes that institutions are not only rules that regulate and constrain 
human behavior. They also provide scripts and schema that people use to view the world. 
De Haan and Zoomers (2003) calls upon researchers to look beyond access to resources
to see how institutional context also shapes aspirations and beliefs of what (livelihood 
strategy) is possible. Investigating the processes of generational livelihood change among 
different classes in India, Jakimow (2012) concluded that the institutional context 
reinforced disadvantages in multiplication and transfer of wealth and it prevented the
poorest from aspiring to better livelihood activities resulting in more deprivation and 
poverty.
 Institutions are also implicated in the process of recovery from livelihood crises. 
Literature on the coffee crisis shows that Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
conducted awareness campaigns about the coffee crisis and promoted fair-trade and 
organic coffee markets as alternatives to conventional coffee markets. Various researchers 
found that participation in organic and fair-trade networks reduced farmers vulnerability 
to market crises (Bacon 2005, 2008), leading them to call for further integration of 
smallholders into global value chains by connecting them with organic and fair-trade 
networks as a way to cushion them from future fluctuating prices (Bacon 2005, 2008; 
Murray et al 2006; Rueda and Lambin 2013). Critics argue against an uncritical push 
to incorporate smallholder producers into such global value chains noting that this puts 
small producers in a subordinate position in networks governed by global capital 
(Fernandez 2014). Fair-trade has been critiqued as a neoliberal project that confers 
tangible benefits as development gifts not through empowerment but patronage and 
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          exclusion while employing governance metrics that are coercive and marginalizing 
(Dolan 2010). Critics have further questioned the long-term impact of alternative 
markets, arguing that fair trade and organic trade has done little to help the poorest
growers and in some cases they have become more indebted which results in less income 
generation than conventional growers (Utting-Chamoro 2005; Wilson 2010). The most 
damning critique of alternative markets such as fair trade and organic certification is that, 
even where they were perceived to confer tangible benefits, they only served elite farmers 
and did little to alleviate the poverty of land constrained farmers and other marginalized 
groups including women and  informal workers (Fraser et al 2014; Tallontire et al 2005; 
Utting-Chammoro 2005; Valkila and Nygren 2010), and further deepened inequalities in 
access to resources and markets (Fraser et al 2014 ).
 State institutions also play key roles in the recovery process. Case studies show 
that in some instances, the state took center stage through interventions including 
subsidies, price support, research and training farmers in new crop management and 
marketing practices (Bacon 2005; Eakin et al 2006). Other state programs provided
support to growers to diversify away from either coffee or tobacco (Craig 2005; Eakin 
et al 2006). As a result, some authors in the academy, as well as development agencies, 
have argued for the strengthening of the capacity of state institutions to help smallholder 
producers cope with crises and build capabilities to deal with future crises (Babin 2012). 
Most of these calls ignore the uneven outcomes of state intervention. Critics cite cases 
where state interventions helped those farmers who could get them, but inefficiency and 
mismanagement in state owned institutions coupled with poorly designed programs 
actually exacerbated livelihood crises (Ambinakudibe 2009; Browning 2013). In cases 
where state programs provided resources for growers to diversify, they ended up 
suppressing community and local responses to the crisis, promoted over-exploitation of 
environmental resources  and had the opposite effect of pushing some growers further 
into subsistence livelihoods (Browning 2013; Haussermann and Eakin 2008). 
Furthermore, uncritical calls for increased state intervention ignore the history and 
dynamics of relationships between state institutions and smallholder farmers (exceptions 
are Eakin et al 2006; Fraser et al 2014 and Hausermann and Eakin 2008). The dynamics 
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          of relations between state institutions and smallholder growers influence growers’ 
perception of risks they face, the types of help they can expect, and importantly, their 
flexibility to innovate and come up with robust local responses.
 In Malawi, smallholder tobacco growers must contend with a plethora of 
institutions and organizations. This dissertation holistically examines the diverse ways 
in which these institutions and organizations mediate livelihoods in a tobacco growing 
economy. Local level institutions like marriage and formal organizations like Burley 
clubs, help facilitate tobacco production and shape a world view that sees tobacco as 
an integral part of rural life. National and regional level institutions and organizations, 
including clubs, cooperatives, regulatory institutions, leaf companies and the tobacco 
market all play a role in shaping beliefs of what is possible in tobacco growers’ futures. 
Starting with the previous chapter on the long history of tobacco production in Malawi, 
this dissertation takes a historical approach to explore the evolution of state-smallholder 
relations through market and regulatory practices, and the relations between smallholders 
and other organizations. In doing so, I illustrate how these relations continue to shape the
world views of smallholder tobacco growers. In the next section I discuss the research 
design and data collection methods used to investigate how institutional practices and 
influences affect how growers experience and respond to the current market instability.
     3.4 Research Design
 
My Approach to the Study
 Tobacco is a global crop with social and economic implications on diverse groups 
of people across the world. To study such an encompassing commodity I adopt the 
framework advanced by Eric Wolf in “Europe and the People Without History” in which 
he asserted that the world inhabited by human kind constitutes a totality of
interconnected processes which must never be studied in isolation. He challenged social 
scientists to discover a history that would account for how social systems of the modern 
world came into being. To investigate the processes of capitalist development, 
researchers need to investigate the effects and reactions of micro populations. Wolf 
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          further noted that histories of local peoples and places are not static givens, but rather a 
dynamic set of temporal and spatially changeable relationships (Wolf 1982). Further to 
this, I combine different scales of analysis to explore local reactions to broader national 
level or global political and economic processes. I explore how national level agrarian 
histories and a particular local culture mediate the on-the ground responses to global 
restructuring phenomena (Babin 2012; Lyon 2011). Such an approach requires a careful 
balancing of scale and context. Scoones (2009) notes that “the future of the livelihoods 
perspectives is analyses which examine networks, linkages, connections, flows and chains 
across the scale but firmly rooted in place and context” (Scoones 2009,19). Some recent 
works (Besky 2012; Lyon 2011) provide methodological models for injecting scale and 
linking global processes to local livelihoods by using an ethnographic approach. Other 
studies (Brezeale 2010; Challies and Murray 2014) have combined a global value chain 
approach with the livelihoods approach to account for global changes on local 
livelihoods.
 This research project sought to explore the intersection of global market processes 
with often times divergent and contradictory discourses around national politics and state
policies, and how these affect smallholder tobacco growers. Marcus (1998,97) notes that 
“cultural logics sought after in anthropology are multiply produced and partly 
constituted within sites of the system i.e. modern interlocking institutions of the media, 
markets, specialist experts etc”. I examine the actions of these actors and their influence 
on the process of tobacco production and marketing in Malawi (Dilly 2010). While I 
situated the study in Kumala village as my field site, I keenly followed the discourse 
around tobacco in different forums including the review meetings of the tobacco 
establishment. I held interviews at corporate offices of key players in the tobacco industry 
including regulators, tobacco leaf merchants, managers of the auction market and 
bureaucrats at the Ministry of Agriculture. I collected stories from the media to identify 
the ways in which policy and political discourse around tobacco were woven and crafted 
by key actors for the Malawian audience. Ultimately through this multilayered approach 
I illuminate the dynamics of interactions between actors and institutions and smallholder 
tobacco growers, and how these shape the growers perception of changes and how they 
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          respond to them.
     3.4.1 Methodology
 In this section I discuss the research questions, research design and the data 
collection methods I employed to capture local peculiarities of tobacco based livelihoods, 
as well as the national structural, institutional, and discursive elements that circumscribe 
smallholders’ experience and perception of unpredictable markets and uncertain futures. I 
also provide a brief description of the field site.
 Understanding the link between growers’ experiences and responses to an 
unstable global tobacco economy is a task that calls for investigation into several 
aspects of agriculture, both from the perspective of the farmers, and that of policy 
makers and managers of the sector at various scales. Ultimately the challenge for me 
became to investigate how smallholder farmers filter tobacco dynamics in global 
agriculture through their interaction with various local and national level institutions. 
Through this ethnographic enterprise, I sought to capture lived experiences of tobacco 
growers and the meanings attached to tobacco growing in rural Malawi, and how these 
influence responses to the current crisis (Griffiths 2009; Stull 2009). I interviewed people 
about their livelihood activities, about their farming history, their experiences with 
commodity markets and decision making about crop practices. The ethnographic 
approach further allowed me to observe the structures that underpin the tobacco industry 
in Malawi at all levels. It revealed the tensions between official narratives and personal 
experiences which cannot be captured in aggregated national data sets. It allowed me to 
see the effects of instability in the tobacco industry; effects that one would never relate 
to tobacco from aggregate national reports of dwindling farm incomes (Dilly 2010). 
Throughout the study, my main question was: how do smallholder tobacco farmers expe-
rience the instability in the tobacco industry? I broke this question into related questions;
(i) What are the perceptions of smallholder tobacco growers of the changes that are 
happening in the industry?
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          (ii) How do institutions related to production and marketing of tobacco shape farmers’
perception of risk and awareness of the changes they face?
(iii) How have smallholders responded to the changes in the global tobacco industry?
 Fieldwork focused on understanding people’s livelihoods, farming histories, and 
their experiences with market crises in order to understand the effects of instability in the 
tobacco industry on the livelihoods of smallholder farmers.
     3.4.2 The Site
 I conducted the study in Kumala, one of 92 villages under Khubwi Section, itself 
one of 14 Sections of Mitundu Extension Planning Area (EPA). Historically, tobacco has 
been the major source of income for the people of Kumala. Kumala has the second 
highest concentration of tobacco growers in Khubwi Section with a total of 16.15 Ha of 
land allocated to tobacco in 2015/16 growing season. Umodzi village had 23.55 Ha 
allocated to tobacco. The history of tobacco in the area is underpinned by the presence 
of two estates, one at Mitundu Trading and the other adjacent to Kumala village, both 
originally owned by the now defunct Press Agriculture. Press Agriculture was one of the 
companies owned by Press Corporation, a conglomerate controlled by Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda, former President of Malawi that played a critical role to channel investment into 
the agricultural sector in Malawi (Van Donge 2002). The estates used to grow a lot of 
tobacco and they employed people from Kumala and surrounding villages as laborers. 
The theory is that after the growing of burley tobacco was liberalized, these people went 
back to their farms to grow burley following the tobacco husbandry techniques they 
learnt from the estates.
     3.4.3 Sampling
 I conducted a multistage sampling process. The first stage of sampling involved a 
village wide census with the purpose of establishing a sampling frame. In all, the sam-
pling frame had139 households. The second but no less important purpose was to 
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          familiarize myself with the village and the people. This second stage used results from 
the village census to categorize farmers into tobacco growers and non-tobacco growers. 
Tobacco growers were those who grew tobacco in the current farming season. Non-
growers were those who indicated that they were not currently growing tobacco, and had 
not grown for at least the last two consecutive years.
 In the third stage of sampling, I identified households according to the three stages 
of the household lifecycle, young (early) stage households, mid-stage growing 
households, and mature (late stage) households. This is because my initial focus had been 
on young farmers, with the intent to study the long-term perception of risk among young 
farmers. Although my focus changed to cover farmers of all ages as the study progressed, 
these categories still proved useful. I employed the household lifecycle approach due to 
difficulties over the definition of age and delineation of categories of young, middle age, 
and old. Cross-cultural studies have shown that age is not just a chronological number but 
a lived experience with distinct cultural meanings accompanied by specific social roles 
that individuals are expected to fulfill at different stages in life (Cliggett 2005, Lee 2003, 
Sumberg et al 2012). I identified early stage households using the following 
characteristics:1) head of household is under the age of twenty-five, 2) has no more than 
two children and dependents, and 3) must have established himself as an independent 
household within the last three years. Middle stage household heads were those over 27 
years of age, had growing children, and must have established households at least three 
years old. Mature (or late stage) households are those with senior men and adult sons still 
living in the same household.
 Having placed the households in the three life cycle stages, I used purposive 
sampling (Bernard 2006) to identify ten case study households from each life stage 
category split between growers (5) and non-grower (5) households. This yielded thirty 
(30) case study households in total. The case study households were selectively sampled 
in order to capture variation in socioeconomic status, household size and composition. 
From the non-tobacco growers category, I purposely included those focused on business, 
those engaged in dimba farming as an alternative to tobacco, as well as those carrying out 
other livelihood activities such as firewood and charcoal selling (Orr and Mwale 2001). 
82
          These became my case study households whom I interviewed in-depth about their 
experiences growing and marketing tobacco (for growers) and making a livelihood away 
from tobacco in the village (for non-tobacco growers) (McCabe 2005).
     3.4.4 Data Collection Methods
 I employed a mix of qualitative data collection methods to study the effects of 
institutional restructuring on smallholder tobacco farmers livelihood strategies. I 
collected three types of data (i) demographic and socioeconomic data (ii) ethnographic 
data (iii) secondary data.
(i) Demographic Data
 I collected demographic data through a village census, which was my first activity 
in the village. The census captured demographic information such as names of household 
members, ages and educational levels of members, livelihood activities by members of 
the household; numbers and sizes of the farm plots the household was working on that 
growing season. During the census interviews I also asked about the ownership of the 
farm plots, specifically whether it was owned by the husband, the wife or if it was a 
rented plot. Furthermore, the census collected data about numbers and types of assets in 
the household, as well as the ownership of the assets (i.e. whether owned by the husband 
or the wife). This census helped me to become familiar with the population and the key 
livelihood activities (Schensul et al 1999). It also helped separate tobacco growers from 
non-tobacco growers for further interviews. Data about the ages of household heads also 
helped me identify the different stages of the lifecycle which formed an additional 
category for case study households (see Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 for demographic, 
socioeconomic, livelihoods and assets data).
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          Table 3.1: Demographic and Socioeconomic Data
Source: Author’s Census Data
Table 3.2: Other Household Livelihood Activities
Source: Author’s Census Data
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          Table 3.3: Assets Owned By Households
Source: Author’s Census Data
(ii) Ethnographic Data
 a) Key Informant Interviews
 I conducted interviews with selected key informants to get a broad view of themes 
around village life, and tobacco farming and marketing in Kumala and surrounding areas. 
Results from the census were useful in identifying informants based on particular aspects 
of village life and farming. Key informant interviews focused on social organization in
the village, history, key events in the farming history of the village. Interviewees included 
village heads and other knowledgeable people identified in the census. I identified key 
informants who I deemed knowledgeable on particular topics such as tobacco production 
and marketing (Schensul et al 1999). These included staff from the department of 
agricultural extension, extension agents of tobacco companies operating in the area, and 
staff from cooperatives. Interview topics included trends in tobacco production, percep-
tions on the future of tobacco, official positions of various agencies on tobacco and the 
effects of a changing tobacco economy.
 b) Semi-structured Interviews
 I conducted semi-structured interviews with officials, including officers from the
Ministry of Agriculture, agro-input dealers, executives from head offices of tobacco
companies, officials from Auction Holdings Limited, (AHL-the company that runs the 
tobacco auction) and officials from Tobacco Control Commission (TCC), which is the 
85
          industry regulator. The interview with the Ministry of Agriculture was intended to get the 
official position of the Ministry on tobacco and their perception as to what is causing 
instability in the industry. Interviews with the tobacco company executives focused on 
their perception of the instability in the industry as well as the relationships between the 
companies and government on one hand, and the growers on the other. Tobacco 
companies are known for their secrecy which meant that getting information was an ardu-
ous undertaking. Requests for interviews had to be cleared at the highest level of corpo-
rate affairs departments. And even then, they declined to share data on how much tobacco
they bought and the destination of their tobacco citing protection of trade secrets. The 
interview with a TCC Executive centered on the role and capacity of the government to 
stabilize the tobacco industry. Interviews with staff from AHL were interesting because of 
the honesty and forthrightness of their answers. While the rest of the industry including 
government were reluctant to admit that tobacco was facing troubled times ahead, AHL 
were forthright about the initiatives they were taking to diversify from tobacco. They 
were also eager to talk about the mismanagement and alleged practices of corruption 
among players and collusion among tobacco buyers.
 c) Participant Observation
 I employed participant observation to understand dynamics in the production and 
marketing process. I accompanied some respondents from my case study households to 
their farm plots and helped with gardening. This gave me a chance to talk about decision 
making and adaptation at farm level. On these observation trips, the farmers and I talk-
ed about weather patterns and the challenges it presents to farmers. These conversations 
gave me insights into how farmers perceive climate based risks and how they prepare to 
offset them. One way to adapt is to plant a variety of seeds with different characteristics. 
My participants demonstrated incredible knowledge about seeds and the choices they 
make on what seeds to plant based on their perception of weather patterns. I learned that 
farmers who often own and work on several farm plots may plant different varieties of 
seed on different plots. For example, a farmer may plant a short maturing maize variety
on one plot and a long maturing variety on another plot in order to hedge their bets on the rains.
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          In addition, I observed extension meetings where agents of the tobacco companies 
met with growers to discuss tobacco growing and marketing. This gave me insights into 
the relationships between tobacco companies and the growers as well as what these
parties both expect from each other. Finally, I visited the tobacco Auction Floors in 
Kanengo to observe how tobacco marketing is done. I did this to get a deeper 
understanding of the marketing process itself and the ways in which players in the 
industry play their roles on the marketing segment of the tobacco chain. Observing the 
marketing allowed me to understand the tobacco grades system and how it gives rise to 
perceptions of good as compared to bad tobacco from the perspective of both the buyers 
and the growers. I observed the social positioning of the actors as they played their roles. 
Tobacco buyers typically occupy the highest position in the play of events even above 
TCC officials who are supposed to play a regulatory role during the sale. The farmer 
occupied the lowest rung on the ladder. The farmer watched as the buyers decided what 
price they were willing to pay for his tobacco. But not all the time. During one of my 
visits I observed farmers shut down the auction floor in protest of poor prices and a high 
rejection rate. This was a show of farmer solidarity and resistance toward the tobacco 
establishment that has become common in recent times.
 d) Group Interviews
 I conducted two group interviews at the initial stage to gauge knowledge about 
main themes surrounding agriculture and livelihoods in the village. The interviews 
included various demographic groups: young, old, men and women to allow me to get 
rounded views about life in the village. The interviews covered topics such as farming, 
food security, challenges to farming and livelihoods and they allowed me to ask pointed 
questions to gauge the knowledge of stressors to livelihoods. I asked participants to 
confirm the livelihood options available in the village, who among men, women and 
young people pursued which livelihood options and the meanings attached to particular 
livelihood options. From the information collected through these interviews, I was able 
to draw a broad seasonal agricultural calendar and construct a timeline of major events 
related to agricultural livelihoods in Kumala.
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          e) In-depth Household Interviews
 I conducted in-depth open ended interviews with male heads of the case study 
households. I locate the dynamics of farm production and livelihood making within the 
household as a social and economic unit in which actions to adapt to social, cultural and 
economic change take place (Wilk 1997). The household is conceptualized here as a set 
of fluid social relations and practices which include allocating work and resources, but 
also the rights to enjoy the benefits of collective energy. These relations are dynamic and 
they may vary as a result of changes in the economic environment (Cliggett 2001; Wilk
1997).The household is also a site of unequal relations which constrains individual 
choice, entrenches patrimonial power relations that disadvantage women and young 
people, and allows senior male heads of households to exploit women’s labor and income 
(Ellis 1998; Guyer and Peters 1987). Anthropological research on the household has 
revealed the tensions that exist between junior and senior men in a household revolving 
around control and access to productive resources. Senior men use wealth accumulated 
over a life time and generational authority to perpetuate a patriarchal hold over young 
men by keeping control of resources such as land, livestock and farming equipment. This 
keeps young men from moving out to establish independent households, allowing senior 
men to exploit their labor on the farm and control decision making on productive 
activities (Cliggett 2005; Donham 1999). However, this patriarchal hold comes with 
obligations as senior men are expected to provide resources for young men to marry and
establish their own homesteads, and if this is not accomplished young men may choose 
to break away and seek their fortunes elsewhere (Donham 1999; Wilk 1997). Locating 
the study within the context of the household revealed insights on how household heads 
access labor for growing tobacco from their wives and children and how that in turn 
obligated them to share proceeds from tobacco. Attention to the household also revealed 
the ways in which material needs and reproductive needs, including the need to form new 
households for young people intersected to keep tobacco farming at the center of family 
life.
 I conducted no less than two interviews with each case study household. The first 
interview covered the basic socioeconomic profiles of the household including household
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          size and composition, farm size, livelihood options. The interview also covered the 
journey of the grower i.e. how they got started in farming and their experiences either as 
a grower or a non-grower. The last part of the interview covered the perceptions of the 
future of tobacco farming and their plans for the next growing season. The second 
interview was held at the end of the tobacco marketing season when farmers had sold 
their tobacco, received their money, and were in the process of making plans for the next 
growing season. The interview reviewed plans and expectations from last season as
compared to how the growing season turned out. We reviewed how much tobacco, maize, 
soy and other crops they had harvested. How much they had made from tobacco sales and 
what they have done with the proceeds. The interview also asked farmers to recount their 
experiences during the selling season. This was especially important for farmers who 
indicated that they were on contract with tobacco companies as well as those who were
not on contract. The interview ascertained the grower’s perceptions on the future of to-
bacco i.e. if for example, in the first interview they expressed desire to get out of tobacco 
farming, were they making plans to follow through?
 In total, I conducted in-depth interviews with respondents from 34 case study 
households of which 16 were tobacco growers, 13 non - growers and 5 labor migrants 
(see Table 3.4 below).
Table 3.4: List of Case Study Households Interviewed
Source: Author’s Census Data
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          Of the 13 non -growers, in-depth interviews revealed that some of them had 
decided to quit tobacco but many had no resources, either land, labor or money to 
successfully grow tobacco and they were working towards that goal. Also included 
among the case studies were five (5) interviews with persons who had just returned from 
labor migration.
 In addition to these, I conducted seven (7) Key Informant Interviews, nine (9) 
participant observation events, three (3) focus group discussions, (3) Group Interviews 
(3), six (6) life histories and twelve (12) semi-structured interviews (see Table 3:5).
Table 3.5: Other Interviews
Secondary Data
 In addition to interviews, I also collected archival material from newspapers on all 
news topics on tobacco from 2011 up to 2016. In addition, I collected publications from 
my informants’ work places. These included annual reports and data on production and 
marketing of tobacco.
 The ethnographic and secondary data allow me to tell stories of rural life under 
a tobacco regime. They are stories of individuals, families and communities living with 
contradictions around a crop that once promised prosperity for everyone but now brings 
uncertainty about future livelihoods except for the selected few.
Data Analysis
 Following data collection I tabulated demographic and socioeconomic data in 
Microsoft Excel and I generated some descriptive statistics on age, gender and other 
socioeconomic indicators such as land and asset ownership. Qualitative data generated 
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          from interviews and group discussions were recorded in audio, transcribed and loaded in 
ATLAS. These data were deductively coded for socioeconomic indicators such as gender, 
grower vs non-grower, and age-group. In addition to socioeconomic indicators,  I 
identified and coded the data for key concepts which were further grouped into 
categories. Some of these categories corresponded to or were  generated from the 
research questions. These included categories such as:
• perception of instability in the tobacco industry
• perception of causes of instability in the tobacco market
• perceptions on long-term viability of tobacco farming
• adaptive responses or plans to take adaptive responses
• measures for coping against tobacco market instability
Other categories were allowed to emerge from the texts. These included:
• interactions with tobacco companies
• challenges in the tobacco marketing system
 Further analysis sought to  provide context and  explanations of the key emerging 
categories using ethnographic details. I used exemplar quotations to illustrate key 
findings of both extremes -the most representative and the least representative. I reached 
my final conclusions by comparing categories to understand how they relate to each other 
while paying special attention to cases deviation -for example my conclusions on 
growers’ understanding of market instability in the short-term and in the long-term had to 
be consistent with adaptive actions they had or had not taken. Finally, I checked the main 
categories to ensure they were  consistent and supportable by ethnographic data while 
making links between these categories and literature on concepts of vulnerability, risk 
perception and livelihood adaptation.
     3.5 Conclusion
 This dissertation brings together strands of two interrelated stories. These are 
stories of a changing agriculture within the context of changing global economic and
trade regimes, and the stories of lived experiences of smallholder tobacco growers as they 
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          deal with these changes. The task of unearthing and making sense of these stories
required the combination of two research traditions, the livelihoods approach and
agrarian political economy. The livelihoods approach allowed me to discuss the dynamics 
of livelihood making in a rural setting, as well as the practicalities of livelihood
adaptation and diversification. This approach also allowed me to unpack and bring to the 
fore the livelihood context, comprising national and local trends such as the on-going 
market instability, and the policies and regulations that constrain local livelihoods. 
Importantly, the livelihoods approach also allowed for an exploration of the role of 
institutions in shaping awareness and perception of risk, as well as in assisting rural 
populations cope and recover from livelihood crises.
 I drew on the agrarian political economy research tradition to highlight debates 
on the development of capitalism, and the status of the peasantry. Scholarship on agrarian 
political economy provided me with a framework for understanding the changes in the 
rural economic and social landscape brought about by the development of agrarian 
capitalism. The political economy approach also provided a background for
understanding capitalism and the role it plays in the neoliberal restructuring of
 agriculture, including gutting the state centered marketing and regulatory systems which 
has resulted into increased vulnerability among growers across the world.
 This task of unearthing these stories also required a combination of methods that 
allowed me to follow the discursive elements, as well as the processes and practices of 
growing and marketing tobacco in Malawi. Through semi-structured interviews with 
industry executives, regulators, and government bureaucrats I collected the official 
narratives about tobacco livelihoods and the current market instability. In-depth 
interviews, life histories, group interviews and observations allowed me to capture the 
practical experiences of making a livelihood out of tobacco but also of living under a crop 
with an unstable market.
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          Chapter Four: The Social Organization of Tobacco Production
   4.0 Introduction
 In order to appreciate the dynamics of change in agriculture and the rural 
economy, and to understand how locals perceive and respond to these dynamics, this 
chapter will introduce the reader to the places,  the people in the dissertation and their 
social worlds. The first stop on the journey to explore dynamics in production, marketing, 
and management of the tobacco value chain is Lilongwe, the capital of Malawi. With an 
industrial zone and an administrative center, Lilongwe is a  nexus of global-local tobacco 
relations, where global tobacco capital meets local politics and local sociocultural 
production peculiarities. It is a place where global economic, institutional and regulatory 
processes, and the profit making motives of  tobacco conglomerates articulate with local 
politics.
 The chapter introduces Kumala village and the people who grow the tobacco leaf, 
taking us to the most primary node of global-local connections of the tobacco 
commodity chain. By placing the village in relation with Lilongwe the capital city and
the industrial zone that houses the commercial tobacco establishment and allied service 
industries, I illustrate how Kumala, as a place, is inserted into the national agricultural 
economy and into networks of global commodity flows. In addition, the chapter also 
introduces the farm families and the community that produce this global commodity. I 
discuss the people, the household setting, and their livelihood activities. My goals are 
twofold, (i) to illustrate the household social relations that make production of tobacco 
possible, and(ii) to illustrate the role of tobacco in the household and the broader rural 
economy. Ultimately, in this chapter I show that at Kumala, the organization of labor for 
tobacco production, and the flow of earnings from tobacco are central to the reproduction 
of the household and the community.
   4.1 Lilongwe: The Setting of the Study
 Lilongwe, the administrative capital of Malawi, is an ideal place to conduct an 
inquiry into the social relations that structure the production and exchange of a global 
93
          commodity such as tobacco. The story of the founding of Lilongwe with the 
establishment of estates by Andrew. F. Barron and Roy Wallace has already been 
recounted in chapter two. The move by Barron and Wallace marked the beginning of the
establishment of the central region, and Lilongwe in particular, as a key center of 
tobacco production in Malawi. Today, Lilongwe is the second biggest producer of 
tobacco in Malawi after Kasungu District. Nevertheless the real shift of tobacco power 
from the southern region was effected in 1979 with the establishment of an auction floor 
at Kanengo - an industrial zone on the outskirts of Lilongwe (Wilshaw 1994).
 Visitors landing at Lilongwe’s Kamuzu International Airport are welcomed to a 
rural farm landscape at an airport just 20 km outside the city center. A fifteen minute drive 
into the city on the main road (the M1) brings one to an incline overlooking an industrial 
zone, revealing an array of factory style buildings. That is Kanengo. The term
‘industrial’ could be considered a misnomer because over 90% of the industries are 
agriculture related and are mostly centered on tobacco. In addition to the tobacco auction 
floor, Kanengo is where offices belonging to international and local tobacco leaf 
merchants are located. The auction floors as well as processing and storage plants for leaf 
companies occupy most of the industrial zone, with more still under construction on the 
outer edges of the zone. The Railway Company, as well as international and local road 
haulage companies are also located here to service the auction floors and the tobacco 
processing plants. Not to be outdone, input suppliers and commercial banks have posi-
tioned themselves inside the industrial zone to service both the staff from tobacco
and allied industries, as well as growers. Whereas global capital has provided for 
magnificent offices, state-of the art communications for expatriate managers and their 
local staff in industrial enclaves like Kanengo, evidence of how the periphery has fared 
in export driven agriculture is not too far to see. At the edges of the industrial zone, the 
Lilongwe-Salima Road separates the industrial zone from Chatata village which
symbolizes the impoverishment in the rural areas where the tobacco is grown, just a few 
meters from the center of wealth in the industry.
 Another ten kilometer drive from Kanengo will take one to Capital Hill, a 
collection of uniformly white office buildings that is the seat of the Malawian 
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          government. Here bureaucrats at the Ministry of Finance keep an eye on tobacco sales 
and crunch numbers on how much foreign exchange will be trickling into the country. 
Down the road, staff from Ministry of Agriculture Headquarters collate statistics on 
tobacco production from local offices throughout the country. The production 
assessments indicate whether the country is headed for an oversupply or a deficit of 
tobacco. These assessments are a first indication of whether prices will be good or bad.
 Further, in down town Lilongwe is the premier business location in all of the cen-
tral region and it provides a strategic place for measuring the pulse of the economy. Li-
longwe (and Malawi in general) is a seasonal economy, and the season is marked with the 
beginning in March or April of tobacco sales and runs up until August or longer depend-
ing on tobacco volumes. In a good season multitudes of growers from tobacco growing 
districts in the central region descend on Lilongwe. They come to purchase farm imple-
ments and inputs, consumer goods like radios, televisions, cell phones, clothing, bicycles, 
and of late, solar equipment for lighting. Service industries including garages, transport-
ers and operators of entertainment joints all make good business servicing the influx of 
rural growers awash with tobacco money. During the season, banking is a nightmare as 
banking offices and ATMs are filled with growers making withdrawals, following up on 
delayed funds or conducting other banking transactions. This is when business thrives 
and Lilongwe comes alive. Traders usually greet each other with small talk on how the
‘season’ is going. Of late, this small talk consists of complaints about how the season is 
no different from any other time. “Season inali kale” “the season used to be the season in 
those days.” is the popular refrain.
 Situating myself in Lilongwe revealed how tobacco oils the economy and sets the 
rhythm of life for the different sectors such as banking, transport and entertainment. 
Being in Lilongwe also allowed me to experience the contradictions in the tobacco 
industry. Whereas industry employs the rhetoric of declining global demand due to the
 WHO spearheaded Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC) to explain low 
prices paid to growers, this is contradicted by the pace of investment in the sector. The 
construction of processing plants and offices is going on at full pace. The Tobacco 
Control Commission (TCC) has financed two multi-storey office buildings within a 
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          fifteen year period. Premium TAMA one of the leaf buying companies is finishing up an 
expansive processing plant. An Egyptian cigarette maker is also finishing work on a new 
processing plant. All these investments are in stark contrast with the impoverishment of 
tobacco growing communities like Chatata village, a throw away from the tobacco 
industrial site. It is also in stark contrast to the feeble business life prevailing in down 
town Lilongwe in recent years. These contradictions form the background of my
approach to the local and global components of the crisis that tobacco growers in Malawi 
face. While there is clearly a global context to the story of tobacco, the shape of the crisis 
has local elements which impact growers’ livelihoods.
The Study Area
 I conducted this study in Kumala village under Mitundu Extension Planning Area 
(EPA) in Lilongwe, which is itself one of 36 EPAs under Lilongwe Agricultural 
Development Division (ADD). I obtained institutional ethics clearances, (non-medical 
IRB from the University of Kentucky) and from the District Commissioner of Lilongwe 
in whose district I intended to conduct the study. With this permission, I headed to Lilon-
gwe Agricultural Development Division (ADD) to notify the District Agricultural Devel-
opment Officer (DADO) about my intention to conduct the study in his area. We dis-
cussed the objectives of my research and I asked for his help to identify the most suitable 
EPA in the ADD where issues surrounding tobacco farming could be best studied. Before 
settling on the village site, we went through some ‘must-know’ statistics about the ADD. 
Lilongwe ADD is one of eight ADDs in Malawi. ADDs are the major agricultural admin-
istrative regions in which the country is divided. Lilongwe ADD has a total land area of 
approximately 1,194,949 hectares of which about 679,394 hectares is arable. It covers 
four districts in the central region of Malawi namely; (i) Lilongwe West, (2)Lilongwe 
East9, (3) Dedza and (4) Ntcheu. ADDs are further divided into Extension Planning Areas 
(EPAs), and EPAs into Sections overseen by an agricultural extension worker. In the end 
he suggested Mitundu EPA and advised the Agricultural Extension Development Officer 
9 Lilongwe East and Lilongwe West are part of Lilongwe District. They are only designated as districts in the 
classification of agricultural zones in Malawi
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          (AEDO)10 at Mitundu to cooperate with me on the study.
Mitundu EPA
 Mitundu EPA is located 30 km southeast of the capital Lilongwe and it covers 
the area under Traditional Authorities (TAs) Chiseka and Msinja. These are both Chewa 
Chiefs and Chewa people dominate the area. The EPA is comprised of 819 villages with
11973 male headed households (MHH) and 10866 female headed households (FHH). It 
has a total of 15,649.5 Ha arable land and 6555.4 Ha non-arable land. Of this, 21,230 Ha 
is under smallholder cultivation while estates occupy 974.5 Ha. Located on the flat lying 
Lilongwe plains, Mitundu EPA covers a rich agricultural area with dark red soils. It has 
three distinct seasons; dry, cool and rainy seasons and it registers between 800-1200 mm 
of mean annual rainfall which is favorable to most field crops. The length of the growing 
season is between 135 - 150 days and it usually coincides with the rainy months of
November to April (see figure 4.1 showing map of Malawi and figure 4.2 showing map of 
Mitundu EPA).
Figure 4.1: Map of Malawi Showing Lilongwe District
10 Agricultural Extension Development Officer (AEDO) is the title of the officer in charge of an EPA
Source: Agricultural Land Resources Unit, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water 
Development, Malawi
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          Figure 4.2: Map of Mitundu EPA
Source: Agricultural Land Resources Unit, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water 
Development, Malawi
 Socioeconomically, Mitundu is an important agricultural and commercial center 
in several ways. First, it encompasses a rich agricultural area, such that it is considered 
the breadbasket for the capital. The EPA is a key source of farm produce including maize, 
beans, cassava and sweet potatoes. In the months of March to June multitudes of trucks 
ply the road from Mitundu Trading center into the capital bringing sweet potatoes to 
markets in the city. Small scale farmers and traders hauling oversized sacks of sweet 
potatoes on bicycles compete for a share of the road with the trucks as they too make 
their way to the city markets. Sweet potatoes are an important snack and breakfast food in 
Malawian urban centers, creating a big demand for the tubers for which farmers are
happy to supply. When the potatoes go out of season, the same trucks and bicycles can 
be seen ferrying cassava on the same route, to the same markets. Such is the importance 
of Mitundu that the construction of a tarmac road from the city to Mitundu trading center 
was justified on the premise of this being a rich agricultural area.
 Secondly, owing to the agricultural produce and relatively easy accessibility to 
the city, Mitundu has developed into a relatively large trading center. On market days, 
which fall on Saturdays and Wednesdays, people and business persons from the city and 
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          other parts of Lilongwe flock to Mitundu to buy agricultural produce for consumption or 
for sale back in the city. Some traders also bring goods for sale including second hand 
clothes, household items and other consumer goods. Several large farm input supply 
chains as well as locally owned suppliers of seed and fertilizer have opened businesses 
here to be close to the farming population.
 Thirdly, Mitundu is close to the Mozambican border. As such, there is always 
traffic of people going to trade between the two countries. Mozambican traders frequent 
Mitundu to sell their wares and buy wares for resell in their country. As a rich agricultural 
area which is easily accessible to the capital serving volumes of people and as a gateway 
to Mozambique, Mitundu is connected to the region, nationally and across the borders of 
Malawi. People have access to trade opportunities. They can easily board a truck, bus or 
ride a bicycle to sell their wares in town and shop for their needs. While many areas in 
Malawi experienced food shortages in 2015/16 due to erratic rainfall (Malawi 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee11, Fewsnet 201612 , World Food Program13), 
Mitundu had relatively good harvests. Droves of informal traders descended on the 
villages in the EPA to buy maize. The dynamics of the food market come into play and 
affect the income and food security of the people of the region. Labor is another 
connection between Mitundu and the urban economy. Some residents commute from 
Mitundu and surrounding villages to work in the city as low level clerks, maids and 
guards (watchmen).
 From land use records at the EPA, the AEDO and I noted that Khubwi Section is 
the most prolific producer of tobacco in the EPA and we settled on Kumala as the village 
where I would conduct my study because the village had a long history of growing 
tobacco in the EPA and most people depended on income from tobacco.
The Village
 Kumala village is located about 5km west of Mitundu trading center and is easily 
accessible by car or the many bicycle taxis (Kabaza) that ply the route. It is off a major 
11 http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp285528.pdf
12 http://www.fews.net/southern-africa/malawi
13 https://www.wfp.ord/news/news-release/wfp-begins-unprecedented-emergency-food-relief-
operation-drought-hit-malawi
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          earth road that passes through residential areas and farmlands connecting Mitundu to 
Malingunde, another major trading center further west. Turning off the road, a narrow 
path descends into the village. Standing at an incline, the village is a mixture of all types 
of dwellings. Most houses are made of earth and thatched with grass but a few are made 
of burnt bricks and roofed with iron sheets; a reminder of the village’s more prosperous 
past. A household usually has two to three houses depending on the size of the household. 
If the household owns livestock, the pens are built close to the houses. Kumala is a rather 
concentrated settlement such that most people have their farm plots outside the village al-
though a few households have farm plots next to their houses. Households typically have 
multiple plots spread across the area which means that they have to walk or bike to their 
fields.
 Down the slope, beyond the village and at the end of the incline is a dambo - a
wet land on the banks of a small perennial river usually covered with green grass for 
most of the year. Some residents have plots at the dambo called dimbas where they grow 
vegetables, beans, sweet potatoes and summer maize using hand-irrigated water from the 
river. The dambo is also where tobacco growers make nurseries for tobacco seedlings. 
Looming further west is Dzalanyama Forest, a government protected forest reserve where 
some Kumala residents go to harvest wood and some to make charcoal.
Entering the Study Site
 Having settled on the site, the Extension Officer for Khubwi Section escorted me 
to the village to meet with Village Headman Kamala. Upon learning the purpose of my 
trip, the headman convened a meeting with all the other chiefs in order to allow me to 
explain my research plans. At the meeting I briefly introduced myself as a student at the 
University of Kentucky interested in studying the community’s perception of long-term 
trends in agriculture with a focus on  tobacco farming. At the end of my briefing one of 
the chiefs raised his hand to speak. He asked whether this was all just about research or 
whether at some point I will be coming up with a program to distribute farm inputs. This 
was to be anticipated. Historically, most of the research conducted by government and 
development agencies has been done either as pre-project assessments or as baseline or 
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          evaluation studies related to some project intervention. This makes it harder for academic 
researchers like me to justify studies with no immediate project intervention. In response 
I clarified that I was a student with no affiliation to any government or non-governmental 
agency and I will not be rolling out any projects. The next question was, also expectedly, 
about what I intended to do with the results of the study. I proceeded to elaborate on the 
benefits of this kind of research to the tobacco farming community and the country as a 
whole. I explained that the findings will help me and people in policy making positions 
in government and other agencies to understand how farmers were coping with changes 
in the markets for the crop they depend on. After a brief discussion among themselves 
they approved the plan and allowed me access to the households in the village. After this 
meeting, I noticed that people were open to talking to me and to answer my questions. I 
hired a research assistant from the village to escort me around and I began to learn about 
the village and the people.
   4.2 The People
 The area of study is popularly known as Kumala Village but in fact Kumala is just 
one of seven villages under Group Village Headman Michembo. The other villages are 
Kumala, Chanonga, Lunguzi, Kumsalula, Gwengwe, Chitani, and Langwani. Though all 
residents born in the village now self-identify as of Chewa ethnicity, they are 
essentially an amalgamation of different ethnic groups that came into the area and settled 
under the chieftainship of Michembo. For example, the Kumalas were originally 
Ngonis from Mozambique who came to the area through Ntcheu in Central Malawi 
passing through Dedza on their way to the present site. By the time they arrived at the 
present site in the early 1930s, they had already picked up Chewa customs. Until recently 
the heads of these seven sub-villages were merely recognized as family heads and not 
village headmen. With the coming of a government farm input subsidy program in mid 
2000s, the families were designated as villages so that they could access subsidized in-
puts in their own right. Now the new village heads are responsible for their own families 
(now called villages) on matters of marriages, land, family disputes, and other ceremonial 
functions like funerals and passage ceremonies. For purposes of this study, Michembo 
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          with its seven sub- villages is considered a singular unit of study but is referred to as 
Kumala in line with popular usage in the area.
 Being Chewa, the people of Kumala practice matrilineal and matrilocal marriage 
where kinship and inheritance is traced through women. In times of old, upon getting 
married men would go to live with the families of their wives. These days men are likely 
to bring their wives into their own household. However, according to the census, 30% of 
husbands indicated that they came to live in the village following their wives.
   4.3 Livelihoods
 As observed by other researchers in Malawi and elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa 
that diversification is the feature of rural life (Orr & Mwale 2001, Peters 1997, Bryceson 
1997), the people of Kumala practice a range of both on and off-farm livelihood activities 
differentiated by gender and socioeconomic status.  The wealthiest households have the 
most diversified livelihood activities, the most important of which is tobacco farming. All 
wealthy households grew tobacco and all of them had contracts with a tobacco company. 
The wealthiest households also keep larger livestock such as cattle and pigs. While there 
is no established market for beef, cattle are kept as accumulated assets. Trained oxen are 
occasionally hired out to neighbors for ploughing and pulling oxcarts. Pigs are considered 
a village bank to be sold when money is needed urgently, although one household in the 
top sold pork as a business activity. Households in the top wealth category also keep 
assets like ox-carts and bailing jacks which they hire out. In addition, they have more 
farm plots; on average households in the top tier work over five farm plots. They may not 
necessarily own all the plots they work on. There is a vibrant market for rented farm plots 
in the village such that anyone with money can rent a farm plot and grow crops on it. 
Plots are rented on a yearly basis or on a multi-year arrangement. Another distinctive 
feature of the wealthiest segment is that this is the only group that produced surplus 
maize. Rather than sell it on the market as less wealthy households do, these households 
use the surplus maize to feed permanent workers and to pay casual laborers.
 In the middle socioeconomic tier are households with between two and four farm 
plots, most likely growing tobacco on contract with a tobacco company but not with 
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          as many assets like oxcarts, bailing jacks or big livestock. These households tended to 
have relatively fewer livelihood activities and they mostly invested time and resources 
on on- farm activities, and a few were employed as primary school teachers or guards 
at a nearby mission school or hospital. In the lowest socioeconomic tier are the highly 
land constrained households. These households lack land and resources to grow enough 
maize for household consumption, and they actively pursued off-farm activities including 
petty trading of vegetables and dried fish, and beer brewing. This category also relied on 
selling labor and extraction of natural resources such as hauling and selling firewood and 
charcoal in town for a significant proportion of their incomes.
On-Farm Livelihood Activities
 On farm-livelihood activities underpin the village economy with rain fed farming 
as the primary livelihood activity, in addition to dimba farming, livestock keeping and 
raising trees for sale. Farm sizes range from a quarter of an acre to two acres. However, 
residents may have several plots spread through the surrounding areas. There is a wide 
diversity of crops with maize, groundnuts, tobacco, soy, sweet potatoes, beans, and 
cowpeas as the most common crops. Farm production revolves around maize which 
almost every household grows for consumption and for sale. Maize is intercropped with 
beans, pigeon peas, cowpeas and other legumes like soy. Two households were an 
exception to this rule as one grew soy and the other beans as cash crops with the intention 
of selling in town. Second in popularity is groundnuts which most people grow in 
addition to maize. Although it is not grown by every household, tobacco remains the most 
important cash crop in the village as I elaborate below.
 Dimba farming takes place on dambos which are flat lands along rivers which 
may or may not be flooded. Dambos are good for agriculture because they usually have 
rich fertile soils (Wiyo et al 2015). People in Kumala use dimbas to grow vegetables, 
sweet potatoes , beans and summer maize. Growing dimba maize in the summer is quite 
lucrative. Unlike maize grown in upland fields during the rainy season, green summer 
maize has a readily available market. Fresh maize is a popular snack in Malawi, 
commonly sold on street sides either boiled or roasted. Traders come all the way from 
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          Mitundu trading center to Kumala to buy green maize from the dimbas for sale at either 
back in Mitundu or in Lilongwe. My calculations showed that a quarter of an acre of 
dimba maize could produce MK40, 000 ($86 in 2015). People told me that they use this 
income for household needs and to buy fertilizer to grow maize in upland gardens in the 
next growing season. Ironically, the prospects for rain fed maize is not always assured 
owing to erratic rains. Furthermore, since most households sell their surplus maize to 
traders right after harvest, they end up creating a glut which depresses prices.
 Raising vegetables in the dimbas is also a potentially lucrative activity. One of the 
respondents from the case study households opted to go into vegetables full time after 
he fell off the tobacco wagon. He grew okra, cabbage, onions and chillies for sell. From 
0.3 acre of chillies he made MK400,000 ($869 in 2015) which is what on average a good 
tobacco farmer can make from an acre of tobacco.
 The people of Kumala are lucky to have access to a diversified ecological system 
which includes a wetland. If well utilized these wetlands could help them sidestep the 
problem of seasonality that plagues rural livelihoods of many smallholders in Africa 
(Ellis 2006). A well developed horticulture in the dimbas is one option that could 
immensely increase incomes, and improve food security, and reduce dependence on 
tobacco. A study in Ntcheu and Dedza districts in central Malawi found that dimba
farming contributed as much as 70% of household income (Wiyo and Kasomekera 1994). 
Even at national level with the droughts, volatile weather and food insecurity that 
persistently plague the country, dimba farming has been suggested as a long-term 
solution. But as of yet dimbas do not feature in any policies for water and irrigation 
development at national level (Chinsinga 2007). A deliberate government policy would 
encourage people to put more energy and resources into dimba farming as opposed to 
upland agriculture. The irony is that people in Kumala use dimbas to raise resources for 
upland agriculture which is less productive as compared to dimba farming. Dimbas are 
also key for upward mobility in Kumala. Although strictly speaking, land is never sold, 
most dimba owners rent out pieces of land to others if they are unable to work 
themselves. This allows a lot more people to have access to the dimba. Rent arrangements 
can be made on a yearly basis or for three or more years. The existence of this market for 
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          land enables landless young people to get started on their farming career as for the most 
part dimba farming requires very little resources.
 Some residents, especially the older ones have wood plots where they raise trees, 
mostly eucalyptus species, for sale as poles for building houses and tobacco barns. 
Thirty-three households reported having woodlots ranging from a quarter of an acre to 
one and half acre. This was an initiative of a European Union funded  project that brought 
seedlings and taught the villagers some forest husbandry practices. A half acre with 500 
trees each selling at MK100 would give a farmer MK50,000 ($108.6 in 2015) which is 
good money in the village; equivalent to what an acre of groundnuts would fetch. The 
woodlots if well taken care of ensure a steady flow of income on a yearly basis as there is 
demand for poles in the village and beyond.
Off-Farm Livelihood Activities
 All households have members engaged in off-farm non agricultural activities. 
These include petty trading (buying and selling of tomato, onions dried fish and groceries 
etc), produce vending (buying and reselling maize, groundnuts etc), harvesting and 
selling firewood from the forest and beer brewing.
 Produce vending was associated with youthful and energetic men. People carrying 
out these jobs were not the poorest but they still lacked adequate resources and land to 
stand on their own. With just a little capital, they buy produce from other villagers and 
supplement it with their own harvest to sell. The buyers are other traders from town who 
need bigger quantities. These bigger traders do not have the time to traverse the villages 
to buy from villagers who probably want to sell small quantities at a time. The young 
men from the village save them this trouble by acting as middlemen. Although despised 
by villagers, these “vendors” carry out a vital function by linking the farmers to buyers. 
They are also very shrewd businessmen; buying and selling several times in the season 
to recycle their money and sometimes withholding stock when prices go down. In an 
in- depth interview one produce vendor said he didn’t find farming profitable and that he 
would rather stick to buying and selling.
 Charcoal and firewood selling was associated with the poorest “whose only 
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          valuable asset was the bicycle”. Harvesting and selling firewood and charcoal making are 
dangerous and back breaking pursuits. They involve going into Dzalanyama, a protected 
forest reserve in the mountains to cut wood or make charcoal for sale. If they succeed, 
they have to haul the wood or charcoal back to the village from where they chop it into 
size bits and arrange it before taking it into town on bicycle to sell. While the 
government allows villagers to go inside the forest reserve to harvest dried up and dead 
wood, it does not allow people to fell trees and make charcoal. Due to public outcry 
about the depletion of the reserve, government stationed an Army unit to guard the forest. 
Villagers going into the reserve risk being caught and mistreated by soldiers. If they do 
manage to avoid getting caught in the reserve, carrying their loads into town is another 
ordeal to go through. In addition to the risk of getting knocked down by vehicles, there 
are numerous road blocks in town manned by police and forestry officers. The latter are 
sorely on the lookout for illegal wood and charcoal traders. The line between legal and 
illegal is hazy such that all people participating in this trade consider themselves at risk 
because any encounter with police or forestry officers results into their charcoal or wood 
being confiscated. Addison, one of the respondents I interviewed on the topic related that 
despite the ordeals they have to go through, it is a profitable venture.
 The people of Kumala pursue different livelihood pathways and activities 
according to their social economic status. Households in the lower socioeconomic 
categories pursue livelihoods pathways oriented towards off-farm activities, mostly based 
on natural resource exploitation and petty trading out of necessity. Households and 
individuals in the top socioeconomic category have diversified livelihood portfolios with 
both on-farm and off-farm activities as a way to spread risk. However, in Kumala 
tobaccoplays a key role in the livelihoods of all socioeconomic categories whether a 
house grows it or not. In the next section I discuss the role of tobacco in Kumala 
community.
     4.4 The Place of Tobacco in Kumala Society
 Tobacco is a commodity with implications on the household as well as the 
community. This section examines the relationships that members of tobacco growing 
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          households enter into and maintain throughout the tobacco growing and marketing cycle. 
These are the relations that not only make smallholder tobacco production possible, but 
also make it the successful export crop as Malawians know it. These intra- household 
relations allow for the mobilization of labor, shape access to resources for production and 
are avenues for marketing the tobacco leaf. The norms that go with belonging to these 
household relations also provide guidance for the distribution of proceeds from tobacco 
sales. The goal of this discussion is to show the centrality of household labor to 
smallholder tobacco production in Kumala and to illustrate the role of tobacco in the 
reproduction of the household and the community.
 From the village census conducted as part of this study, 34% of the households 
reported growing tobacco in the 2014/15 growing season. This proportion might seem 
small for an important cash crop but this needs to be interpreted with caution. To begin 
with, tobacco is not a crop for the poorest segment of the village population owing to the 
large amounts of resources in inputs and labor required to grow the crop (Peters 1997, 
Takane 2008). Precisely because of these two reasons (inputs and labor scarcity) tobacco 
is also important to the village economy as a redistributive factor. Households that grew 
tobacco are mostly those with household heads in the mid-stage of their life-cycle. This is 
easy to understand as this is the group with all the energy and the resources to grow 
tobacco. This is also the group with ambitions to improve their socioeconomic 
circumstances and the energy to work for  their dreams. In one focus group discussion, 
participants observed that tobacco growers were typically people with more land than the 
average resident, had more resources, and were more educated. Observations showed that 
non-growers were mostly young households who were just starting out, and the elderly 
(late stage of the life-cycle) who had neither the energy nor the resources to command 
labor. Further to this, the number of people growing tobacco in a particular season is 
partly influenced by leaf prices on the market in the previous season. If a grower fetched 
low prices at the tobacco market, chances are they will not have enough resources to 
invest in tobacco the next growing season. They would then not grow tobacco that year 
as they try to build more resources to try again. As such, people fall in and out of tobacco 
growing depending on availability of resources or access to credit.
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          Tobacco is important to the social, economic and cultural life of the village for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, tobacco is a key part of a repertoire of crops and income 
activities. Households grow tobacco, maize and groundnuts as key crops. Tobacco and 
groundnuts are cash crops while maize is for household subsistence and where surpluses 
are made, for paying casual laborers. Farmers usually rotate farm plots because tobacco 
and maize take a lot of nutrients from the soil. Groundnuts is usually rotated in to restore 
nitrogen into the soil. Secondly, tobacco is central to the food self-sufficiency of the 
households. The only (few) households with maize in their granaries were the top tobacco 
growing households. This is because with rising costs of fertilizer, only successful 
tobacco growers can afford expensive fertilizers to grow maize. Even for the poor 
households tobacco is also a bridge to survive the hunger months. The length of the 
growing season of the tobacco crop ensures that it begins to mature from end of January 
and March which are considered “hunger months” by the villagers. Poor households that 
can’t afford adequate fertilizer to grow a decent tobacco crop to sell at the auction floors 
still grow it to sale to intermediate buyers and “vendors.” Intermediate buyers with only 
rudimentary knowledge of tobacco quality are known to buy even the worst quality leaf. 
They roam the villages looking for tobacco during the hunger months and villagers look 
at this as an opportunity to sell their tobacco and earn quick money to buy food.
 Thirdly, tobacco has over the years taken on meanings of what it means to be a 
successful man because it is the surest route to accumulate assets. Except for the very 
few that consciously stopped growing tobacco to pursue other interests, growers and 
non-growers alike were adamant about the centrality of tobacco to their notions of 
wellbeing. “All these houses you see with bricks and iron sheet roofing? That’s tobacco 
money. There is no other crop that will bring you that kind of money. You don’t grow 
tobacco, you are nothing” (Fanwell, October 2014). The villagers claimed that in the past 
when tobacco farming was still profitable they were able to build decent houses and ac-
quire goods like bicycles, motor bikes and even motor vehicles. Tobacco allowed them to 
acquire assets such as livestock, oxcarts, and tobacco bailing jacks. Even now when some 
people realize that tobacco is not as profitable, they grow it as an insurance and savings 
scheme. “If something were to happen and I needed money urgently, I can borrow money 
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          from local money lenders on the strength of a tobacco crop. All they need is to see that 
you have a tobacco stand and they know you can pay either using the tobacco leaf or with 
money”(Feston, October 2014). For others, tobacco farming is a savings scheme. “you 
only do it to save and recycle money”. Such is the importance of tobacco and the 
meanings associated with it in Kumala.
     4.5 Tobacco, Farm Household, and Community in Kumala
 In this section I discuss the household setting at Kumala as the primary social unit 
for organizing agricultural labor, managing productive resources, organizing 
consumption, and for biological and  social reproduction (Netting 1993). A study of 
tobacco production at the household level illuminates labor organization processes built 
upon  unequal gendered and generational social relations in the household. It highlights 
the overt and subtle ways in which the organization of production and marketing of 
tobacco invests control with household heads to ensure tobacco remains a male
dominated crop. Ultimately, it sheds light on processes of reproduction of family life in 
Kumala. I also focus on the household as an adaptive unit which reflects how changes in 
the broader social and economic environment influence individual life decisions. Wilk 
(1997) and, Netting (1993) argue that changes in the form and composition of the 
household show the flexibility of the household to changes in socioeconomic 
environment such as political and economic shocks, land constraints and population 
pressure. Here I discuss the organization of the household to show how smallholder 
tobacco production is possible but also to suggest a framework for using changes in 
household form to highlight the impact of an unstable market tobacco market.
Household Composition
 Monogamy is the prevalent form of marriage at Kumala. Chewa villages 
elsewhere in Lilongwe are noted for polygamous families but in Kumala polygamy is 
extremely rare. From the census, out of 137 households only 3 reported being 
polygamous - a man having two wives. Even where a polygamous union was recorded, 
the other spouse lived in a different village. Households are commonly composed of a 
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          couple, their children and sometimes, nephews and nieces. In some cases a widowed 
parent and workers are also part of the household. Newly married children are expected 
to live within their parents’ household for at least one to two years and put in their share 
in farm production work but they usually maintain their own house where they cook their 
meals separately. In cases where more than one married child stay near their parents, an 
extended household is formed composed of semi-autonomous and cooperative 
households. In such cases the family may work together on the parents’ farm plots in 
addition to having individual plots and other non-farm enterprises.
 The household is the primary unit for organizing labor as part of members’ 
obligations to the household. To demonstrate belonging to a household, a member is 
obliged to participate in labor activities such as farm work, building maize granaries, 
building and maintaining tobacco barns, participating in community work on behalf of 
the household. For women household duties include cleaning house, cooking, and farm 
work. Tobacco production among smallholders at Kumala is primarily dependent on 
family labor. A household head, his wife and children all work in the tobacco fields. 
This applies even for married sons living in the household. Upon getting married the son 
moves out of his father’s house. This is called “kupatula nkhali”-”separating the cooking 
pots”. This means the son and his wife move out to separate quarters and a separate 
kitchen. They have some autonomy but not completely independent of the head of the 
household. Depending on the availability of resources and the relationship between 
father and son, the father may give the son a farm plot and capital. After one year the son 
delinks from the household. More often than not, the head of the household prefers to 
keep the newly married son in his fold for two to three years to take advantage of their 
labor. The head of the household (usually the man) takes charge of key productive 
activities. As the one with access to input loans and marketing services providers, he 
makes decisions on how much land will be allocated to tobacco and the other crops in 
a particular year. Such decisions are made on the basis of practical considerations such 
as the availability of labor as well as a crop rotation cycle of maize, groundnuts (or any 
other legume) and tobacco.
 In return for labor the household has obligations to its members. Members of 
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          the household are entitled to having their welfare taken care of including provisions of 
food, education etc. Every member of the household expects a share from proceeds from 
collective labor, especially proceeds from tobacco sales. Tobacco being a family crop has 
many claims staked on it as the entire household can claim to have participated in the 
production. Once the tobacco is finally sold, the male household head controls the 
earnings but is expected to distribute a share to his wife, and his married children. As 
such tobacco sales season is very much anticipated in the household so much so that there 
is pressure to keep growing - resources allowing.
 Households are also expected to transmit property to younger members and 
facilitate the establishment of new households. Married sons accept to live and work in 
their parents’ fields with expectations of an inheritance of land, and provisions of money 
and inputs that will enable them to set up their own farmstead. This expectation is taken 
seriously and serious disagreements may result if this expectation is not honored by the 
household head. The following story illustrates the conflict that may arise when 
expectations are not met.
 William Phiri has nine children- all of them married. The last one, Dennis got 
married in 2014 and lives with his wife in his father’s compound. William has five farm 
plots which he previously worked with the help of an employee in addition to family 
labor. When the employee left, all his responsibilities fell on Dennis. From January to 
March Dennis worked in his father’s maize and tobacco fields from 6 am to 5pm, only 
taking a break at lunch. Balancing tobacco and maize is a tough act. The two crops be-
come labor intensive from January to March requiring no less than two rounds of weed-
ing for each field, two fertilizer applications and the beginning of harvesting of the tobac-
co leaves. After tobacco leaf is harvested and taken to the family compound, an intensive 
work process begins to tie the leaves together in a bunch. The bunches are then hung out 
in a curing barn to dry. Dennis did all this work diligently for his father, 
hoping that at the end of the season he would get enough money to support his family, 
and at least buy farm inputs for himself for the next season. When the tobacco went for 
sale and charges for input loans, transport and other levies had been deducted, the profit 
came up to MK300,000 ($600). His father gave him MK20, 000 ($40). For being a son 
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          and a member of the household, and for being a newly married man who needs resources 
to set himself up in farming, he felt the money was too little. He expressed his frustration 
to friends and he was reportedly making arrangements to move to his wife’s village.
 The story illustrates the generational relations at play and the types of conflict that 
may arise if sons find living arrangements to no longer be satisfactory. Dennis believed 
that his father withheld harvest income in order to keep him at home; without sufficient 
income Dennis, and indeed other young men, cannot establish independent farmsteads. It 
also illustrates the expectations that members of a household have in terms of assistance 
with the reproduction of new households. These expectations are more intense where 
tobacco farming is involved. Dennis’ disenchantment was in no small measure because 
his father was growing tobacco and he wanted to do the same. If he only wanted to grow 
groundnuts or soy he would not have as high expectations.
     4.6 Tobacco and Gender Relations in the Household
 Tobacco highlights the power inequalities in the household illustrated by the 
division of labor over control of crops as well as control of proceeds from exchange. 
Male heads of households admitted to taking control of key crops such as tobacco, maize 
and Soy. Tobacco is decidedly a man’s crop. Female headed households and those house-
holds where the man is temporarily away refrain from growing tobacco, choosing to 
concentrate on food crops instead. Asked why they don’t venture into tobacco, heads of 
female headed households (FHHs) cited lack of adequate labor as the main reason. With-
in the household tobacco becomes the man’s crop because of institutional practices and 
discourses that favor adult men while minimizing the contributions of women and young 
people. The two key factors that limit women’s full participation in tobacco production 
within households are access to land and access to tobacco institutions.
Tobacco and Access to Land
 The people of Kumala have well defined customary land tenure system where 
the rights to land are invested in the most senior member of the household, who in turn 
allocates the land to family members. Transfer of land is through inheritance, often when 
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          a child gets married. Both male and female children receive land from their parents. The 
control of land allows the household head to acquire registration numbers and a quota 
from the Tobacco Control Commission which allows the grower to produce a specific 
amount of tobacco. The registration number also allows growers access to the tobacco 
market. Husbands who marry into the village have land use rights to their wife’s land but 
they cannot dispose of it. As such, even they can use farm plots belonging to their wives 
to obtain a registration number. The registration number is an important asset for any 
tobacco grower. It is the key that allows one to transact in the tobacco business and those 
growers with a clean and valid registration number often use it can transact on behalf of 
those without. In this way it can be used to control other people’s labor.
Access to Institutions
 Tobacco has also turned out to be a male dominated crop through restricted access 
to tobacco institutions which favor men. The burley club is a key institution at village 
level through which most smallholder tobacco growers access input loans, extension 
services, transportation services and other marketing logistics. Membership to the burley 
clubs at Kumala was exclusively male. There were no women on the membership lists 
of the two clubs in the village. In his study on tobacco livelihoods after the liberalization 
of burley, Orr (2000) found that in his sample only 12% of club members were women. 
Club members told me they knew of instances in other clubs with female membership but 
these were isolated cases. Self-selection plays a key part in driving away female mem-
bership. As an example, financial institutions and leaf companies make loans for tobacco 
production through clubs. Although each club member gets their share of the inputs, in 
the books of the lenders the loans are made to the group- an arrangement known as sever-
al liability in the lending industry. In the event of a member failing to pay their portion of 
the loan, the club is required to step in to pay the defaulter’s loan. This gives the incentive 
for club members to select only people they perceive as reliable and capable growers 
to ensure that nobody defaults (see also Takane 2008). General lack of resources and 
domestic duties prevent women from giving as much care to tobacco as men can which 
excludes them from consideration for club membership. As a result, women tend to focus 
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          more on low resource intense crops such as beans and groundnuts. Of these, groundnuts 
is the most popular cash crop after tobacco. Women handle the 
processing and marketing of groundnuts and control the earnings. The status of 
groundnuts is fluid depending on the fortunes of the household in tobacco. Key 
informants related that groundnuts used to be entirely a woman’s crop before 2005. After 
a series of tobacco price crises, men who fared badly at tobacco markets began to take an 
interest in groundnuts as a fall back crop. When the household has fallen off the tobacco 
bandwagon, they switch all their attention to groundnuts as a cash crop to rebuild cash 
reserves. In this case the head of the household takes full control of the crop.
     4.7 Linking Labor, Production, and the Household
 This discussion has shown how tobacco is dependent on unpaid family labor and 
how household organization makes smallholder tobacco production possible. It also 
illuminates the household as a site of exploitation. Through control of resources such as 
land and the tobacco registration number that gives him access to the industry, a male 
head of household has access to institutions, the financial resources and marketing 
services. Through these he can lay claim to household labor, control production and 
marketing of tobacco and thus the economic fortunes of the household. The other 
household members provide labor and cede the marketing to the head of the household 
and hope for the best. Experience has shown that not all heads of households are benign. 
When the tobacco is sold the seller sheet with information on how much tobacco was sold 
and at what price is sent to the owner of the registration number. In informal 
conversations, some wives in tobacco growing households related that they never get to 
see their husbands’ sellers sheet. In my own study I tried to verify incomes of growers in 
my case study group by looking at the sellers sheets. People would often say they 
misplaced it or it was with a friend who lives in the next village. This lack of 
transparency paves the way for exploitation and deepening of existing gender 
inequalities. The household is dynamic where members move in and out to pursue 
individual interests. It is a place where obligations and rights need to be carefully 
balanced otherwise disaffected members end up leaving. Beyond the household tobacco 
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          has a critical role in the social reproduction of the community through processes of labor 
exchange which is key for upward mobility for young people. Tobacco is also facilitating 
the emergence of a local entrepreneurial class that is interested in buying and reselling 
tobacco leaf for profit
     4.8 Tobacco and Community: Mobilization of Labor Beyond the Household
 Beyond the household, production of tobacco also has implications for the 
community. In this discussion I describe the role of tobacco in reproducing the 
community through labor exchange. As the key cash crop that brings money into the 
village, tobacco facilitates labor exchange processes. This impacts the community in two 
profound ways. Firstly, mobilization of labor in the community provides the means for 
coping with unfavorable livelihood outcomes for poorer people. Secondly, labor 
exchange facilitates the regeneration of the community by allowing young people to build 
assets and set up their own households.
 Tobacco is a labor intensive crop and a lot of that labor is required at the 
beginning of August when land preparation in the gardens and tobacco nurseries begins. 
Critical and time specific tasks such as transplanting, fertilizer application, weeding and 
leaf picking all require significant amounts of labor. The need for labor is more acute 
from December up to February when these farm activities also coincide with similar 
activities in maize. At peak times of the growing season when labor demand is at its 
highest, family and hired labor work together from early in the morning up until around 
12 noon when the family may go home for lunch and rest. Hired labor is expected to 
continue working up until late early afternoon when family labor comes again to join 
in. At these peak times work goes on up until in the evening all week, come hail or rain. 
Labor arrangements come in three forms; seasonal fixed wage contract, casual labor, and 
the tenancy. Tenancy has already been discussed in chapter 2. Here I discuss fixed wage 
contract and casual labor.
 Fixed wage contract also comes in two forms; monthly wage contracts and 
seasonal contracts. The monthly contract is where the farmer and the worker agree on 
a monthly wage. The seasonal contract is where the worker is paid a pre-agreed lump 
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          sum at the end of the tobacco growing season. Typically a worker on a monthly wage 
contract gets MK2000 ($2.74) per month. The seasonal contract is the most prevalent 
form of labor arrangement in Kumala. Relatively well established growers choose to hire 
kin for seasonal contracts; mostly nephews or distant relatives. There could be altruistic 
reasons as these wealthier farmers may want to reinforce or create ties with kin (Englund 
1999). But they may also hire kin because relatives are not likely to make trouble if they 
are paid a lower rate than agreed. In some cases rather than hire labor from among kin, a 
grower with access to resources may advance inputs to close relations so they can grow 
the tobacco on their own plots. Upon harvest, the owner of the resources gets his share of 
tobacco leaf leaving the rest to the sub-contracted grower to sell. This arrangement puts 
relatives to work but it also helps them get established with their farming. Those who can 
afford it may hire non-relations or people from outside the area altogether to be sure they 
will concentrate on their work, but strangers easily become disagreeable if contractual 
obligations are not met. This seasonal labor arrangement is now common among tobac-
co growers as the tenancy system has waned in the area. With the history of exploitative 
practices under the tenancy system, many laborers have become assertive on matters 
related to wages and demand that they be paid a fixed mutually agreed amount. Further-
more, workers prefer this arrangement as they don’t want to take on the risk of produc-
tion together with the farmer in case tobacco sales don’t go well that year. Depending on 
age and experience, a laborer could expect to be paid wages in the range of MK20,000 to 
30,000 ($43-65 at $=460, 2015 exchange rate) for a season’s worth of labor.
 Casual labor, locally known as ganyu, is a very important fixture of the village 
economy in Kumala. The term ganyu covers a broad range of labor activities, but in rural 
livelihoods literature it mostly refers to short term  agricultural related piecework where 
payment is through cash or food (Kerr 2005, Whiteside 2000). The tasks include land 
preparation, weeding, harvesting, making and tending to tobacco nurseries among others. 
Having said that, any short-term work done by semi-skilled artisans like brick layers is 
also referred to as ganyu. Land and resource constrained households consistently 
indicated that they rely on finding work as casual laborers, alongside selling firewood and 
charcoal, as a significant source of livelihood. At the peak of the growing season, which 
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          also happens to be the peak of the hunger season, resource poor households rely on ganyu 
to earn money to buy food. In some cases households that own land but had suffered a 
livelihood crisis were also found in the category of people performing ganyu work. In a 
group interview on the history of livelihood crises in the village, respondents related that 
in 2004 when Bakili Muluzi was President of Malawi, tobacco prices were particularly 
bad and most tobacco growers lost money such that they could not raise funds to start 
farming again. Some of these households fell into the category of ganyu laborers. These 
households combined ganyu with other extractive activities such as selling firewood and 
charcoal.
 Labor exchange (both ganyu or seasonal contract labor) is an important piece of 
the puzzle in the process of coming into being for a young man. Young people with no 
land or capital rely on ganyu labor to accumulate savings with the view of using those 
savings to acquire farm plots and inputs. GC, a young man from one of my case study 
households started doing ganyu in the dimbas of other wealthier people while he was 
still in school. He worked dimbas for a year and the next year he rented a dimba of his 
own and started growing vegetables. At present he works on two farm plots in addition 
to the dimba he bought. Another respondent AC, a young man of 24 years was given one 
acre by his parents and another acre came from his wife’s parents. But he did not have 
the resources to buy fertilizer and to pay for extra help. He engaged in several activities 
including working in other people’s gardens. When I met him for the second round of 
interviews, he had just harvested his maize and groundnuts from the previous season and 
he was preparing to go into tobacco. He used his earnings from ganyu and other 
activities to buy fertilizer and inputs so he could start farming on his own. Other 
respondents recounted similar stories of how they started on a low note, some despite 
having wealthy relatives. Thus ganyu is a very important activity in the process of 
establishing oneself in Kumala. Without the option of ganyu, many young people would 
find it difficult to establish their own households. Because most crops are grown for 
subsistence tobacco is the key crop that brings money into the village and keeps it 
circulating. It is tobacco that is the backbone of labor exchange in the village.
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            4.9 Tobacco and Local Exchange: Intermediate Traders and Money Lenders
 Tobacco is also important in places like Kumala because it has facilitated the rise 
of an entrepreneurial cadre that sees its future away from the production aspect of the 
crop and more into the exchange part of it. In a seasonal village economy with 
distinct periods of scarcity and plenty, people need injections of cash to help them 
through the lean periods. The intermediate tobacco trader - the vendor is a much vilified 
and yet indispensable figure in the local village economy. Though vilified for their 
exploitative tendencies, vendors and money lenders play a critical role to sustain the 
village economy by providing cash for consumption and investment.
 The Intermediate Tobacco Buyer (IB) scheme introduced by Government upon 
the liberalization of the tobacco industry in the early 90s, issued licenses and quotas to 
business persons to buy tobacco from farmers, and sell it at the auction floors (Koester et 
al 2004). The scheme was suspended in 2000 following complaints from the industry of 
poor quality tobacco coming from IBs and the poor prices paid to growers by the 
vendors. The ban did nothing to kill the system as it continues unofficially. Only this 
time, an individual (usually a business person) obtains an estate tobacco grower’s 
license, but instead of growing the crop, they simply buy it from other farmers and sell 
it on auction market. At the time when tobacco is ripening (from January to March) an 
assortment of itinerant traders armed with weighing scales and cash supplied by their 
town based bosses go through the villages buying tobacco from the farmers. This period 
also happens to be the peak of the hunger season when many farmers need food and cash. 
The tobacco vendor then becomes a savior for cash strapped and food deficit households 
looking for quick cash to buy food. Farmers always complain of poor prices and vendors’ 
use of unapproved weighing scales; more often than not tampered with so that they show 
lower weights. Government and tobacco leaf companies discourage the practice and often 
mount campaigns to arrest the vendors. Despite the harassment, vendors fill a gap that 
neither government nor tobacco companies are willing to fill by providing cash to farmers 
at a time when they need it most. With rampant inefficiencies in the tobacco marketing 
chain it can take several weeks for a farmer to get his tobacco to the auction floors, to get 
it sold and eventually access his money. This is the reason cited by farmers who sell their 
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          tobacco to vendors so as to get cash for immediate household needs.
 There are signs of attempts by some growers to move up the value chain by 
specializing in trading of tobacco and leave production all together. These are usually 
young people with limited land holdings and a small capital base. In interviews they 
intimated that they think tobacco growing is hard work and that it doesn’t pay well 
enough, that is why they opt to buy and sell. In addition to tobacco, they may also buy 
and sell groundnuts and Soy. As they grow their capital base, these young entrepreneurs 
also go into money lending. In an interview, George who has not grown tobacco in his 
entire farming career repeatedly said that he did not consider tobacco growing a viable 
venture. He would rather lend out money on interest, which is usually as high as 50%. 
In addition to this, these money entrepreneurs also advance money to farmers who are 
unable to secure loans either from financial institutions or tobacco leaf companies. 
Usually the agreement is for the grower to pay back in form of a specified amount of 
tobacco. For example, in 2013 a desperate farmer got MK4000 (then equivalent to $11) 
from my research assistant. The agreement was that he would pay back 40kg of tobacco. 
A staggering amount when you consider that in that year the average price for burley 
tobacco was $2/kg. For borrowing $11 he had to pay back $80. Money may either be 
advanced at the beginning of the growing season or in January and February when the 
crop is about ready for the market - the same time when most farm households ran out of 
cash and food. The money and input lending business is so lucrative that it has become an 
established route for village entrepreneurs seeking to diversify their business portfolios 
away from farming. Feston, one of the farmers in my sample of case study households 
who in his own words had a profitable season in 2015, expressed his desire to go into 
the business of lending out inputs. For the 2016 growing season he planned to get inputs 
from the company he is contracted with and advance them to other farmers so he can 
get tobacco in return. The money and input lending phenomenon has become part of the 
exchange processes, in village life as well as part of an intricate web of relations around 
which tobacco production and marketing occurs.
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            4.10 Conclusion
 In this chapter I introduced Lilongwe the capital, and the commercial and 
management center of the tobacco industry in Malawi, and Kumala the village where the 
generation of value in the tobacco value chain begins. I set these two places  in relation to 
each other to show the spatial separation as a metaphor for other contradictions. 
Lilongwe demonstrates the dualism in  the tobacco industry. Physical barriers, language 
and bureaucratic procedures separate industry managers, bureaucrats and regulators from 
the grower. This separation also coincides with concentration of tobacco wealth and 
power within the commercial center which continues to flourish with new investments, 
as opposed to peripheral places like Kumala where farm families and their communities 
who toil to produce the crop make do in precarious livelihoods. The chapter also illus-
trates how producing villages like Kumala are part of global commodity flows, through 
connections to other producing places, global centers of the industry, and the places 
where tobacco products are consumed. These connections illustrate how the fortunes of 
growers at Kumala are tied to those of growers elsewhere. For example, the fortunes of 
Malawi’s burley tobacco are affected by production in far flung places like Argentina and 
Brazil. Instances of overproduction in these places affects prices of Burley produced in 
Malawi. This has implications not only for national revenue accounts in Malawi, but also 
on the livelihoods of people in Malawi, both tobacco growers and those who do not grow 
it. Furthermore, Kumala is connected to the outside world through consumption. Burley 
tobacco produced at Kumala is made into cigarettes, a commodity consumed by millions 
of people globally. The value of labor of smallholders at Kumala is embedded in a 
product that has lifestyle, as well as public health implications on a global scale.
 The chapter also introduced the  people of Kumala. Besides the label of “growers” 
as they are known in industry and government, these are people with aspirations about 
their lives, and think of tobacco as a means to those aspirations, be they material and 
financial success, or recognition and respect among their peers. The people of Kumala 
have adopted and integrated tobacco into their social and cultural lives through gendered 
and generational labor relations  that make the production of tobacco possible. Depending 
on personal ambition, and one’s place in household labor relations, different people will 
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          understand and interpret the on-going tobacco market instability and declining income 
in different ways. The chapter further highlighted the community dimensions of tobacco 
production through the role of labor exchange, and market exchange processes that make 
tobacco the key commodity even in the village economy. These are nuances and 
dynamics that need to be appreciated in order to understand locals’ perceptions of an 
unstable market, as well as for understanding changes brought about by the liberalization 
of agriculture and the restructuring of the global tobacco industry.
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          Chapter Five: Institutional Context of Tobacco Production 
and Marketing in Malawi
     5.0 Introduction
 This chapter foregrounds discussion on how institutions and the institutional 
setting mediates access to livelihood options, but also how they shape the perceptions to 
risk among smallholder growers. It builds on the discussion in chapter two on the
political economy of agriculture in Malawi where I described the role of a predatory state 
and the mechanisms it used to regulate and extract surplus from smallholders. I further 
described the policies and events that structure the relations between the state and 
smallholders up until this day. In this chapter I expand on that discussion by recognizing 
that in the colonial and post-colonial era, besides the state, there were many interests in 
the production and supply of cash crops including the industries that needed raw 
materials, the large trading firms that organized for the collection and export of these 
crops, and the big plantation or estate owners. The industrial interests and trading
interests working in concert with the state regulated what was grown, what quality, the 
marketing arrangements, and the price they were willing to pay for it (Banaji 2016, 
Bernstein 1977). This chapter will show that while the aims of the state and the industrial 
interests are still aligned, the industrial interests are now more powerful than the state and 
they are fully in the driving seat. I also show that rather than being just a game played by 
external interests, extraction of surplus through commodity marketing has attracted local 
elites who have become important, albeit subordinate players.
 In this chapter I also discuss the institutional apparatus and the various actors 
driving tobacco production and marketing in contemporary Malawi. Tobacco remains the 
backbone of the economy and it is still tied to dynamics around state building as well as 
relations between political and business elites on one hand, and smallholder growers on 
the other. As a crop at the heart of the state building enterprise, tobacco has an extensive 
institutional apparatus around it including government owned regulatory, research and 
training institutions, marketing institutions, leaf companies, growers’ associations, input 
suppliers and transporters among others. In various ways these institutions have propelled
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          tobacco to become Malawi's number one export commodity. On the other hand, they have 
also facilitated the extraction of surplus from smallholder growers to actors higher up in 
the value chain.
 Adopting the commodity systems approach (Stone et al 2000, Prowse 2011), I 
discuss the macro-level organization of the tobacco industry to show how production is 
organized, how inputs are channeled and the tobacco leaf marketed. I also discuss power 
relations in the industry. Which institutions produce signals that matter most in the 
industry? How is policy shaped and how do key players interpret policy interventions? I 
discuss these questions to lay the foundation for a discussion on how the activities of key 
players in the institutional framework shape the smallholder grower's perception about 
the future of the industry. I argue that the tobacco institutional framework that is 
responsible for issuing growers' quotas, facilitating access to inputs and the market, as 
well as managing the marketing process itself, is riddled with mismanagement, 
inefficiencies, contradictions, corruption, and a lack of transparency particularly towards 
growers. I also argue that the place of tobacco in the Malawian economy has made it a 
political crop establishing it as a tool for patronage politics and legitimization for
extraction of surplus, even as the system victimizes growers. I further argue that for all its 
inefficiencies, the apparatus around tobacco is kept in place because of the various rents
in terms of levies and other fees which various institutions collect from growers via 
a centralized system. As a result, growers experience the industry as one that's rigged 
against them. Consequently, growers’ focus on the industry’s imbalance precludes them 
from seeing the current market crisis as a major shift in the global tobacco system itself.
     5.1 State Institutions
Ministry of Agriculture
 The Ministry of Agriculture is a key institution in the running of the tobacco 
industry in Malawi. With regards to tobacco, the mandate of the Ministry is to provide 
policy and strategic direction for the development of the tobacco sector in Malawi. The 
Ministry regulates all production and marketing activities of all actors in the industry 
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          such as associations, graders, transporters, financial institutions, and tobacco leaf
 companies. The stated objective of the Ministry is to ensure that the farmer benefits the 
most from tobacco production in Malawi, and to achieve this, the Ministry has set 
policies, the most notable of which is the setting of minimum prices which leaf buyers 
can pay growers for specific grades of tobacco (these are published every year before the 
commencement of the tobacco market).14 The Ministry has a regulatory organ, the 
Tobacco Control Commission (TCC), as well as a research and extension arm, the Agri-
cultural Research and Extension Trust (ARET) and Mwimba Tobacco Research Institute, 
which trains farmers and technicians specifically for the tobacco sector. In addition, it 
oversees other state owned institutions that are key actors in the tobacco market includ-
ing the grain marketer, ADMARC which in turn has significant shareholding in Auction 
Holdings Ltd, the company that runs the tobacco auction.
 Measured by its key objective of ensuring that tobacco growers benefit the most, 
the Ministry is having a hard time fulfilling its mandate as evidenced by declining 
farmers’ incomes and the chaos that characterize the industry. According to the Ministry, 
the challenges can be attributed to the liberalization of production in the early 90s that 
allowed smallholder farmers to grow burley tobacco which was previously restricted to 
estates. Liberalization made it difficult for the Ministry to control production and 
enforce quality standards leading to over-production and declining quality of tobacco, and 
ultimately, declining prices. As a mitigating measure, the Ministry through the Tobacco 
Control Commission plans to implement a new biometric registration system to enforce 
quotas and hopefully prevent overproduction.
 As a key institution in the tobacco sector, any actions or policy directives from the 
Ministry are keenly observed by both the industry and by Malawians at large. The 
Ministry has remained coy about the future of tobacco, blaming the current instability 
and low prices on production side factors, such as overproduction and growers lack of 
attention to quality. However, in closed quarters such as industry conferences, ministry 
officials have assured the tobacco industry of their support in the face of the global 
anti- tobacco movement. Ministers and top officials have declared that tobacco is a 
14 Ministry of Agriculture Interview
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          strategic crop to Malawi and therefore Malawi will keep growing it (Tobacco Reporter 
11/3/2016)15. While assuring Malawians that tobacco has a bright future , ministry 
officials have suppressed grower dissent against the tobacco industry. While visiting 
tobacco farms in the company of industry executives, a former Minister of Agriculture 
downplayed farmers pronouncements against the newly introduced Integrated 
Production System(IPS) which farmers felt was another way for the industry to rip 
farmers off (Nyasa Times, 27th January 2016)16. The Ministry’s downplaying of the crisis 
in the tobacco industry shapes the perception about the future of the industry among 
growers. In an interview on the interpretation of fluctuating prices and declining incomes 
in the tobacco industry, a respondent observed that if the government is not panicking, 
then there is nothing to worry about. As an institution, the Ministry’s major signal to the 
farmer has been silence. The Ministry oversees agricultural extension programs towards 
smallholder farmers in the country. Over the years government extension agents have 
become less and less involved with tobacco, leaving that space to private extension 
agents from leaf companies. This means that at the farm level, everything growers hear 
related to tobacco comes from extension agents employed by tobacco firms. It follows 
that other than the industry’s perception on the future of tobacco, growers have limited 
access to alternative views.
 
Other Government Ministries
 Other key institutional players include the Ministries of Trade and Industry, and
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Planning (MFEDP).
 The Ministry of Finance attaches paramount importance to the foreign exchange 
generated through tobacco leaf sales as well as the revenues on taxation of tobacco 
products. The country is going through tough economic times following the withdrawal 
of foreign budgetary assistance. The Ministry of Finance must make sure they get every 
dime to support a national budget based on internally generated resources. In industry 
meetings representatives from the Ministry spoke against upsetting the industry because
15 http://www.tobaccoreporter.com/2016/11/malawi-sticking-with-leaf-production/
16 http://www.nyasatimes.com/ips-enslaving-malawi-tobacco-farmers-to-poverty/
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          that would result in dire consequences for the economy.
 The Ministry of Trade has increasing exports as its number one goal and it looks 
at tobacco as the key export. Ministry officials have lobbied on behalf of the tobacco 
industry in international trade forums. At an industry meeting in 2014, delegates 
discussed how new regulations on tobacco ingredients enacted by the European Union 
(EU) would affect Malawi’s burley tobacco. A resolution was made to lobby the EU 
to ease regulations to save the market for Malawian burley. The Ministry of Trade was 
tasked to draft a position paper to highlight Malawi’s position on the matter.
 Except for the Ministry of Health which is concerned with increasing rates of
non-communicable diseases, these powerful ministries and other government institutions 
have allied themselves with the tobacco industry. In addition to these key ministries, the 
whole government machinery is at the disposal of the tobacco industry. Presidents have in 
the past made it a point to preside over the opening of tobacco markets and various
officials grace industry organized conferences. This despite the obvious transgressions of 
an industry which has shown that they are not ready to play by the rules (see Chapter 6) 
and without regard to the consequences of their actions on the economy and the 
livelihoods of smallholder farmers.
Politicians, Politics, and Tobacco
 In Malawi tobacco has always been close to politics and politicians. In post 
independent Malawi the political elites and senior civil servants benefited from policies 
of alienation of customary land to acquire estates for tobacco. State owned financial
institutions provided favorable concessionary loans to boost tobacco production. Tobacco 
was and is still an important tool for patronage to keep dependents on the leash (Geist et
al 2008; Van Donge 2002). In contemporary politics, past press reports alleged that leaf 
companies strive to align themselves with political parties by offering senior party figures 
lucrative contracts and buying their tobacco at good prices. This is seen as a way of 
preventing politicians from taking decisive action against industry malpractices.
126
          The State and Donors
 Tobacco production happens in the space of relations between donors and the 
government of Malawi. The key donors include the World Bank (WB), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), USAID, the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) and IrishAid which are very active in the agricultural sector. The Malawi Growth 
and Development Strategy II (MGDS II) on which donors base their support to Malawi 
calls for increased exports to meet Malawi’s balance of payment needs and to fuel 
economic growth. Having supported the liberalization of the industry, donors have 
refrained from providing support to tobacco or getting involved with discourse and any 
goings on with the industry (Van Donge 2002). Rather, they have supported farm income 
diversification initiatives such as the EU’s Farm Income Diversification Program (FIDP) 
and the IFAD funded Rural Livelihoods Economic Enhancement Program (RLEEP). 
These programs are not crafted in explicit terms as interventions to end Malawi’s 
dependency on tobacco but it is an unspoken goal among program managers. Donors 
hold considerable influence in the Malawian economy having at one point contributed 
40% of the development budget and they continue to provide technical support in areas 
of capacity building and human development. Over recent years it has become clear that 
donors have ceded policy space regarding tobacco (Prowse and Moyer-Lee 2013). One 
can surmise that donors have done this quietly because of tobacco’s status as a pariah 
crop but also for fear of challenging the powerful tobacco industry.
Tobacco Control Commission
 Set up by an Act of Parliament (Control of Auction Floors Act Cap 65:03), the 
Tobacco Control Commission is the most important regulatory institution in the tobacco 
industry in Malawi. As an institution mandated to regulate the production, manufacture 
and marketing of tobacco, the commission advises the government on the sale and export 
of tobacco. Its powers span across the entire spectrum of players in the industry, from 
grower, transporter, buyer to exporter. Among its key functions are to register and license 
tobacco growers and sellers, to define tobacco grades and classes for the purposes of 
selling and buying, and control and regulate the sale of tobacco in Malawi. The 
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          Commission is also mandated to carry out market research and disseminate information 
relating to tobacco.
 The Commission has a critical role to play to balance the volume of production 
and quality of tobacco in Malawi. In recent years the tobacco industry has suffered from 
fluctuating and declining prices leaf merchants offer to farmers for their tobacco, which
industry players have attributed to over- production and declining quality of the tobacco 
leaf in Malawi. The Commission has been powerless to reverse the trend. As a licensing 
agency, TCC offers quotas to farmers - both estate and smallholder growers. The 
registration and licensing process of burley clubs illustrates the experiences of growers 
with the TCC. To register as a club, a group comprising at least 10 - 30 members must get 
a letter from an Agriculture Extension Development Officer (AEDO) and three elected 
officials; Chairperson, Secretary and Treasurer must make their way to  the
registration offices set up by the Tobacco Control Commission (TCC) where they fill out 
forms and get registered after paying a fee for their desired quota. For a quota of up to
3000kgs clubs pay Mk10, 000 ($20). Registration is an arduous process fraught with 
inefficiencies that inevitably breed corrupt practices. Starting with getting the letter from 
the local agricultural office, travelling to the regional registration office and interacting 
with the registration staff in the computer room, the process is daunting for a village 
farmer. A woman farmer related that she spent three days at the registration office 
languishing in the corridors crowded with other desperate farmers from all over the 
region trying to get her club registered. All the while the registration staff kept telling 
them that the ‘network’ was down so they couldn’t register anyone. On the third day one 
of the staff from the computer room whispered in her ear, “Are you dumb? You have the
‘network’ in your pocket.” She gave him some money and promptly got her registration 
certificate.
 Another critical function of TCC is to license companies that seek to buy tobacco 
leaf from Malawi. In 2015 there were eight leaf companies operating in Malawi. To be 
registered a company must among other things, demonstrate ability to purchase at least
500,000 kgs of green weight and that sufficient funds in US dollars for purchasing 
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          tobacco can be raised.17 In addition the company must own or have access to processing 
facilities, and have the ability to employ sufficiently trained staff to man the auction 
floors. A prospective buyer further undertakes to abide by government conditions such as
minimum prices of specific grades of tobacco included in the Memorandum of 
Understanding signed with government. In recent years buyers have blatantly ignored 
prescribed minimum prices without incurring any punishment from TCC.
     5.2 Private Operators in the Tobacco Industry
Tobacco Leaf Merchants
 These are the most important players on the commercial side of tobacco, owing 
to their massive financial muscle. I use the term leaf merchants to refer to government 
registered business establishments that buy Malawi’s tobacco for export and domestic
use. This is to differentiate them from tobacco companies, the global tobacco
transnational corporations (TNCs) that actually process tobacco into the final product 
and sell it to the consumer. Leaf merchants operating in Malawi (except JTI which makes 
its own cigarettes) sell their semi-processed tobacco to these giant TNCs such as Phillip 
Morris and BAT.
 Of the leaf companies operating in Malawi (see Table 5.1 for the list of leaf 
companies operating in Malawi), Limbe Leaf Tobacco Company, owned by Universal 
Corporation USA (58%) and Press Corporation from Malawi (42%) is the most 
influential. It purchases 51% of Malawi’s tobacco and sells mostly to Phillip Morris. 
Alliance One International, a subsidiary of the Virginia based conglomerate with 
operations in 35 countries is the second most influential player on the Malawian market. 
Alliance One mostly sell their tobacco to BAT. Japan Tobacco International (JTI) is a 
relatively new comer on the Malawian market having acquired a smaller company and 
making substantial investments. JTI which identifies itself as a tobacco company with 
operations in 70 countries is the only cigarette maker (Mevius, Winston and Camel 
brands) buying leaf in Malawi (2015). In addition, JTI also has pharmaceutical and 
17 http://www.tcccmw.com/registration.php 
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          processed food businesses which, the company says, are expected to establish a 
foundation for future profits. Previous estimates before the entry of JTI, show that 
Alliance One used to purchase 40% of Malawian tobacco leaf. It is unclear how the ratios 
have changed with the coming of JTI to join the two established players. Malawi Leaf 
Ltd and Premium Tama Tobacco Company are the two wholly Malawian owned 
companies created in the mid 2000s to enhance competition among growers. RJ Wallace, 
African Tobacco Services and Vision Tobacco are the other players with the latter two 
being new entrants.
 As group, but more especially the three large operators, these leaf companies are 
a formidable economic and political force. They tout their contributions to the economy 
of Malawi and use this as a leeway to firmly exert their weight in domestic politics. They 
have further ingrained themselves in the lives of Malawians as good citizens through 
corporate-social responsibility projects including drilling boreholes, building clinics and 
school blocks. Furthermore, they have created front organizations for initiatives such as 
eliminating child labor in agriculture. Some authors have argued that these efforts are 
nothing more than a smoke screen to mask the companies’ role in impoverishing the very 
same people they purport to help (Otanez et al 2006).
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          Table 5.1: Leaf Companies Operating in Malawi
Leaf Companies Operating in Malawi
Description
  Jointly owned by Universal Leaf USA (52%)
  and Press Corporation of Milawi (48%). It is 
  the most influential leaf company on the
  Malawian market.
Company#
  Limbe Leaf Tobacco1
2   Alliance One Ltd   Part of Alliance One International based in
  Virginia, USA. It was formed following the
  merger of Stancom Ltd and Dimon Ltd in 2005.
  Both Stancom and Dimon had operations in
  Malawi.
3   Japan Tobacco International (JTI)   They came on the Malawian market in 2009 
  when they bought African Leaf Ltd. They
  invested $435 million in leaf purchase, storage,
  and processing.
4   Malawi Leaf Ltd   A wholly Malawian owned leaf company. It
  was formed in 2006 to promote competition on
  the tobacco market dominated by foreign
  companies. It is 100% owned by Auction
  Holdings Ltd.
5   Premium TAMA Ltd   Another Malawian company, a joint venture by
  the Premium Tobacco Group and TAMA (8%).
6   RJ Wallace   Quite small, but it is one of the oldest leaf
  companies on the Malawian market.
7   Africa Tobacco Services   A South African company and a new entrant 
  on the Malawian market having arrived in
  2015. ATS specializes in Burley.
8   Vision Tobacco   A Chinese company, also a new entrant on the
  Malawian market. They started purchasing
  Malawian leaf in 2015.
Source: Author’s Field Notes
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          Transnational Tobacco Companies
 Although transnational tobacco conglomerates such as BAT and Philip Morris do 
not have physical presence in Malawi they are key buyers from Malawi based leaf 
companies, and they exercise control by dictating the quantities and quality of tobacco 
and how much they are willing to pay for it. By dictating prices irrespective of demand 
and supply these foreign tobacco companies foster anti-competitive behavior which 
results into growers getting paid low prices.
 The transnational tobacco companies pushed leaf merchants to press government 
for the operationalization of the Integrated Production System (IPS) purportedly to ensure 
that the tobacco industry is responsive to concerns about the environment, labor 
practices and food insecurity. Company officials from BAT and Phillip Morris visit 
regularly and they influence activities. Otanez et al (2006) have detailed the efforts of 
BAT to pay for corporate social responsibility projects such as eliminating child labor in 
an effort to comply with industry standards. These industry standards provide a regulating 
context in which tobacco is grown in Malawi. These major companies through the 
International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA) a pro tobacco non-profit have 
lobbied Malawian government officials to reject the FCTC spearheaded by WHO to 
control tobacco production and supply globally.
Banks/Money Lenders
 Commercial Banks in Malawi offer some, but not significant, credit to the 
smallholder tobacco subsector. However, they are conduits of farmers’ dollar earnings 
from the auction market. All tobacco growers are required to have bank accounts. Once 
a farmer’s tobacco is bought on auction, AHL the auction company, is mandated to remit 
that money to farmers accounts within 24 hours. Since banks pay farmers in the local 
currency, and since the currency fluctuates so much, banks make easy money from the 
dollar to Kwacha exchange differential. In addition, the Banks acquire valuable foreign 
exchange to sell to other clients.
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          Input Suppliers
 There are several major suppliers on the Malawian market including Yara 
(previously Norsk Hydro), Smallholder Farmer Fertilizer Revolving Fund (SFFRM), 
Farmers World and ADMARC. Small, locally owned agro-dealer shops are also a 
common sight in many trading centers. Previously, farmers obtained loans from any 
lender to purchase fertilizer and other inputs from suppliers of their choice. Following 
apathy towards lending to smallholders by major financial institutions, leaf companies 
have moved in to provide financing. Now the leaf companies are beginning to 
monopolize the supply of inputs following the inception of integrated Production System 
(IPS) in 2012. Through the IPS leaf companies insist that their contracted growers obtain 
inputs from the tobacco companies themselves. This move towards vertical integration 
across the production chain is another frontier for profit making for leaf companies. With 
this arrangement, leaf companies are able to dictate prices to captive contracted growers 
(see Chapter 6 section on contract farming). In their 2016 Annual Report, Alliance One 
states that they charge a mark-up higher than their cost on the inputs, which translates
into lower cost for procuring the crop (Alliance One 2016).
Tobacco Marketing
 The market, where producers and buyers meet, is an important  institution in the 
exchange process. In addition to acquainting growers with indications about demand 
and quality of products desired by the buyer , the market is also an indicator of power 
relations among the players (Appadurai 1986). Laborious, inefficient and non responsive 
market processes restrict access to the tobacco market for many smallholder growers. 
Vested power interests resulting from potentially anti-competition institutional 
alliances plus disproportionate power relations between leaf buyers, government and 
tobacco growers further cloud the market experience for most growers. As a result the 
tobacco market in Malawi displays a disconnect between growers and the rest of the 
industry institutions, such that growers don’t get real indications about the long term 
prospects of the crop.
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          Auction Holdings Group Ltd
 The Auction Holdings Group (AHL) owns the only licensed tobacco auction 
floors in Malawi. By law, all tobacco in Malawi must be sold on the auction floors. AHL 
owns and operates four auction floors, Limbe, Lilongwe, Chinkhoma in Kasungu and 
Mzuzu auction floors. AHL conducts the sales and is responsible for remitting money into 
growers accounts, taxes to the government and the numerous levies to the various 
organizations. Currently tobacco is marketed through both, the auction system and 
contract farming system. With the auction system buyers line up and bid for tobacco 
offered for sale by random growers, whereas in the contract market, leaf companies only 
buy from farmers with whom they had a prior production agreement. In either of these 
systems the tobacco must be brought to the auction floors.
 As the only marketing channel of tobacco the AHL’s position is critical to the 
competitiveness of the tobacco industry in Malawi. However, the company is caught up 
in a web of complicated relationships that may foster uncompetitive behavior in  the 
industry. AHL is technically a private sector entity but state owned grain marketing 
company, ADMARC has a significant stake in it. In addition, AHL has on its Board of 
Directors representation from the Ministry of Agriculture. Analysts have argued that
AHL has used its closeness to the State and its institutions to close out other players from 
establishing tobacco markets in Malawi (UNCTAD 2011). In addition, AHL owns several 
companies, two of which are active in the tobacco marketing business. Malawi Leaf Ltd, 
set up through a directive of the government to increase competition among tobacco leaf 
merchants is owned by AHL. It competes with other leaf merchants buying leaf from the 
auction floors owned and operated by its parent company. The other company, Tobacco 
Investments Ltd (TIL), is into tobacco grading and re-handling. If a tobacco bale 
presented to the auction floors is found to be wanting in quality it is referred for 
re-handling. There are several commercial grading companies but TIL is the biggest.
Of late there has been an increase of bales that have been referred for re-handling, leading 
observers to suspect that AHL has an interest in these referrals to boost its other 
businesses. Other companies include Agricultural Trading Company (ATC), a farm
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          input supplier, AHL Chemicals and Steel Limited (ACSL), and AHL Commodities 
Exchange (AHCX). The latter company, AHL Commodities Exchange is the most explicit 
statement that AHL is looking at a future beyond tobacco. Established in 2012 to be “the 
country´s vibrant commodities trading platform with the state of the art trading system 
supported by an integrated robust technology,” (ahlmw.com.n.d)18 AHLCX operates a 
commodity market for crops other than tobacco such as maize, groundnuts, Soy, 
pigeon peas, rice and beans. While AHL has taken steps to diversify its portfolio, the 
same message has not trickled down to smallholder tobacco growers. Asked why the 
company is not educating farmers about the uncertain future facing the tobacco industry, 
a representative of the company replied that they are a private company and “it is not 
their job to inform farmers whether their industry is faced with doom. That is the job of 
government extension agencies.”
     5.3 The Tobacco Market: Smallholder Farmers’ Experiences
 Having laid out the range of institutions central to the tobacco industry in Malawi, 
I turn now to farmers’ views of the tobacco market place. To help the reader understand 
the disconnect between the grower and the tobacco establishment, I discuss farmers 
experience with the tobacco marketing process. Access to the tobacco market at the 
auction floors is the biggest headache for smallholder farmers. Simply transporting 
tobacco to the market requires that the grower must put up with extortion, risk of loss of 
tobacco through theft, and loss of quality due to exposure to the elements. After the
curing process, tobacco leaves are pressed into bales each weighing on average 100kgs. 
The grower (or most likely the club) must find a transporter to ferry their tobacco to the 
auction floors. Growers are encouraged to use transporters registered by TCC but these 
are usually overwhelmed by demand and they may not show up for several weeks after 
being requested. Growers resort to paying bribes so transporters can load their tobacco 
first. Frequently growers use unregistered transporters. This brings the risk of theft. After 
loading their tobacco on a truck, some growers have had their bales disappear into thin 
air. In some cases transporters tamper with the bales by removing some leaf from their
18 http://www.ahlmw.com/Company/ahl-commodities-exchange-limited
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          clients’ bales to make bales of their own. Transporters charge a fixed rate per bale. 
Regardless of distance carried transporters charge a minimum of MK2000/bale ($4/bale 
in 2015) to deliver to the auction floor.
 At the auction floors bales are weighed and stacked according to type (Burley, 
Flue-cured, or Dark-fired) and whether they are for the auction or contract market. On 
sale day, bales are laid out on the floors; auction market on one side and contract market 
on the other. Prior to the sale, a representative of the TCC assigns grades to the bales on 
offer. The auction market participants include a starter, an auctioneer, a classifier and 
buyers from leaf companies who walk through the row of tobacco presented for sale. At 
each bale the Starter shouts a starting price which the auctioneer chants in auction chatter 
gradually bringing the price down until a buyer from one of the companies signals 
intention to purchase it. Once a buyer has signaled their willingness to buy the bale, a leaf 
checker then marks the price to confirm the sale. This happens very fast with the auction 
train spending no more than fifteen seconds on any one bale. If no buyer offers a suitable 
price the bale is bought by the house to be offered for resale at a future date. Bales
deemed to be poorly graded are rejected and sent for re-grading with one of the 
commercial grading companies. Grading fees are charged to a farmer’s account. On the 
contract market, a similar scenario unfolds, except that here, instead of several companies 
bidding for the bales, it is just one company haggling with the TCC. The starter shouts
the price and the company buyer either agrees or waits for the price to go down before 
committing to purchase the bale. If the farmer is not satisfied, they have the option of 
taking their tobacco to the auction market.
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          Figure 5.1: Inspection of Tobacco Bales Prior to Auction
Growers expressed frustration that the market is confusing and they are no longer sure 
what leaf buyers want. The sources of frustration with the market could be classified as 
follows:
(i) Mismatch of expectations between buyers and growers. There are 65 grades of Burley 
tobacco depending on leaf position on the plant, length, texture and color among other 
attributes (see Appendix 5). Growers typically grade according to position of leaf on 
the plant, the length, and whether it’s broken or not. Once a grower grades correctly and 
avoids mixing tobacco with foreign matter, they surmise that their tobacco should fetch a 
good price. Leaf buyers may have extra criteria and needs. For example, if in a particular 
week buyers are looking for cutters which are found lower on the plant, any farmer who 
brings leaf or lugs will not get a good price regardless of how good the quality of his leaf. 
This makes it hard for growers to relate the prices on offer to the quality of their tobacco. 
Growers expressed dissatisfaction with this, saying they can’t predict the needs of buyers 
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          on any particular day as bales are sent to the market sometimes weeks prior to the sale.
(ii) Related to the above issue, in recent years, despite railing farmers to improve the 
quality of their leaf, buyers have shown preference for average quality tobacco. A visit 
to the auction floors and interviews with floor executives confirmed that buyers opted for 
lower quality tobacco which they buy cheaply. Random checks after auction sales found 
that well graded and high quality leaf that should fetch $2/kg and above was rejected by 
buyers in preference for cheap leaf of below $1.50/kg. This is a puzzling finding which 
I did not fully investigate but it could be explained either on financial grounds, i.e leaf 
companies had decided not to pay above a certain price, or it could be because leaf 
companies expected to get premium leaf from their contracted growers.
(iii) Growers lack of voice in the market process. Growers are mostly sidelined in the sale 
process. Although rules of the auction market allow growers to stop the sale of their crop 
if they are not satisfied with the price offered, very few can do that owing to the 
intimidating atmosphere on the floors. They rely on representatives of growers 
associations and TCC to speak on their behalf. Growers are frustrated that despite 
collecting a lot of money from farmers to work on their behalf, these organizations seem 
not to have enough clout nor interest to stand up to leaf buyers.
(iv) Rampant corruption. In informal interviews with growers at the auction, they noted 
that services are too slow and many of them believe that they need to pay bribes to get 
good services at the market. Growers have to pay bribes to get preferential off-loading 
slots, they pay buyers to offer them a higher price for their tobacco and they pay to have 
quick access to their sellers’ sheets. Many industry insiders including staff from AHL and 
leaf companies also grow or buy tobacco from farmers and sell on the auction. Through 
networks at the market, industry insiders are able to enlist colleagues to buy their leaf 
at favorable prices. Growers notice these things and hence reinforces the belief that you 
either need to know someone or pay bribes to get good services at the auction market.
 Inefficient logistics, unpredictable requirements from buyers and corruption are 
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          some of the farmers’ experience of the tobacco market in Malawi. These experiences 
have become ingrained in the system and they appear as part of the game for smallholder 
growers, such that it is hard for them to surmise that they are dealing with a shift in the 
global industry, rather than the usual ups and downs of a commodity market.
     5.4 Growers’ Associations/Organizations
 Grower Associations are organizations recognized by government and TCC as 
bodies representing tobacco farmers in Malawi. In 2015 TCC had on its list eleven 
registered growers’ associations. Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) is the biggest 
and longest existing tobacco growers organization. National Smallholder Farmer 
Association (NASFAM) is the second biggest. It has national coverage but it is not 
exclusively tobacco as it caters to farmers growing other crops. Other smaller associa-
tions have presence in specific areas.
Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA)
 TAMA is the biggest tobacco farmers organization in Malawi representing 85% of 
tobacco growers in Malawi. It was founded in 1929 to promote and develop the tobacco 
industry in Malawi with particular emphasis on protecting and advancing the interests of 
the tobacco growers. TAMA seeks to meet its objectives through advocacy, information 
dissemination, tobacco markets promotion, and of late, value addition for its members 
(TAMA n.d). Over the years TAMA has promoted itself as the voice of the grower that 
conducts advocacy on behalf of growers such as negotiating with government and 
buyers for better prices. This is the function that most analysts hold them accountable for. 
Through its 49 cooperatives countrywide TAMA also provides extension services, input 
loans, and tobacco  transportation services to its members. These are the functions that 
have endeared TAMA to its members. In an economic environment where growers lack 
access to credit coupled with an underdeveloped input market and limited organizational 
abilities for a crop that requires massive logistical organization, TAMA has over the years 
provided useful services that have allowed smallholder to continue their participation in 
the tobacco production. 
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          In the more strategic area of advocating for better conditions for the grower, 
TAMA’s impact has been questionable. TAMA has been criticized for focusing on the 
needs of big growers and neglecting the needs of smallholders (PSIA 2005). A historical 
perspective of the association provides insights on the focus of its activities. Firstly, 
TAMA’s origins date back to 1929 when the Nyasaland Tobacco Association (NTA) was 
formed (PSIA 2005). This was an era when tobacco was a crop for big estates and it 
follows that from its formation up until when tobacco was liberalized for smallholders 
in the early 90s, the association was accustomed to catering to the needs of big growers. 
Over the years the TAMA Secretariat has become part and parcel of the tobacco 
establishment with only tenuous connections to the smallholder growers who now 
produce the highest proportion of tobacco in Malawi. The Secretariat operates under the 
oversight of a Council composed of Councilors (who are actual growers) elected to 
represent growers from their respective areas. The President and members of the Council 
have made vocal pronouncements against key issues affecting smallholder farmers. Issues 
such as the hasty and disorderly commencing of the contract marketing scheme, and low 
prices offered to growers. Councilors have also expressed strong opposition to the 
arrangement that allows tobacco buying companies to also run estates and take part in the 
actual production the crop. The secretariat has not taken a strong stance on these 
contentious matters. This says a lot about the focus of an association that touts itself as 
the voice of growers.
 Secondly, up until 2004, membership to TAMA was mandatory for all tobacco 
growers. This meant that all tobacco growers had to be members whether they felt TAMA 
represented their interests or not. Then as now, TAMA collected levies from proceeds of 
members’ tobacco sales, thus its financial survival is guaranteed regardless of whether 
the organization performs or not. This only changed in 2004 when membership to TAMA 
became voluntary. Still more, many farmers remained members because it was the most 
recognized association that could help with transport and marketing logistics which pose 
challenges to many growers. It must be noted that TAMA was the one organization that 
vehemently opposed the liberalization of burley to allow smallholders to participate in the 
early 1990s. Representing the interests of large estate owners,  the association feared that 
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          the liberalization of burley would lead to loss of labor for estate owners (Prowse 2010).
If TAMA has been muted in representing its members, it has actively championed the 
issues dear to the tobacco industry. TAMA has been a vocal proponent of the contract
marketing system denounced by its members and its own council members. TAMA has, 
like the industry establishment, blamed growers for the problems in the industry. 
According to TAMA, the problems in the tobacco sector center on too much quantity, 
poor quality and declining demand due to the global anti-tobacco lobby. One industry 
respondent confided to me that buyers (leaf merchants) were keen to eliminate auction 
in favor of contract system. According to him, buyers had pledged to pay good prices in 
confidence because farmers will then produce good quality tobacco. His tone indicated 
that TAMA was fully on board with this arrangement.
 TAMA has also been active in countering the anti- tobacco advocacy from abroad. 
TAMA is listed as a founding member and has at some point been chair of the 
International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA), an international group comprising 
growers worldwide supported by the global tobacco industry. At the urging of ITGA, 
TAMA has strongly argued against the FCTC. In addition to hosting summits, TAMA 
organizes the activities of the World Tobacco Growers Day (WTGD) in Malawi,  mainly 
to express their opposition to the FCTC. In a statement on the WTGD 2016, TAMA noted 
that  “ tobacco growers around the world wish to collectively demand from their 
governments a sustainable future in the face of the large uncertainties engulfing the 
tobacco market as a result of a steep decline in demand, without any present options that 
may ensure the subsistence of tobacco-growing communities” (TAMA n.d)19
Burley Tobacco Farmer Clubs
 Beyond the household, the tobacco farmer must contend with other social 
arrangements, the most immediate of which is the farmers club. Burley Clubs were 
created as part of the liberalization process to allow smallholders to grow Burley 
tobacco, previously the preserve of large estates (Negri and Porto, nd). As envisaged by 
the framers of the liberalization process, these clubs were supposed to facilitate farmers’ 
19 http://www.tamalawi.com/news/the-4th-world-tobacco-growers-day.html
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          access to finance through the now defunct Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC) and 
other financial institutions. Clubs were also meant to facilitate members’ access to official 
extension services as well as access to the auction floors where tobacco sales are
conducted. Additionally, club members could benefit from economies of scale in 
procuring farm inputs and transport services. Clubs act as a group lending institution and 
they monitor members repayment of debts as the members are jointly liable for any loans. 
Data from the Tobacco Control Commission shows a steady rise in the number of Burley 
tobacco clubs from 14,873 in 2000 to a high of 59,500 in 2010 before dropping to 37,048 
in 2012 following a disastrous season in 2011. In 2013 there were 40,593 Burley clubs.
 Clubs take different shapes with varying functions, intents, and affiliations. 
Primarily, clubs are there to help members access loans and they may help with transport 
and marketing arrangements for members (Van Donge 2002). Some clubs may be 
affiliated to national level associations such as NASFAM and TAMA while others only 
have loose membership to local level associations for the purpose of entering into 
contracts with tobacco companies. A typical tobacco farmers club has 10 -30 members 
who come together primarily to access loans from financing entities. With the stakes of 
tobacco production increasing and with the need for trust among members, it is 
common to have clubs that are started by a core of founders who are close family 
members. For example, a man, his younger brother(s), and his adult sons may form the 
core of the club with a few other people joining in. Sometimes clubs are entirely made up 
of family members. With the demise of MRFC the State owned agricultural lending 
company, and waning interest from other financial institutions to lend to smallholder 
farmers due to high transaction costs and high default rates, tobacco leaf companies are 
stepping in to provide financing through some of the same clubs.
 Upon acquiring the registration number, the farmer or club is authorized to grow 
and sell a specified number of kilograms of tobacco at the Auction Floors. The 
registration number also binds the farmers to sell only tobacco grown by them and not to 
buy tobacco grown by other people. The registration number is an invaluable asset to the 
tobacco farmer. Without it no farmer can sell tobacco at the Auction Floors and no 
tobacco company would enter into an agreement with such a farmer. To have an active 
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          and trouble- free registration number is the dream of every tobacco  farmer. Although 
many people call themselves tobacco farmers, not all of them have valid registration 
numbers. Farmers without the registration number either grow so they can sell to local
vendors or they depend on the few that do, such as friends and family members to sell the
tobacco on their behalf. This is where the burley club becomes a nest for cheating and 
exploitation. There are stories of people who have lost all their earnings and become 
impoverished after using other people’s registration numbers. When a grower uses 
somebody else’s registration number, their access to the officially issued seller’s sheets 
is at the mercy of the owner of the number. As such, if the owner chooses not to reveal 
it, the dependent grower has no way of knowing if and when their tobacco was sold, and 
for how much. And if the owner of the registration number has a loan with a financing 
institution or a tobacco company, they could use the proceeds from the grower riding on 
their back to pay off those loans.
 Rick was once considered the brightest prospect in the village as a tobacco farmer. 
He got married in 2002 but kept working with his father; only starting his own farmstead 
in 2006. At the height of his farming career he grew two acres of tobacco (it is a hard feat 
for an average farmer in the village to successfully grow even one acre). A look at the 
assets he acquired in his brief time as a tobacco farmer confirms the assessment of his 
peers. He acquired livestock, an ox-cart, a bailing press, a groundnut sheller, and a two 
acre woodlot; all markers of a very successful farmer. All along he had been using the 
family’s tobacco  registration number together with his father and elder brother. In 2011 
both his father and elder brother failed to repay their loans which meant that if Rick were 
to use the same registration number the following year, proceeds from the sale would first 
go towards paying off his father’s and brother’s loans. Rick was not keen on 
repaying their loans so he started looking for friends who would let him use their 
registration number. The following year, 2012, he grew tobacco again and got 2800kg; 
a very good harvest that puts him in a top category as a farmer. By comparison, in 2015 
the most successful farmer in my sample of case study households got 2000 kgs. As fate 
would have it, the friend’s registration number had an outstanding loan attached to it and 
Rick’s proceeds went to pay off that loan; leaving him with nothing. That was the 
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          beginning of his downfall. Today, he can barely afford proper clothes for his family, let 
alone finance his farming. He has not grown tobacco since 2013; only concentrating on 
soy and groundnuts with the hope of building up his capital and eventually going back to 
tobacco farming. “I am a very good farmer, even with the low prices that everyone got in
 2011, I still fetched good prices. Had it not been for the incident with the registration 
number I would have been very far” (Rick, August 2015).
 It’s not just non club members who are vulnerable to being cheated. 
Peripheral members of the club are also vulnerable to exploitation. Owing to the fairly 
opaque documentation around contracting loans and tobacco sales, and since only a few 
members actually deal with the banks and the tobacco companies, some club members, 
especially the illiterate ones, have a hard time figuring out how much they owe. This 
results in core members inflating the loan amounts of the peripheral members. Similarly, 
after tobacco is sold at the auction floors, some members may not know how much their 
tobacco fetched and how much of that money went to servicing the individual or group 
loan. There are rampant cases where a few members ended up paying the loan for the 
entire club.
 The Burley club is a key institution in the smallholder tobacco production and 
marketing chain. Intended to facilitate more effective participation in the tobacco market 
through organizing farmers to access extension services, credit, transporting and 
marketing of the crop, and even to challenge the tobacco establishment in Malawi (Van 
Donge 2002), the club has become a means  through which tobacco companies use 
growers to police each other and reduce risk of production failure and loan default. 
Rather than challenge the tobacco establishment to negotiate for better deals for its 
members, the club has become a vehicle through which the tobacco company enforces its 
production quotas and transfers risk to growers (by taking advantage of the club’s 
members to police each other and serve as debt insurance).
 The club also creates power differentials in the village. The registration number 
is a key asset to the club such that most clubs revolve around people who are de facto 
patrons of the clubs either because they own the registration number or they have the 
influence to force members to meet their loan obligations. This position of power is often 
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          abused to the disadvantage of peripheral members of the club. Due to the demands placed 
on the tobacco club members to maintain the integrity of the registration numbers, and
the origins and composition of the club, failure by members  to repay a loan may result in 
grave consequences. If a member fails to repay their portion of the loan, the club is
forced to repay on their behalf to avoid losing their registration number. Depending on
 the wealth of the defaulter, they may voluntarily sell their assets to repay their loan. If 
the owner is a core or founding member, out of respect, the club may give them another 
season, hoping that they will recover from their loss and repay their loan. In extreme 
cases, especially where the defaulter is without assets, or is a beginner , the club may 
repossess the farm plots of the defaulter and put them on sale to recover the loan.
     5.5 Rents in the Tobacco Value Chain
 The multiple institutional players and actors in the tobacco value chain are 
sustained by fees and levies deducted from leaf marketed through the system. In 2016 for 
every 100kg bale of tobacco, the farmer parted with $9.28 in levies and fees (see Table
5.2). These do not include transport fees, loan repayments, labor and other production 
expenses.
Table 5.2: Tobacco Market Levies and Fees 2016
These levies have been a source of complaint by growers who argue that some of these 
levies are on the higher side. They argue that the work done by some of these agencies do 
not merit the fees they charge.
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            5.6 Conclusion
 This chapter has shown that tobacco production is made possible through 
elaborate structures starting from state level to the community. History and processes of
 state building made tobacco a national strategic crop  with an elaborate institutional 
structure of regulators, policy making bodies, service providers, grower associations and 
leaf merchants. The purpose of the chapter is not to portray all institutional actors in a bad 
light. Rather, it is an examination of the actions of self-interested actors acting 
within a particular institutional framework. In this framework, the state presides over an 
undiversified agricultural economy and is keen to fill its coffers through the easiest source 
of revenue- tax on the agricultural sector. The state is joined by local institutional actors 
and private companies who seek to make money from the tobacco value chain. Where 
the interests of the state and other actors converge, it becomes imperative for all actors to 
cooperate to ensure an organized and stable marketing which is achieved through 
legislation, regulations, policies and practices that regulate the industry.
 What is undeniable is that this elaborate institutional structure is sustained on 
the back of the smallholder tobacco grower who is saddled with levies and fees, some of 
which go towards institutions whose services do not match with the amounts they 
collect. A centralized marketing system ensures that each of the institutional players gets 
their piece of the pie, while the grower who has to deal with rising costs, unpredictable 
weather and an unstable market is the last to get paid. The existence of an institutional 
framework in which most of the actors have no alternative sources of income is unlikely 
to send true signals to the farmer about the true state of the industry. In addition, the 
tobacco grower experiences the institutional framework around tobacco through 
processes marked by blatantly unequal power relations and rampant exploitation. The 
registration and marketing processes are riddled with inefficiencies and corruption. I 
argue that since tobacco has always been an exploitative crop regardless of whether the 
prices are stable or not, smallholder growers experience the current instability in the 
industry through the exploitative processes in which they are enmeshed. As such, the 
current instability is seen by many growers as part of the game of tobacco and is not 
enough to increase perception of risk among a majority of growers, let alone to trigger 
concerted efforts in search of options for livelihood diversification.
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          Chapter Six: Changing Structure, Producing Instability
     6.0 Introduction
 This chapter discusses the structural changes in the tobacco industry. As the 
farmers at Kumala deal with fluctuating prices and ever changing standards of what it 
means to grow a good quality tobacco crop, they are working within a set of myriad tacit 
arrangements at global and national levels that influence what is grown, how it is grown 
and how much farmers are paid for their annual crop.
 To understand how global  processes influence the livelihoods of smallholder 
tobacco growers, it is important to highlight the specific factors and trends implicated in 
the production, marketing and consumption of tobacco globally, and explore how they 
have changed over the recent years. Following Craig (2005), and (Little and Dolan 2000), 
I use the term structure to refer to the organization, social relationships and political 
systems around a commodity often formalized through legislation, regulation, and 
contracts. In this chapter I examine how these relationships and systems influence all 
stages in the tobacco chain from, production and marketing to consumption. Being a crop 
that resists mechanization, tobacco production and manufacturing have for the most part 
been separate realms. The relatively small-scale production operations, sometimes
carried out by plantations but more commonly by small family farmers, operate in an 
industry where giant firms dominate processing and manufacturing (Goodman 1994). 
This sets up a dynamic where multitudes of producers find themselves in a subservient 
position to manufacturers. Manufacturing, the stage that involves transforming raw 
tobacco into cigarettes, is dominated by multinational corporations. These multinational 
corporations also dominate the marketing and distribution of the final product. It is 
estimated that as much as 50% of tobacco value is concentrated in marketing (Groger et 
al 2015). In 2015 the value of cigarettes traded on the international market was $36.1
billion20.
 As a tradable item, tobacco is also affected by trade and regulatory arrangements 
external to the industry, and may fall within the remit of national governments, 
20 UN Comtrade, commodity code 240220. Accessed 01/08/2016
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          inter- governmental agencies and other interest groups. Firstly, national governments 
have looked at tobacco as a revenue generator. How much revenue they decide to collect 
from tobacco, and the means used, have far reaching implications on trade and 
consumption of tobacco products. Secondly, governments pay keen interest to tobacco as 
they seek to protect jobs created by production, manufacturing and marketing of tobacco 
products. Added to that, tobacco production and consumption are also health, 
environmental and labor issues. As consumers and the public in general become more 
aware of tobacco’s role in increasing morbidity and mortality, and harming the 
environment, tobacco gets drawn into discourses, conventions and regulatory actions that 
affect how much is grown, how it is marketed and how it is consumed. In recent years as 
these factors have come into play, and become hotly contested by multiple parties with 
varying interests and affiliations, global production, marketing and consumption patterns 
of tobacco products have changed, with palpable implications on the livelihoods of 
tobacco growers (Benson 2008; Kingsolver 2011).
 The broader aim of my study is to explore the interplay between rural peoples 
whose livelihoods are in flux, and the larger institutional and structural forces which give 
shape to regional economies, and the livelihoods of those who live there (Sick 2014; 
Tsing 2004). This chapter demonstrates how the structural and institutional changes at 
global level affect the local industry, and ultimately, how they affect smallholder tobacco 
growers at Kumala. This framing allows me to situate growers’ experiences of an 
unstable market within a broader global context. It also allows for a closer examination of 
processes of economic globalization demonstrated in the nature of changing relationships 
between the state, the tobacco industry and the growers (Craig 2005; Stanford 2000). In 
the first section I discuss the changing trends in the industry and in the second section I 
discuss changes in the local industry focusing on the changing relationships between key 
players in the Malawian industry.
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            6.1 Changing Trends in the Industry
Public Health, the FCTC, and the Anti-Tobacco Lobby
 Anti-smoking campaigns by global public health activists spearheaded by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) have changed the perceptions towards use of tobacco 
products among the key consuming populations in North America and European 
countries. The World Health Organization estimates that tobacco kills 6 million people 
every year and this is on course to increase to 8 million by 2030. Tobacco related 
mortality is not restricted to smokers alone. By the accounts of the WHO, 600,000 people 
die due to exposure to second hand smoke every year. WHO notes that smoking tobacco 
is associated with causing death through non-communicable diseases such as cancer, 
cardiovascular disease and through communicable diseases such as tuberculosis and
lower respiratory infections.
 In addition to causing loss through mortality, the morbidity resulting from 
smoking leads to reduced earnings in smokers’ household and increased healthcare costs 
which are borne by both households and governments( WHO n.d)21. Gradually, tobacco 
has become a pariah crop, and the smoker a maligned figure. Ever since revelations of 
the link between smoking and cancer became public in the early 1950s, the meaning of 
smoking has gradually changed from symbolizing the notion of masculinity and freedom 
represented by the Malboro man, to symbolizing illness and addiction (Brandt 2007). In 
recent years there have been massive public health campaigns and regulations to end the 
use of tobacco. Much of the momentum behind this push is attributed to the WHO 
spearheaded FCTC. The Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC) is the 
primary global regulatory framework for tobacco control. It is the first treaty signed
under the auspices of the WHO, and as of the time of writing, 170 countries were party to 
the treaty. The FCTC seeks to combat the globalization of the tobacco epidemic brought 
about by complex factors such as trade liberalization, foreign direct investment, global 
marketing and trafficking of contraband. Articles of the FCTC spell out measures relating 
to reduction of supply and demand  through taxation and other financial tools as well as 
21 http://www.who.int/tobacco/economics/en/
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          legal instruments. Other articles relate to the protection of the environment, providing
alternatives for farm populations dependent on tobacco farming as well as measures for 
monitoring, surveillance and technical cooperation among members to combat the 
tobacco epidemic (WHO. n.d). The FCTC is steadily gaining ground. At the time of 
writing, 1,052 municipalities across the United States, representing 81.5% of the 
population have introduced laws banning smoking in non-hospitality workplaces and/or 
bars and restaurants (American Non-Smokers Rights Foundation, 2017). Furthermore, 
countries who are signatories to the FCTC have moved to regulate packaging and 
advertising of tobacco products especially to minors. Other measures include increasing 
taxes on tobacco products to discourage tobacco use and efforts to eliminate illicit 
trafficking in tobacco products to cut the availability of cheap tobacco alternatives.
 Outside of the FCTC individuals in the USA have successfully brought lawsuits 
against tobacco companies for addiction, illnesses and death resulting from smoking 
tobacco (NOLO .n.d). These developments have shaken the core of the tobacco industry 
forcing it to fight for its survival. With support from governments of producing countries 
the tobacco industry has sought to counter the anti-tobacco sentiment by highlighting the 
benefits of tobacco farming on the livelihoods of farmers and farm workers and on 
revenues of national  governments. Nevertheless, smoking prevalence rates in North 
America and Europe, the areas where tobacco has been used for a longer period and 
which were also premium markets for the industry, have been falling steadily over the 
years (see Table 6:1).
Shifting Demand for Cigarettes
 The anti-smoking campaigns may have shaken the tobacco industry but have not 
resulted in a total victory (see figure 6.1). Data from WHO shows that while the smoking 
prevalence rates, the percentage of people who smoke daily, have been falling steadily 
in developed countries, they have been rising in developing countries (see Tables 6.1 
and 6.2). For example , in 2000 Australia had smoking prevalence rates of 19.4 among 
females and 22.8 among males. By 2015 the prevalence rates had fallen to 10.9 among 
females and 13.8 among males. In Canada 18.8% of females and 21.6 % males smoked in 
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          2000. By 2015 the rates had dropped to 8.5 among females and 12.7 % among males. The 
story is quite the opposite in developing countries. In 2000, 0.6% of females and 8.3% 
of males smoked in Cameroon. In 2015 the smoking prevalence had shot up to 29.9% 
among males and was unchanged among females. In Egypt, 0.8% of females and 29.2% 
males smoked in 2000. In 2015, 0.2% females and 41.8% males smoked. The Asia-Pa-
cific region has seen the most rise in demand for cigarettes. Between 2001 and 2012 
demand for cigarettes grew by 59% in Vietnam, 41% in China, 34% in Indonesia, 32% in 
the Philippines, and 15% in India between 2001 and 2012 . This has been 
attributed to the  rise of a consumer middle class and evolving norms about the desirabili-
ty of  smoking as a symbol of masculinity and the intensified marketing of major tobacco 
brands in the region.(Goger et al 2014).
Table 6.1: Developed Country Smoking Trends
Source: WHO Global Report on Trends in Prevalence of Tobacco Smoking 2015
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          Table 6.2: Developing Country Smoking Trends
Source: WHO Global Report on Trends in Prevalence of Tobacco Smoking 2015
Shifting Production Patterns
 Following pressure from public health advocates and governments of consuming 
countries, production of tobacco is shifting towards least developed countries with the 
least effective regulatory frameworks. In 2001, the USA was the world’s leading exporter 
of tobacco but has since been overtaken by Brazil. Between 2001 and 2010 production of 
tobacco declined 39% in the USA, 37% in Italy and 31% in Indonesia. In the same period 
production increased in India (197%), Malawi (112%), Brazil(67%), Argentina (68%) and 
China (34%) (Goger et al 2014).
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          Figure 6.1: World Tobacco Production and Area Harvest
Source: FAOSTAT
Figure 6.2: Tobacco Production Share by Region in 2000/2001
Source: FAOSTAT
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          Figure 6.3: Tobacco Production Share by Region in 2013/2014
Source: FAOSTAT
 Overall production has risen significantly in Asia followed by Africa while Europe 
has seen the largest decline from 8.2% of the world’s production in 2001 to 3.4% in 2014. 
China is responsible for much of the rise in Asian tobacco production. The existence of a 
large domestic industry which uses all the tobacco produced in that country helps explain 
why China is not a significant exporter of tobacco like Brazil.
Industry Consolidation
 The industry has seen a changes arising from mergers and acquisitions that have 
led to consolidation of the industry into a few corporate players. The tobacco
 manufacturing and sales industry is now controlled by four transnational firms at the top; 
Phillip Morris, British American Tobacco (BAT), Japan Tobacco International (JTI) and 
Imperial Tobacco (Bialous and Peeters 2012). These mega companies, which dominate 
manufacturing and marketing of cigarettes, have been involved in a flurry of mergers 
and acquisitions of smaller companies to strengthen their positions on the world market. 
Between 2005 and 2012 Phillip Morris acquired leading tobacco companies in Australia, 
Canada, Jordan, Colombia, New Zealand and South Africa while BAT acquired firms in 
Colombia, Indonesia and Turkey. JTI acquired a leading British tobacco company 
Gallagher Group . In 2005, Stancom and Dimon, the 2nd and 3rd world largest leaf com-
panies, merged to form Alliance One. The leaf processing stage in the value chain is now 
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          dominated by two global leaf merchants, Alliance One International, and Universal Leaf 
who account for 45% of the market share each (Goger et al 2014).
 Beyond the Board rooms, this consolidation has changed the structure of the 
industry in ways that have consequences for smallholder growers. With these 
consolidations, control of the tobacco value chain has become highly monopolized 
resulting in uneven power dynamics between players in the chain. For example, even as 
leaf companies come to the villages ostensibly in partnership to help growers improve 
their tobacco and offer a steady market, the same companies dictate leaf prices leaving 
farmers with no room to negotiate. Furthermore, awash with massive revenues, these 
multinationals have acquired some economic and political muscle and they are able to 
leverage their purchasing power to drive down prices of raw tobacco. Lawsuits in 
different regions have alleged that major leaf merchants operate cartels on leaf markets, 
working with each other to bid low on auction prices (D. Lamar Deloach, et al., v. Philip 
Morris Companies, et al. U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina; 
Zimbabwe Herald 29 April 2014).
Changes in Production and Marketing Arrangements
 For growers, the most noticeable change in the industry has been on production 
and marketing management. Tobacco companies are keen to do away with the traditional 
auction system of marketing in preference for contract production and marketing 
arrangements. Leaf companies are now providing growers with inputs such as seed and 
fertilizer on credit as well as extension services with a promise to buy the tobacco leaf. 
From the company perspective, contracting is a way to gain control of the supply chain 
which allows them to forecast the availability and quality of raw material. They also see 
contracting as a way to sidestep credit supply constraints among smallholder growers and 
as a way to eliminate labor abuses in the supply chain (Oya 2012). The major effect of 
this vertical integration has been to sideline auction houses in which national
governments often have stakes (Benson 2008; Craig 2005). Besides this, integration 
restructures the relationships between the leaf companies and the farmer and possibly 
introduces new vulnerabilities. Whereas with auction marketing growers had relatively 
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          little contact with the leaf companies, now the companies direct all aspects of production 
and marketing. For the farmers involved, they see it as a good development. “It’s a 
partnership. The company and the farmer are now working together. They know our 
problems and they can help us.” (Samuel, September 2015). For the older generation, 
they see it as a return to good old times before the liberalization when there used to be 
order in the industry. “When we used to grow NDDF, government used to buy it from us. 
Prices were announced in advance. The coming of the auction market brought confusion 
and corruption. Now these companies are coming to help us” (VH Mikeka, June 2014). 
Other growers appreciate the face-to-face way of doing business as opposed to the 
impersonal auction market. “You get to know the buyer of your crop” (Mr. Willard, 
October 2014).
 In this discussion on the changing structure of the tobacco industry, I have 
highlighted the global processes and trends, including the rise of regulatory frameworks, 
changes of corporate organization in the industry, and changing production and 
consumption patterns that are disrupting the industry. This is to highlight the fact that 
smallholder tobacco growers are facing not just a down turn in market conditions but 
major shifts in the global landscape that shapes the production, marketing and 
consumption of tobacco. This also seeks to highlight the areas of  vulnerability of 
growers. Increased regulation, increased awareness about the dangers of smoking and the 
inevitable reduction in consumption of tobacco will, in the long run, take away the 
viability of tobacco livelihoods. Consolidation and vertical integration in the industry 
further increases the marginalization of the grower in the global tobacco value chain
where growers have neither the muscle nor the voice to shape the market. In the next 
section I discuss how the structural changes affect the local tobacco in Malawi.
     6.2 Instability in the Local Industry
 The changing structure of the global tobacco industry has had a profound impact 
on the local industry. The global changes in the structure of the industry articulate with 
factors in the political economy of the local industry, which translates into what 
smallholders experience in their livelihoods. The smallholder farmer experiences the 
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          instability in material ways, through stringent and unpredictable quality standards which 
sometimes result in their crop being rejected at the market. Smallholder growers also 
experience reduced earnings from their crop.
High Tobacco Rejection Rates
 In recent years growers presenting their tobacco for sale at the auction floors have 
experienced massive rejection rates. In one interview a respondent from AHL related that 
in that week the trend had been that out of 2000 bales presented for sale at the auction 
market only 800 were bought. The rest were rejected ostensibly for being poorly graded, 
or because the buyers simply weren’t looking for that particular type. In the 2016 
marketing season  in some weeks of trading rejection rates were as high as 80 % (see 
Figure 6.4). The industry standard rejection rate is 20%. Observers have identified this 
phenomenon as an effect of the battle for supremacy for the contract vs auction market. 
Industry insiders and analysts confided that leaf merchants are keen to force government 
to abandon the auction market so that all tobacco is exclusively traded through 
contracts.23 Leaf merchants are putting emphasis on contract markets by getting most of  
their leaf  needs from contract farmers; only using the auction market to supplement their 
share. Rejected bales not only delay the sale and increase impoverishment of the grower 
who has to wait for weeks or months to receive his earnings, they also impose additional 
costs on the farmer especially when the tobacco is referred back for grading.
Figure 6.4: Burley Weekly Rejection Rates: 2016 Marketing Season
23 http://mwnation.com/burley-tobacco-rejection-rate-worries-stakeholders/
Source: AHL 2016
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          Figure 6.5: Rejected Tobacco
Source: Photo by Author
Declining Income
 Smallholder Burley tobacco growers have also been experiencing declining 
earnings. From a high of $2.37/kg in 2008, and a record volume of 169 million kgs which 
saw total sales gross $400 million in revenue, it has been a downhill trend in terms of 
both the price paid to growers for a kg and the total revenues from tobacco proceeds 
collected by government. In 2015, 168 million kgs grossed $208 million in national sales 
with the grower fetching a national average of $1.67 kg (see Table 5:3). The average of 
$1.67/kg masks huge differences between prices paid to individual farmers, as well as 
differences in the prices offered to growers in different weeks of the marketing season. In 
some years, the prices start off very poorly at the beginning of the season and fluctuate up 
and down, only steadily picking up towards the end of the season. In 2016, prices started 
off relatively high and decreased as the season progressed (see Table 6:3). In 2011, the 
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          official average price for burley was $1.13/kg, one of the lowest recorded in recent times. 
Farmers in the study area benchmarked 2011 as a disastrous season; referring to it as the 
“80 cents” season because most smallholder growers in the area received prices hovering 
around 80 cents per kg for their tobacco.
Figure 6.5: Weekly Average Tobacco Prices 2016
Table 6.4: Annual Burley Sales (1995-2016)
Source: TCC (2015) and AHL (2016)
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          These trends have brought uncertainty and economic insecurity among growers. Growers 
have disrupted sales at the auction market in protest against poor prices. In 2015, during 
the course of the study, tobacco markets were suspended several times due to disruption 
by farmers. Non growers have also felt the effects of declining tobacco earnings. The 
Reserve Bank and other financial analysts have attributed constant currency 
devaluation to low inflows of foreign exchange from tobacco sales (William Kumwembe, 
Daily Times, 10 June 2016;Taonga Sabola, Daily Times 12 November 2014; Chikondi 
Chiyembekeza, Malawi Nation, 25 April 2013). In the wider economy it means reduced 
flow of money into the rural areas and reduced consumption and welfare for the rural 
masses.
     6.3 Changing Relationships under Economic Globalization
 In the wider sense of economic globalization, the changing structure of the global 
tobacco industry and the resulting instability in Malawi is about changing relationships 
between growers, leaf companies, and the state on one hand, and the state and leaf 
companies on the other. This approach frames the problem of declining grower incomes, 
and uncertain and unstable markets as rooted in shifts in the ways actors relate to each 
other in the tobacco value chain. The changing relationships between growers and leaf 
companies are exemplified by the emergence of contract farming and marketing 
arrangements.
     6.4 Changing Farmer-Leaf Company Relationships: Entrenchment of Integrated 
Production System/Contract Farming
 Contract farming is an arrangement where tobacco leaf merchants enter into 
agreements with farmers (both smallholders and estates) to grow and supply specific 
volumes and quality of tobacco. The leaf company undertakes to buy the tobacco at an 
agreed price. Several reasons have been advanced for the rise of contract farming 
globally. Globalization and restructuring in the agro-food industry, demanding and 
exacting consumer preferences, the rise of private regulation, the competition for product 
differentiation and branding have been cited as factors leading to the growth of contract 
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          farming in Africa (Gibbon and Ponte 2005; Röttger 2004; Watts 1994). Liberalization of 
the agricultural sector following structural adjustment programs could also have been a 
plausible reason for the emergence of private sector led contract farming in Malawi. IMF 
mandated reforms in the economy required the dismantling of controls in the agricultural 
sector and privatization of agricultural lending and marketing parastatals among other 
things (Chilowa 1999; Harrigan 2003). As a result, credit provision and marketing 
services for the smallholder farmers were severely scaled down. ADMARC, the state 
owned agricultural marketer that used to buy tobacco from smallholder farmers no longer 
bought the commodity. Agricultural lending was entrusted to Malawi Rural Finance 
Company, a State owned company which operated along private lines meaning that 
agricultural credit was not available to everyone. This created a vacuum that private
companies were uniquely positioned to fill but ultimately failed to do so (Harrigan 2003). 
When it eventually happened,  the rise of private sector led contract farming in Malawi 
was a result of political upheavals in a neighboring country. When Zimbabwe’s President 
Robert Mugabe violently snatched land from white farmers, it led to a shortage of flue- 
cured tobacco on the market. Malawi’s production  of Flue-Cured tobacco had already 
been falling from 25.7 million kgs in 1991 to 8.5million kgs in 2001 (Kumwenda and
Madola). Zimbabwe, being a big producer of this type of tobacco, picked up the slack and 
supply on the market was barely affected. But following reduced production in
Zimbabwe from the late 1990s, the market supply was affected. Limbe Leaf Tobacco 
Company, decided to stabilize and revive production of flue tobacco in Malawi. The 
company entered into a partnership with Kasungu Tobacco Farmers Trust, a recently 
privatized parastatal that specialized in flue cured tobacco. Limbe Leaf provided a 
comprehensive input package for tobacco as well as maize. It also provided money for 
labor and for food rations (Kumwenda and Madola n.d).
 Following the success of this experiment, other leaf merchants joined in and 
began to do the same with burley growers. This movement towards contract farming was 
eclipsed by developments in the tobacco industry which resulted in the emergence of 
the integrated production system (IPS)-a worldwide trend in the tobacco industry where 
farmers and tobacco merchant firms establish contractual obligations covering production 
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          and marketing of tobacco (Vargas 2010). The IPS is the tobacco industry’s response to
the criticisms it has faced from global public health and human rights activists. The 
industry has had to contend with issues of poor labor conditions (ILO n.d ; Otanez 1994), 
child labor (Otanez et al 2006), environmental degradation (Heist et al 2008), and an 
increase in  malnutrition and food insecurity (CFSC 2015, De Schutter 2014, 
Mwasikakata 2003). In the words of industry insiders “the IPS is a way of looking at the 
entire system; the crop, the environment, the people and the economics.” IPS specifies
the tobacco varieties to be grown as well as the production and management practices to 
be applied. It also requires that farmers care for the environment. One company related 
that farmers are required to plant 180 tree seedlings for every hectare of tobacco they 
grow.
  Under the IPS, people management refers to fair labor practices including 
avoiding use of child labor and forced labor as well as improved welfare of tenants. IPS 
farmers are also encouraged to produce food crops. Companies issue maize, legume seed 
and fertilizer in proportion to tobacco hectarage. Through the IPS the global tobacco 
industry has sought to establish a system that will allow every single bale of tobacco to 
be traced to the grower to ascertain that none of these principles have been violated. By 
pointing out the broader reach of the IPS, industry insiders are keen to emphasize that
IPS is more than just contract farming. IPS falls into two categories; self-financed 
contracts and company financed contracts. Farmers on self-financed contracts only get 
assurance of a ready market whereas with company financed contracts the farmer also 
gets loans for inputs and for rations.
 Whereas previously farmers only looked to financial institutions such as the 
defunct Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC)  to provide financing for production, 
farmers now look to tobacco leaf merchants to provide financing for the production of the 
crop. Three major companies Limbe Leaf, Japan Tobacco International (JTI) and
Alliance One are active in the area around Kumala village. The average loan amount for 
a farmer on IPS is $960.  Although specifics may differ slightly, the contracting company 
provides seed, fertilizer, pesticides and plastic paper for covering curing barns. By 
estimation there are 20% self-financed and 80% on company financed contracts. Tobacco 
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          growers appreciate the coming of leaf companies to finance production and help them 
with the technical aspects of tobacco growing. All except seven tobacco farmers in the 
case study households were on contract with one of the companies. Although I initially 
started out with a category of growers not contracted with any leaf company, during the 
course of the study those very households decided to go on contract. Of the seven not 
originally on contract, one had just returned from labor migration in Mozambique, one 
was getting inputs from someone who was on contract, and the other was desperately 
trying to get on contract with one of the companies.  The other four were either young or 
old but in any case not stable with their farming. Besides the financing, for most growers
it is imperative to get the technical requirements right which drives them into contracts 
with leaf companies. Failure to produce tobacco to specified requirements is increasingly 
becoming untenable as growers risk losing markets. “These days, by working directly
 with the tobacco company, you avoid the discrepancy between what (government) 
agricultural extension says and what the company wants. This time company workers tell 
us what to do, and we know that is exactly what the company wants.”(VH Mikeka, June
2014). Furthermore, with this arrangement growers also notice improvements in their 
own abilities. “We are getting good quality tobacco with the coming of company 
extension agents - the companies have interest in the quality of the leaf” (FKLK, June
2014).
     6.5 Mechanics of Contract Farming
 Typically extension agents employed by leaf companies, scout for and register 
farmer clubs to participate in the contracting scheme around July-August. The agents, 
also known as Leaf Technicians, typically have a diploma level training in agriculture and 
possibly specialized training in tobacco production. They are assigned to an area 
covering several villages but they typically reside in urban areas closest to their work 
places. These agents are responsible for recruiting and training growers as well as 
managing all aspects of the credit program. They provide an extension service to the 
farmers contracted to their company in a bid to  improve volume and quality of the crop 
through good agricultural practices, commonly known as GAPs in the industry. Through 
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          lectures and demonstrations, the agents walk farmers through every stage of the 
production process from sowing, curing and bailing, to marketing. Emphasis is also 
placed on training in agricultural labor practices (ALPs) which cover issues such as how 
to minimize child labor and observing approved labor practices towards tenants. It must 
be noted that there are two forms of membership in the contract scheme. Some members 
only go into a contract to access the market while others get input loans as well. Once 
trained the farmers who registered for input loans are given loans through banks. They 
don’t actually see the money. What they see is a truck with company approved inputs 
arriving at their door step, together with delivery notes for farmers’ signatures to docu-
ment that they received the inputs. The leaf company registers stop orders on the loans 
with the tobacco auction floors. This step essentially attaches the loan to the club’s 
registration number and ensures that proceeds from tobacco sales of the borrower farmer 
go to service his loan first. The Bank opens two accounts for the farmer; a loan account
 and a savings account. After the loan is repaid, tobacco proceeds are then transferred to 
the farmer’s or club’s savings account.
 To qualify, a farmer must have attended extension meetings organized by his 
chosen company for no less than two years during which time they are assessed for 
suitability and preparedness to enter into contract by extension agents of the tobacco 
company. Once they get the contract they must pay a deposit of MK40,000 for inputs 
worth one hectare of tobacco and promise to observe strict agronomical and labor 
practices. Tobacco companies are looking for farmers with the capacity to grow good to-
bacco. Capacity means they have the land and the implements (sheds for burley and barns 
for flue-cured tobacco). Prospective farmers must also be within the company’s geo-
graphical areas of operation, areas where the company has decided to focus its activities. 
Loyalty is also a requirement. Farmers are expected to have been with the company for 
some time (by attending extension meetings and trainings organized by the company) and 
they must have expressed intent to go on contract. A tobacco company representative told 
me that they are looking for the “right farmers who can produce the right kind of tobacco; 
the right quality and the right yield”. They are looking for farmers with good financial 
management. These are farmers who can pay back loans and invest in the right amounts
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          of inputs. This, the company believes, ensures consistency of yields. “Good financial 
management shows that the farmer is serious about his business” he said. These 
requirements and the sentiment in the industry show that contract farming is focusing on 
a particular type of farmer and not each and every smallholder with access to land. The 
IPS is looking for farmers who have the resources, and who are literate enough to benefit 
from extension services from the companies. For example, in 2013/14, one of the 
companies had on its list 40,000 growers who grew tobacco on 25-35,000 hectares. In
2014/15 growing season they had reduced to 20,000 growers working on roughly the 
same hectarage. This was because they had found that they could get more yield from the 
same hectarage if they worked with “efficient” farmers. Reducing the number of growers 
also reduces transaction costs on the part of the company. Early indications show that this 
selection criteria is beginning to create differentiation among farmers in the village. As an 
example, contracted tobacco farmers have been accumulating land holdings as a 
compared to non-growers and non-contracted growers. Because of the stringent 
requirements, members are selective in who they admit into their club to ensure that only 
those who have the money to pay the deposit and can grow good tobacco are allowed in. 
These tend to be those farmers with larger land holdings and a well-developed network of 
friends who can vouch for them with the leaf company. Most of the poorer farmers dream 
about being accepted into a club, but for most it remains just that; a dream.
 For its part, the company expects the farmers to deliver the agreed amount of 
tobacco without fail. For an average farmer working on one hectare of land the company 
expects at least 3,500kg of tobacco, or 35 bales each weighing 100kg. The company also 
expects farmers to employ precise agronomical practices, as they were trained. For 
Alliance One, these include having two nursery beds. The first bed must be 5m by 1m and 
the second 15m long by 3m wide. Tobacco seedlings are sown in the first and transferred 
to the second. Ridges must be spaced 115cm apart and planting stations 47cm apart. The 
first fertilizer application must be done before planting. Farmers on the other hand expect 
the company to buy all their tobacco and help them with transporting their tobacco to the 
auction floors for sale. Strangely, farmers also expect the company to be their ‘voice’ and 
lobby for better prices on their behalf.
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          At an extension meeting organized by one of the leaf companies as the first day of 
the tobacco market drew close, the extension agent invoked the language of
‘development’. “We need to keep meeting to advise each other to improve our lives,” he 
said. He further talked about the company being on a ‘journey’ together with the farmers. 
“We have travelled together from the nursery, now we look forward to the market.” He 
reminded the farmers to repay their loans, and not to sell their tobacco to local vendors. 
“Don’t give your tobacco to local vendors. Vendors will buy your tobacco at MK185 
but they will sell at $1(then $=MK380). Don’t run away from your debts-plan how to 
repay your loans and how to improve your lives.” The other part of the lecture included 
advice for farmers to grade their tobacco properly and avoid mixing grades as that is the 
major cause for farmers fetching low prices on their tobacco. He further advised farmers 
to make sure non tobacco related material (NTRMS) such as feathers, sand, sack twine 
etc do not find their way into their tobacco. There was considerable excitement among 
the farmers and it was clear that they were expecting good prices for their tobacco. They 
asked the company to help them with transport to ferry tobacco to the auction floors. As 
the farmers rose to leave, the agent shouted over the top of their voices to remind them 
about their debts again. “Remember the company made it possible for you to grow tobac-
co-we provided the seed, the fertilizer and the pesticides. Now it’s your turn to show 
appreciation. You know what to do!”
 It is clear that the terms of this journey are one sided, and are only what the 
company chooses them to be. On all farmer expectations, based on the contract 
agreement, leaf companies have been known to fail their contracted farmers. 
Transportation of tobacco to the auction floors is one process fraught with risk for the 
farmer. Tobacco transport contractors will collect tobacco from farmers, but rather than 
take it to the auction floors right away, they have been known to dump it either at their 
home or work yard, as they try to collect tobacco bales from as many farmers as they can 
before taking it all together to the auction floors. The tobacco bales then sit in the 
transporter’s compound, exposed to rain and sun for weeks, sometimes even months. 
Meanwhile the farmers will be wondering as to why their tobacco is taking such a long 
time before reaching the auction floors. This has been a long held complaint from the 
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          farmers and they repeatedly ask the leaf companies for help. Despite promising to help; 
year in- year out, the companies never come through, much to the disappointment of the 
farmers.
Figure 6.6: Loading Tobacco Bales for the Market
In an even more blatant disregard for a contract agreement, in the 2015 selling season leaf 
companies routinely refused to buy tobacco even from their contracted farmers; 
forcing the farmers to try their luck on the open auction. On companies being the 
farmer’s “voice” to lobby for better prices, one wonders how this is supposed to work 
when the companies are responsible for deciding what prices to give to the farmer.
 Farmers interviewed about their experience working with leaf companies 
expressed uneasiness about not getting a written document specifying the terms of the 
contract. The only document these contracted farmers were able to show were delivery 
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          notes showing that inputs had been delivered to them. But even this document didn’t 
specify how much the inputs were worth, the fees or the interest rates. Another anomaly 
with this ‘contract’ arrangement is that tobacco leaf buying companies do not disclose to 
their ‘contracted’ farmers the prices they plan to offer for their tobacco prior to the start of 
the growing season. And if that is not enough, farmers are not told how much they owe at 
the outset. In the 2014/15 season which ran from August 2014 to July 2015, not one 
grower from the case study households interviewed in March 2015 knew exactly how 
much they owed the leaf companies they were contracted to. In essence, the contract is 
a verbal understanding of how much tobacco the club is supposed to produce and sell to 
the leaf company. These are communicated via group training sessions. Obligations of the 
company to the farmer are never detailed in black and white. While contracted farmers 
are happy about getting financing and receiving extension advice, they are keenly aware 
of these contradictions in the ‘contractual’ arrangement. One characterized the 
relationship as “like being a tenant for the company” (Fanwell, June 2014).
 On his part, when the farmer surmises that he is only working to repay the 
company loan, with no profit in sight, he may choose to side-sell his tobacco. This is 
where farmers sell their tobacco using other registration numbers to avoid repaying the 
loans and other levies. Farmers involved in this practice told me that they are forced to do 
this because they need to pay debts, pay workers and keep some money for themselves. 
Side-selling happens when farmers under-produce due to poor rains or other agricultural 
dynamics. They may also side sell to avoid other factors as well, such as the cumbersome 
marketing process.
 Representatives of tobacco companies emphatically told me that it was not 
possible for any one farmer to be contracted to the company and not have a contract 
document. They considered it a serious violation that would lead to the dismissal of 
the Leaf Technician (company extension agent) involved. However, conversations with 
officers of the Tobacco Control Commission (TCC), the main regulatory body of the 
tobacco industry, revealed that the commission was in battles with tobacco companies on 
their lack of transparency, particularly on the contractual terms with farmers that failed to 
show how much farmers owed at the outset of the loan agreement.
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          While contract farming has enabled farmers to keep growing tobacco in the 
absence of reliable financing, it does so based on an unsustainable and unequal arrange-
ment between the farmer and the company. It has also started a process of social strat-
ification by creating categories of farmers who are left outside the system to struggle 
towards an uncertain future, and another category favored by tobacco companies, who are
expected to do well under the arrangement. Among my household case study households, 
all farmers who made profit from their tobacco in 2015 were on contract with one
tobacco company or another. As will be discussed below, this is because tobacco leaf 
companies prioritized buying from their own contracted farmers over non-contract 
farmers. The arrangement with government was that leaf companies would source 20% 
of their leaf from contracted farmers and 80% from the auction market. Leaf companies 
ended up sourcing over 60% of their leaf from contracted farmers. Contracted farmers 
also received better prices than non-contract farmers. Although many farmers aspire to be 
on contract, not everyone can be on contract because of financial and technical 
restrictions. Those who are on contract are an envied group, admired by the rest. James, 
a young man who by the time of the interview had not started farming on his own but 
took on casual labor jobs shared his aspirations for the future with me. “ I want to work 
hard and find myself a farm plot. Maybe then I can join a club and get a contract with 
one of the tobacco companies.” One of the participants in the household case studies, 
Willard, regularly got together with members of his club in the evenings over local beer. 
They kept to themselves and bought copious amounts of beer, just for their own group. 
The normal drinking practice among people from the same village, is that for a start, one 
person would buy for everyone. This is referred to as “throwing a round”. After the first 
round, the next person would throw another round and so on. William’s group, flush with 
tobacco money, kept to themselves, not allowing non-members to partake in their beer.
To join this elite group, apart from being a good farmer, one needs to have good 
networks of friends to vouch for his standing as a person and as a farmer. Having gotten 
in, one needs to manage these relations with peers and with tobacco companies. Failure to 
manage these relations may result in one being ostracized from the group, severing links 
with the tobacco company and ultimately diminishing one’s chances of growing tobacco 
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          in future.
 Throughout the time I interviewed growers for this study I had to deal with the 
contradictions on how the growers could, on one hand be thankful for the companies 
assistance and be keen to work with them, and yet on the other express dissatisfaction 
with how the companies were doing things. Ultimately, I realized that growers have to 
make critical decisions considering the limited options they have. The grower may 
rationalize that it is more important to get inputs than to insist on a written contract 
document. Or a grower may rationalize that he needs to get a foot hold into the system 
and worry about the problems later. Or most likely, growers are grateful for the inputs 
and technical assistance they receive from tobacco companies and they are prepared to 
look beyond the unpalatable aspects of contract farming. As growers weigh their options 
in this way, they are exercising agency over the few matters that are still in their control. 
They are weighing the benefit of a stable market over being legally savvy (in cases where 
the system worked without a glitch). As further evidence of growers exercising agency, 
some growers have chosen to away after determining that contract farming scheme is no 
longer serving their interests.
     6.6 Changing Relationships: The State and Leaf Companies
 The relationship between the State and the leaf companies has also undergone a 
major shift in recent years. The consolidated position of the three major leaf buyers 
Limbe Leaf, Alliance One and Japan Tobacco International, coupled with the 
government’s weak financial position have led to a dynamic of power in the political 
economy in favor of the tobacco companies. Malawi’s dependency on tobacco as the 
main foreign exchange earner makes the leaf companies mediators of Malawi’s access to 
foreign exchange. This gives tremendous power to the leaf companies to dictate their will 
on the State. Secondly, lack of capacity for research on levels of demand, and attributes 
of Malawian leaf in comparison with leaf from competing countries means that the 
government doesn’t really know the actual quality of tobacco produced in Malawi. The 
government depends on the industry for this information. Furthermore, lack of knowledge 
on global industry trends puts the government at a disadvantage when it comes to negoti-
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          ating better prices for tobacco. In addition, years of poor economic performance, natural 
disasters and the withdrawal of economic aid from donors has backed the government 
into a corner where it desperately needs foreign exchange and tobacco companies are the 
only sure way of getting that. The local tobacco industry has used its position in the local 
political economy to perpetrate some practices to undermine the country’s tobacco grow-
ers. Here are a few examples of how the industry has undermined the economic prospects 
of country.
Operating a Cartel/Manipulating prices
 Two major leaf buyers; Alliance One and Limbe Leaf have been accused of 
colluding to undermine the competitiveness of the auction process. An investigation by 
the Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB) in 2005 concluded that Limbe Leaf Ltd and Alliance 
One Ltd operated a tobacco cartel (ACB 2005). Buyers from these two companies 
assigned each other quotas on how much leaf each company was going to buy on a 
particular sale day. Accounts clerks from both companies kept a tally of how many bales 
each had bought and leaf buyers were warned by colleagues whenever they exceeded 
their allocated quota (ACB 2005, IDE-JETRO23). Otanez et al (2007) argued that this 
collusion was responsible for the average price drop from $1.66/kg in 1996 to $0.99/kg 
in 2005. From interviews conducted during the study, respondents within the industry 
confirmed the existence of such malpractice. Government, through the Tobacco Control 
Commission, failed to take any decisive action then, and by some accounts this practice
still continues up to the present. When asked about collusion among buyers with the aim 
of depressing prices, an executive at the auction market candidly replied, “we know it 
happens. It’s just that it’s hard to prove “
Leaf Smuggling
 In previous years, leaf companies have been implicated in smuggling of tobacco 
into Malawi. In 2003, 91 million kgs of Malawian tobacco were diverted to Zambia, and 
Mozambique and re-imported into Malawi as Zambian or Mozambican tobacco. In 2005, 
23 http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Company/malawi02.html
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          smugglers moved 50,000 tons of tobacco across Malawi’s boarders (145, 000 of 
tobacco was sold on the Auction floors in Malawi). Alliance One and Universal Leaf 
in these neighboring countries gladly bought the smuggled leaf on the other side of the 
border, and shipped it to processing plants in Malawi (Otanez et al 2007). Through this 
practice, the Malawian government loses revenue that could have been collected from the 
auction floors, and the companies avoided paying taxes. In 2015 statistics indicated that 
Malawi loses $30m a year due to tobacco smuggling (Christopher Jimu, Malawi Nation 
Online, 2nd April 2015).
Hijacking Policy Processes
 There has been an easy relationship between government agencies and the tobac-
co industry with industry executives routinely sitting on government advisory committees 
(Otanez 2007). Furthermore, the tobacco industry has used countries like Malawi to push 
litigation to challenge anti-tobacco public health measures in other countries. Malawi, 
considered an insignificant tobacco consuming economy, joined a lawsuit as a third party 
to prevent the Australian government from implementing tobacco packaging and adver-
tising regulations meant to reduce demand for cigarettes24. The industry has also been 
active in shaping discourse on the global anti-tobacco regulatory frameworks in Malawi. 
The industry has informed Malawi’s resistance to the FCTC. The Malawian government 
stance on FCTC takes issue with Articles 17 and 18 which, interestingly, are of direct 
relevance to Malawi. Article 17 of the FCTC requests member signatories to help farmers 
dependent on tobacco to switch to other economically viable livelihood options. Article 
18 empowers member signatories to take all measures to prevent environmental 
degradation. Of all the substantive articles of the FCTC, these two are the most relevant 
to Malawi as a producing country. Institutions of the Malawian government and key 
stakeholders including TAMA and TCC have parroted industry logic stating that they 
need to see viable alternatives first before switching25.  Considering how heavily depen-
dent the country is on tobacco and the environmental damage caused by tobacco (Otanez 
24 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds434_e.htm
25 Article on TAMA President’s views on replacing tobacco in Malawi http://www.capitalradiomalawi.com/
     news/item/6913-contrasting-views-on-malawi-s-quest-to-replace-tobacco
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          et al 2008) it is hard to imagine why the government response has been to spurn the 
opportunity to have global partners help with economic livelihood diversification.
Sabotaging the Auction Market
 It is common knowledge in the industry that leaf companies want government 
to abandon the auction market in favor of contract marketing. What is shocking is the 
blatant and overt tactics they have pushed their weight to get their wish after meeting 
resistance from government. Leaf companies resorted to openly discriminating against 
growers who present their tobacco on the auction market in preference for contracted 
growers. Growers related that leaf companies routinely reject leaf on auction on grounds 
of poor quality, only to buy the same quality under contract market. Data provided by 
Auction Holding Ltd (See Table 6.5) shows clear differences between prices paid for leaf 
on auction as compared to leaf on contract market. Even under contract sales, the growers 
who got loans from leaf companies fetched more money as compared to those who only 
had a marketing contract. In 2015, a non-funded contracted burley grower earned 12.5% 
more per kg than a grower who sold on auction, whereas a funded grower earned 8.9% 
more per kg than a contracted but non funded grower.
 Even while the contract marketing arrangement was in its nascent stages, despite 
agreements between government and industry to maintain a ratio of 20-80 between 
contract and auction markets, i.e, leaf companies undertook to buy 20% of their leaf 
needs on contract and 80% on auction market, leaf companies privileged the  contract 
arrangement26.
26 http://mwnation.com/tobacco-buyers-defy-ips-auction-sales-plan/
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          Table 6.5: Leaf Price Comparison: Auction vs Contract 2015
Source: AHL 2015
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          The transgressions of the leaf companies and the reluctance of government to act 
decisively to curb the malpractices point to a shift of balance of power from the state to
the leaf companies. On a visit to the auction floors, farmers shut down the auction market 
to protest against low prices (see figures 6.7 and 6.8). One of the complaints from 
growers was that TCC who are supposed to represent the interests of the farmers were 
simply looking on as leaf buyers continued to reject good tobacco and pay low prices for 
the tobacco they bought.
Figure 6.7: Growers Protest at Lilongwe Auction Floors
175
          Figure 6.8: Growers Protest at Lilongwe Auction Floors
For failing to regulate and control the behavior of buyers over pricing and other serious 
transgressions, the TCC has lost the confidence of industry analysts. Other studies have 
shown that the TCC is rendered ineffective by vested interests. A study into the 
competitiveness of the tobacco sector in Malawi, found that the TCC Board includes 
members of the Tobacco Exporters Association of Malawi, a powerful grouping of
players in the industry including leaf merchants who happen to be the very same people 
it is supposed to regulate (UNCTAD 2011). In the tobacco industry there is a blurred line 
between the regulator and the regulated.
 Another form of changing relationships is when the supposed voice of the grow-
ers plays more to the interest of the industry as demonstrated by the case of TAMA. As 
the largest and oldest growers association, TAMA has been unable to effectively stand up 
to the exploitation of their members by leaf companies. Their policy positions identify
 more with the industry than with the growers. As an example, the industry is reeling
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          under accusations for being complicit for existing poor working conditions for tenants 
and other farm workers (see CFSC 2015; Otanez 1994; Kanyongolo and Mussa 2015;
Kafundu 2005; Kuppens 2005). Having signed a collective bargaining agreement with the 
Tobacco Tenants and Allied Workers Union of Malawi (TOAWUM), the biggest union 
representing tobacco workers and tenants, which would have seen TAMA and
TOAWUM work together for improved conditions of tenants and tobacco workers, 
TAMA refused to honor their side of the bargain and eventually pulled out of the 
agreement (Sidewalkradio.net n.d)27. There is nothing on record to suggest that the 
biggest tobacco growers association ever took up the issue of poor working conditions 
with the industry. Recently, TAMA acquired shares in Premium Tobacco Company, a 
tobacco processing company. TAMA insists that they bought shares of the company on 
behalf of their members to ensure that as co-owners, TAMA members will benefit from 
profits from processing and export of tobacco. Being co-owner of a processing company 
may entitle TAMA to join the Tobacco Exporters Association of Malawi (TEAM), a 
powerful grouping of tobacco exporters. This is the same group to whom growers’ 
associations like TAMA are supposed to negotiate for better prices for their members. 
This further complicates the relationships in the tobacco industry leaving doubts as to 
whether any one entity is available to be the true representative for growers’ interest.
     6.7 Conclusion
 This chapter has noted that the reconfiguration of the structure of the global 
tobacco industry, and the resulting instability of the industry in Malawi is a 
constellation of several global processes affecting the production, marketing and con-
sumption of tobacco. The chapter has also shown that these processes have profound 
economic and social consequences on national economies and the livelihoods of 
smallholder tobacco growers. Through this chapter and the previous chapter on the 
institutional context of tobacco production and marketing in Malawi, I underscore the 
fact that these changes in the global political economy of tobacco structure are filtered 
through the dynamics of local history and agrarian relations, and the economic, political 
27 http://www.sidewalkradio.net/?p=23
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          and social institutions that underwrite tobacco production in Malawi. For this reason, I 
argue that while the industry is going through changes at a global level, it is not 
necessarily a global crisis of tobacco yet. On the contrary, because of unwieldy and 
opaque production and marketing structures in Malawi, the country experiences these 
changes as a crisis for the local industry. Studies of livelihood crises among small 
commodity producers  need to examine the social, historical and political contexts of the 
production and marketing of a commodity as a backdrop for framing commodity crises.
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          Chapter Seven: Responses to a Changing Tobacco Economy: 
Perspectives from the Field
“Yeah, tobacco has a future, but for the government -not for us growers”
     7.0 Introduction
 This chapter integrates insights from observations and interviews with growers, 
industry executives, regulators, government bureaucrats, and observers of livelihoods at 
Kumala to provide a picture of how smallholder tobacco growers understand and place 
the livelihood crisis within a specific agrarian context. This context comprises a 
liberalized economic /agricultural regime where multiple institutional actors play much
more pronounced roles in shaping rural agricultural livelihoods. Still more, this context 
is referenced back to historical relations between the state and smallholders. The chapter 
also describes how smallholder producers use their understanding of their context to
relate to the structural and institutional changes within the global tobacco industry. This 
understanding undergirds a discussion of the influence of government and companies, 
through action or inaction, in shaping growers perceptions of the crisis. The chapter 
further discusses the specifics of how tobacco growers at Kumala are responding to the 
current market instability by employing a traditional repertoire of practices for coping 
with livelihood stresses and by embracing new institutional arrangements to secure their 
livelihoods for the future. The chapter ends with a discussion on how an unstable tobacco 
market impacts the rural landscape through processes of labor movement and land 
stratification.
     7.1 Perceiving Risk from Market Instability
 For the first in-depth interviews, focus group and group discussions, I posed 
questions to gauge respondents’ perception of the general state of farming as the point of 
entry before narrowing down to specifics of tobacco farming. The idea was to understand 
what they considered to be the main challenges to farm based livelihoods and if they
 perceived instability in the tobacco market as a serious challenge. The summary of 
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          responses are shown in Table 7.1 below.
Table 7.1: Perception of Farming Challenges
Note:
Results from 33 case study households, three group interviews, and three focus group interviews. 
Respondents were free to give more than one response. Responses from GI and FGD are classified as one  
even if repeated by different participants.
 Erratic rainfall was cited as the major challenge, followed by low tobacco prices. 
The fact that, of all non-weather related challenges, low tobacco prices was high on the 
list allowed me to launch discussions about instability of the tobacco market. Many of the 
respondents related that they knew that the tobacco market is unstable, citing low prices 
in recent years, and the fact that it took long for their tobacco to be sold. Respondents 
remarked that it was now common to hear that many bales were rejected at the auction
market. When I asked them if this was because of bad farming on the part of 
individual farmers, they replied that the very same growers were able to make a fortune 
out of tobacco in years past. “In a good season you would see people buying stuff, 
especially clothes and building houses. You don’t see that these days,” one respondent 
remarked (Freeman, August 2015). While acknowledging that the tobacco market had 
been unstable in recent years, the farmers framed it as something they expected to pass. 
I asked respondents to recall past livelihood crises and relate how they had dealt with 
them. Respondents recalled multiple crises from the past. Among the notable ones, was 
the 1995/96 crisis when they experienced severe food insecurity and many people went 
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          into ganyu labor to survive.
  Even when they found piece work it didn’t pay much. Respondents recalled that 
working on one acre (land preparation) only got them one  pail of maize. In 2012 they 
also experienced severe food insecurity and maize prices went up. According to the 
respondents, the price of one pail (a five liter bucket) increased from the normal price of 
MK400/5kg to MK1000/5kg (FGD at Kumala, October 2014). Crises specific to tobacco 
include the 2004 crisis when hail storms destroyed the tobacco crop in the field. Growers 
failed to repay their loans and credit companies dispossessed livestock from defaulters. 
Many people stopped growing tobacco at that time. The other notable crisis was that of
2011, the “80 cents season”. Again a lot of growers failed to grow tobacco the following 
season as a result of lack of resources. In the aftermath of all these cases farmers relied on 
tried and tested practices to earn an income and rebuild their capital base. These practices 
included selling assets like livestock, oxcarts, and bailing presses, going into ganyu labor 
on farms in the area, and seeking temporary employment in town. They also scaled back 
on tobacco to grow low-resource crops like groundnuts and soy to raise enough capital to 
go back into tobacco farming.
     7.2 Perception of Causes of Tobacco Market Instability
 Following the understanding that tobacco markets were unstable, I asked 
respondents to relate what they thought was causing the market instability and the 
declining of earnings from tobacco. This question was intended to determine their 
understanding of the structural causes of the crisis. Common responses to this question 
are shown in Table 7:2 below.
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          Table 7.2: Perceptions of Causes of Tobacco Market Instability
Note: Results from 16 grower case study households, 3 Group Interviews and 3 Focus Group Interviews. 
Respondents were free to give more than one response. Responses from GI & FGD are classified as one
even if repeated by different participants.
 While the respondents did not relate fluctuating and declining incomes to 
changes in the structure of the global tobacco industry, they mentioned proximate and 
highly relatable possibilities. These responses show that growers view their troubles 
through the lens of the organization and management of the industry. Explanations for the 
common responses above are explained in detail as follows:
Narratives of self-blame
 This response shows that some growers faulted themselves for receiving low 
prices. At its core, this response points to a narrative among tobacco growers that says if 
a grower received low prices, it means they did not take adequate care of their tobacco. 
Inadequate care means that either the grower did not apply adequate fertilizer and 
pesticides or they did not do a good job on grading. This view was forcefully pronounced
among those growers with connections to leaf companies. Take the example of Edward. 
Edward is a mid-stage grower who accesses inputs from someone contracted with 
Alliance One (he had initially been included among the case study households as a 
non-contracted grower - when I found out the source of his inputs I still categorized him 
as a non-contracted grower who uses alternative means to access inputs). He vouched for 
the future of tobacco and his stated desire was to become a contracted farmer 
himself. When I asked him about the low prices growers have been getting in recent years 
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          he replied, “If the price is bad, it must be the farmer’s fault. If the grading is done well; 
if every farmer graded according to instructions, then the future of tobacco would be 
bright.” (Edward, September 2015). One farmer went as far as suggesting that growers 
encourage corruption at the auction market, and that is what is ruining the tobacco market 
these days. I assume that from his experience seeing growers having to pay various bribes 
in the tobacco logistics chain as well as bribing leaf buyers at the auction market, he 
thinks of growers as initiators and beneficiaries of these malpractices and not as victims 
of a broken system.
 While the above sentiments could be viewed as an honest grower’s self- 
assessment, they also need to be evaluated in relation to the messages coming from the 
tobacco establishment and the government. Ministry of Agriculture, TCC, TAMA and 
leaf companies have for years sent out this message to tobacco farmers. According to 
the establishment, the cause for poor prices is over-production and lack of attention to 
quality. But as shown in chapter 6, and as other stories in this chapter will show, even 
well graded tobacco has fallen victim to poor prices. There is need for a credible study to 
examine the relationship between the quality of tobacco and the prices farmers receive. 
Without this assessment it is difficult to know if sentiments from people like Edward are 
a result of a grower’s honest assessment, or if they are a result of growers’ internalization 
of messages from the tobacco establishment.
Blame the Politics
 Some respondents responded that the tobacco crisis is caused by politics and 
politicians as prices offered to tobacco growers are dependent on what politicians do. 
They pointed out that in the past, the strong leadership of ex-President Bingu wa 
Mutharika forced leaf companies to pay good prices. The implication is that weak 
political leadership is letting tobacco companies get away with paying growers low 
prices. Other respondents took a different angle and blamed poor prices and an unstable 
market on government’s victimization of the tobacco industry. As one respondent put it, 
“The government is over-taxing the tobacco industry. That is why they pay low prices to 
growers” (Daniel, September 2015).
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          Resignation to Fate
 Respondents who blamed the tobacco crisis on themselves, politics, tobacco 
companies or the government were more likely to resign themselves to fate and indicate 
powerlessness about the situation. The common expression was “It is God’s will.” This 
is a popular phrase among Malawians when they discuss things they don’t entirely com-
prehend or things about which they feel powerless, such as illness, death or other tragic 
events. Other common expressions like “Masiku sakoma onse - not all days can be good,” 
and ”We take a chance and hope that next time we will get better prices” suggest that 
those individuals saw fluctuating prices and having their tobacco rejected at the auction 
market as an inevitable part of a tobacco farmer’s life.
Perceptions of Marginalization and Exploitation
 Some respondents expressed awareness of their own marginalization and 
exploitation. They viewed an unstable tobacco market and declining incomes as the 
creation of an exploitative tobacco establishment, working in tandem with a government 
that not only condones it, but actively participates in the exploitation of its own people. In 
a follow-up interview to evaluate the preceding growing season, a case study
respondent expressed dissatisfaction with the way the season had gone. “Look, the village 
had a lot of tobacco this year but there is no ‘chitukuko’ (development)”, he said. “No
one put up an iron roofed house this year. Farmers are just working for the companies” 
(Freeman, September 2015).
 In group discussions or in forums where low prices and the unstable tobacco 
market were discussed, farmers denounced the opaque and inefficient system but also 
lamented at their lack of voice in marketing and regulation processes. The main sentiment 
was resentment against government and its institutions for inefficiency and for the 
various policies that make rural farmers’ livelihoods difficult. Two institutions came 
under the fiercest criticism and these are AHL and TCC. Whereas AHL was attacked for 
its cumbersome procedures and for creating a corrupt environment, TCC was accused of 
being inefficient and for failing to heed the voice of the growers.
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            7.3 Growers’ Perceptions of Auction Holdings Ltd
 AHL is the only entity authorized to run tobacco auction markets. It is charged 
with receiving and bringing growers tobacco to the floors, conducting the auction sales, 
and remitting money into growers’ accounts. Growers regard AHL as inefficient, and the 
auction market process itself as impersonal and intimidating to farmers. Growers felt that 
they needed to have a voice to lobby or influence price decisions on their own tobacco.
“It would be better if the buyers discussed the prices with us- as farmers we have no say 
in the buying process,” one said (Limbani, September 2015). Some respondents, 
especially those who were on contract and those who had been to Mozambique and had 
seen an alternative marketing system, noted that an impersonal marketing system made it 
impossible for growers to get a sense of the future viability of their tobacco. As one 
respondent remarked, “There is no contact with buyers and no negotiation- no way to 
know what’s wrong with your tobacco. It’s a game of chance we play. We grow and they 
exploit us,” (Adams, September 2015). Even among growers contracted to leaf 
companies, their most common request is for the company to liaise with buyers on their 
behalf and ask for better prices.
 The other common complaint against AHL was the cumbersomeness of logistics 
of getting the leaf to the auction floors and the corruption that has been entrenched in the 
process. In individual interviews respondents would say “auction is for the big farmers”, 
pointing at the cumbersome logistics of getting tobacco to the market. Others were more 
critical about the corruption associated with the auction market. As one respondent put it, 
“Auction just paves the way for a lot of profiteering middlemen to reap on the sweat of 
small farmers- there is no way a small farmer can develop”(Bright J, December 2014).
     7.4 Who Speaks for the Farmers? Tobacco Growers’ Perceptions of TCC
 Tobacco Control Commission is the regulating agency for all matters related to 
tobacco in Malawi. In group and individual interviews, growers criticized TCC for being 
an inefficient bureaucracy, and for not protecting growers from exploitation by leaf 
companies. Growers lamented about the struggles they have to go through to register for 
permits and quotas, but the bitterest complaint was about the inability of TCC to ensure 
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          that farmers receive good prices commensurate with the quality of their tobacco. Every 
year, prior to the beginning of tobacco sales, government publishes minimum prices for 
specific grades. TCC representatives are empowered by law to arbitrate on behalf of 
farmers if leaf buyers start paying less than prescribed minimum prices. Growers 
related that they felt that TCC was not keen to exercise its power on their behalf. This 
gave rise to sentiments among growers that TCC is in cahoots with leaf companies. In a 
focus group discussion at the auction floors, growers expressed dissatisfaction with the 
fact that a lot of tobacco had been rejected that day and that buyers were offering low 
prices. They were also incensed by the fact that lower quality tobacco filings were bought 
at the same price as good quality leaf. The fact that a TCC representative was there, and 
he went along with the low prices further infuriated growers. It is things like this that give 
rise to speculation that TCC is allowing leaf companies to rob the growers.
  These sentiments show that smallholder growers blame the market instability 
on the institutions charged with facilitating and regulating the tobacco market. Growers 
think that if these bottlenecks were to be straightened out then the low prices and 
excessive rejections will stop, and growers will prosper again. Both TCC and AHL are
known to be government entities (although state owned ADMARC only has 51% stake 
in AHL). Growers feel that the tobacco system is rigged for the benefit of government, 
tobacco companies and their staff. One grower lamented “only the workers at AHL are 
getting rich- magalimoto onse mukuona apawa palibe po ya mlimi pamenepa, onse a 
ogwira ntchito kuno- all these cars you see, not one belongs to a grower. They all belong 
to people who work here” (FGD 1 at AHL, 5th June 2015).
Trading permits, Export Licenses and Exchange Rate Management
 Away from tobacco sales settings, more resentment was directed towards 
government for policies and machinations that are perceived to be working against small 
farmers, including the regulation of produce export licenses and the management of the 
exchange rate.
 Ministry of Agriculture issues trading permits and export licenses for 
businessmen who buy produce from small growers with the intention of exporting to 
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          markets abroad. Following assessments of levels of production in a particular year, the 
Ministry sometimes decides to restrict exports of specific types of crops deemed to have 
fallen below expected levels of production. This is done ostensibly to protect nation-
al supply. Exports of maize, the national staple food, are subjected to such bans with a 
remarkable frequency. These restrictions are contentious as they are often issued without 
prior warning, leading to inconveniences in the market. For example, once a ban on say, 
groundnuts or soy has been issued, traders stop exporting and hoard what they have. But 
this also means they stop buying from small producers, and if they do buy at all, they 
offer lower prices. In a focus group discussion, participants denounced the chaotic man-
ner in which these export restrictions are issued. One participant questioned if govern-
ment was really keen to see tobacco farmers diversify away from tobacco, saying, 
“Government has just revoked export licenses for groundnuts. These are the kinds of 
things that make it impossible for people to find alternatives to tobacco” (Group
Interview at Kumala, September 2014). This sentiment was further confirmed by an 
agro-dealer who has observed the progress of agriculture in the area for many years. He 
argued that frequent government bans on maize export permits reduces the viability of 
maize as a cash crop.
 Another contentious issue was the fluctuation of the local currency’s exchange 
rate to the dollar. There has been a pattern in recent years where the Kwacha’s exchange 
rate to the dollar has been fluctuating. Observers note that the Kwacha usually gains on 
the dollar around the beginning of the tobacco market. After the market, the Kwacha 
starts to weaken. This means that a strong Kwacha allows leaf buyers to buy more 
tobacco for the dollar, but at the time when growers need to buy inputs, the Kwacha is 
less strong. As a result, prices of inputs, most of which are imported, go up and growers 
need to cough up more Kwacha to pay for inputs. There could be a rational 
explanation for this but some analysts and the farmers themselves fear that government 
is rigging the system against farmers for the benefit of input suppliers. This sentiment 
was expressed strongly by participants in a group interview. In an individual interview a 
respondent took it a step further to suggest that the fluctuation of the dollar is what sends 
people (into labor migration) to Mozambique (Manfred, September 2015).
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          For all the respondents who blame themselves or resign themselves to fate over the 
instability of the tobacco market, there are many more respondents who blame the 
government and its institutions for allowing the exploitation of smallholders and for 
perpetuating policies that harm their interests. These sentiments must be read against 
the background of the role of the state in agriculture and its fractious relationship with 
the smallholders. In recent years, government has adopted a populist stance where it has 
promoted input subsidy programs meant to benefit smallholders, of which the Farm Input 
Subsidy Program (FISP) program is the most popular. Recent administrations have used 
this and other subsidy programs to reach out to the masses to demonstrate their 
commitment to the smallholder farmer. In addition, government has sought to reassure 
tobacco growers that it is concerned with their welfare. At the beginning of the tobacco 
marketing season, government usually publishes statements saying it has negotiated with 
leaf companies to give farmers good prices. Typically, on the day of the opening of the 
market, the President either issues a stern warning or begs leaf companies to give growers
 good prices. As it often happens, the first trading day buyers offer good prices, but after 
that growers start receiving poor prices. Fieldwork revealed that not all tobacco 
growers are taken in by these performances from government. Having gone through 
successive cycles of broken promises at the hands of several administrations, there is an 
anger among smallholders that government does not prioritize their interests. 
Smallholders express powerlessness at the way their governments have treated them, a 
pattern that can be traced from colonial times.
 “Although government likes to say they care about us poor farmers, they don’t 
 care about us at all”(Group Interview at Kumala, September 2014).
 “Tobacco is difficult work - from August/Sept hard work in the fields -borrowing
 money for consumption and yet you get measly pay - the whole rhetoric about the
 government  caring for the rural farmer is a load of nonsense” (VH Chitika, 
 June 2014).
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 “Who are we? Who is a tobacco farmer? The government only works for the 
 companies” (FGD 2 at AHL, 27th June 2015).
 There is the realization that government’s treatment of smallholders is not just a 
matter of innocent negligence, but that government is making money off farmers. As one 
grower put it’
 “Yeah, tobacco has a future, but for the government –not for us growers” 
 (FGD 2 at AHL 27th June 2015).
 These responses show that there is a range of perceptions as to what is causing 
instability and low prices on the tobacco market. There are those who blame themselves 
for not being diligent as growers and therefore bringing poor quality tobacco to the 
market. Other growers lay the blame on politics and politicians as they believe that 
tobacco prices are dependent on who is running the government and what they decide 
to do for farmers. Then there are many who relate tobacco’s misfortunes to government 
through its inefficient institutions and its purposeful exploitation of tobacco growers. In 
all, most growers think that if all these issues were sorted out, tobacco markets would 
work better again. Other grievances are not specific to tobacco but include policies like 
the management of the exchange rate and the administration of trading and export permits 
that make rural livelihoods unstable.
Perception of Structural Changes in the Industry
 As a way to engage growers on the structural and institutional changes taking 
place in the industry, I asked them to describe changes taking place in tobacco farming 
and marketing. Older and mid-stage growers talked about changes in marketing from the 
days when they used to grow dark fired tobacco and were only allowed to sell to 
ADMARC. They contrast those days to the current times when they have direct access to 
the auction market. These respondents also talked about how the closing of credit 
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          companies like Malawi Rural Finance (MRFC) has reduced opportunities for access to 
credit. On current changes most were able to tell that there has been increased 
involvement of tobacco companies in leaf production through financing and technical 
support towards growers. Respondents notice that more extension agents (Leaf 
Technicians) are now coming to advise them on growing tobacco, an area that was once 
the preserve of government extension services. With the involvement of companies, 
growers also notice more stringent standards for production required at the farm level. 
When I asked about the implication of these changes on farming in general a grower 
replied that
 “Now farmers need to be knowledgeable about procedures at auction market and 
 about processes at the banks. They also need to be knowledgeable about financial 
 management. Poor wealth management means farmers get money but they waste 
 it”. (John C, September 2014)
 Other growers complained about how company demands create a need for more 
labor, and how endless meetings reduce the time farmers can dedicate to other crops. On 
the whole growers see the changes in a positive way. They relate that with the increased 
cost of production and restricted access to credit, the coming of leaf companies is a stitch 
in time.
     7.5 Perceptions of Long-Term Viability of Tobacco Farming and Adaptive Responses
 Having talked about instability and the institutional changes in the tobacco industry, I 
asked respondents about their general perception of the future of tobacco farming. Following 
their responses to this general question, I specifically asked about their perception of the 
long-term viability of tobacco farming in relation to a hypothetical risk event - the abrupt 
cessation of marketing of tobacco products as a result of global initiatives to reduce smok-
ing. This question was intended to measure whether respondents who perceived the future of 
tobacco to be in danger, went on to pursue adaptive strategies. A summary of responses are 
shown in Table 7.3 below.
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          Table 7.3. Perception of Long-Term Viability of Tobacco Farming and Adaptive Responses.
Note: Results from 29 grower and non-grower case study households. Adaptation counts for only those who 
have tried tobacco and abandoned it. Adaptive strategies means crop or economic diversification away
from tobacco.
 Among case study households,10 respondents out of 29 responded that they felt that the 
current instability in the tobacco market signified the possibility of a long-term decline of 
tobacco. An ex-civil servant who began growing tobacco prior before burley was liberalized 
stated that he knew that tobacco is on a downward trend. He claimed that he started noticing a 
downward trend from the 2007/2008 season.
 Other respondents mentioned that they had heard on the radio that some countries 
want to ban tobacco but they don’t believe it. “Ndife a Tomasi - we are (Biblical) Thomases,” 
one said. “We will only believe when bales of tobacco rot in our homes” (Fanwell, December 
2014). Another respondent said, “We know about tobacco troubles but as long as the buyers 
are here we will still grow it” (Freeman, October 2014).
  Other sentiments suggested that growers were watching the actions of government. 
These respondents were in two categories. On one hand were those who were optimistic about 
the future of tobacco based on the fact that the Malawi government depends on tobacco for 
revenue. As one such respondent remarked, “Boma limaona cholowa-government benefits 
from tobacco.”(Daniel, September 2015). This assures them that government is not going 
to allow tobacco farming to be banned in Malawi. Other respondents related that they were 
waiting to hear directly from government. A participant at a focus group discussion remarked, 
“We hear about efforts to stop tobacco farming but we need government to tell us what crop to 
grow” (AHL FGD I 5th June 2015).
 These responses further illustrate the effects of the historical relationship between 
smallholders and a heavy handed paternalistic state in shaping the adaptive capacities of 
smallholders. These responses are framed with smallholders’ understanding of the 
191
          government’s reliance on, and the control it exercises over the crop. These respondents were 
all too aware that government relies on tobacco for foreign exchange and that is
why it regulates production and marketing. They are further aware that it is the same 
government that used to run produce markets as well as set commodity prices in the past. That 
is why it is so hard for them to comprehend the possibility of tobacco farming coming to stop 
in Malawi as they believe that the ‘all-powerful’ government would not allow that to happen.
 Responses to my inquiry on the long-term viability of tobacco farming revealed that 
a small but significant number of respondents are aware about conversations where the future 
of tobacco farming has been debated. These growers know about the anti- smoking lobby 
and the moves taken by other countries to restrict smoking, yet they have no perception of the 
gravity of the matter. Not many have processed what the possibility of reduced trade in 
tobacco products means for the future of their livelihoods. Of the ten respondents who were 
worried about the long term future of tobacco, only three had taken long-term adaptive 
strategies. These three had ventured into crop and economic diversification activities that 
entirely excluded tobacco, such as alternative cash crops and business enterprises. One 
common thing about them is that they have grown tobacco before but they taken steps to exit 
tobacco farming on account of their experience with the market instability. I discuss these 
respondents in more detail in the section on Responses to a Changing Tobacco Economy 
below.
Tobacco Remains a Popular Crop
 Despite the wide acceptance among respondents that tobacco markets are unstable, 
findings from the study show that tobacco remains a popular crop. My initial expectation from 
the study was that if farmers were responding to poor tobacco prices by diversifying away 
from tobacco, then there would be a decline on the proportion of land dedicated to tobacco. 
Fieldwork has shown that responses to a changing tobacco economy at plot level will require 
a long-term observation. This is because smallholder farmers at Kumala have a portfolio 
of crops (maize, groundnuts, and tobacco) for cash and for consumption which they rotate 
among various farm plots. Occasionally, they may reduce acreage of a particular crop or fail 
to grow another for lack of inputs. In most cases, this is a reflection of last season’s experience 
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          with that particular crop, but it does not say much about long term changes in crop choice and 
farm livelihoods. This has implications on the interpretation of change of acreage dedicated to 
tobacco. Findings reveal that all but two growers in the case study households have 
experienced loss at the auction floors and ended up having no resources to grow tobacco the 
next season. This does not mean that they give up on tobacco. They resort to growing 
alternative crops such as groundnuts, vegetables and other low-resource crops with the hope 
that they can accumulate enough capital to get back to growing tobacco.
 Tobacco remains popular with those who are currently growing it, as well as those 
who are unable to grow it. A close look at tobacco from the perspective of growers in differ-
ent life-stages offers a way to explore the different meanings and motivations for supporting 
tobacco at each stage in a life cycle.
Young Stage
 For smallholders at the young stage, tobacco represents ambitions for the future. This 
is the group that is just starting out, typically under the age of 25, recently married and at most 
with two children. They may have recently established their own household or may still be 
living with their parents and in some cases they do not have farm plots of their own. Young 
farmers are more likely to be growing maize and groundnuts and in addition to farming, they 
may also perform other livelihood activities to supplement their incomes such as ganyu or 
chopping and selling firewood. They do all this with the hope of accumulating resources to 
go into tobacco farming. During the census when I asked young farmers why they were not 
growing tobacco, without fail they replied that they were “making a foundation (building 
capital)” so they can start growing tobacco. A typical story is that of Arnold.
Story # 1: Arnold
 When I first interviewed Arnold, he was 24 years old and he had just gotten married. 
He was growing maize and groundnuts on three separate plots; one he received from his 
parents, one from his wife’s parents and the other he rented. Previously, before he got married 
he worked on his grandparents’ dimba plot. He also supplemented his income doing other 
things like ganyu labor. In addition, he had access to a dairy cow owned by his grandmother 
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          from which he got milk and he shared the proceeds from milk sales with his grand-parents. 
When I asked him why he was not growing tobacco he replied that he was determined to 
grow tobacco the next year and that he was building a foundation.
 Arnold was aware of the challenges of growing tobacco and the lack of inputs, 
especially fertilizer. He planned to get loans from either a company or from friends. In 
addition, he planned to sell maize from the dimba to buy fertilizer. He was convinced about 
the importance of tobacco. “In this area, tobacco is the chief earner as compared to groundnuts 
for example. Burundians will buy one bag of groundnuts (50kg) at MK10, 000 but one bale of 
tobacco (100kg) will fetch close to MK60, 000 at the minimum”. To him, in addition to 
making wealth, tobacco is about insuring oneself against the rainy day. “In February food is 
scarce in these parts, and tobacco is harvested in February. One can simply harvest some leaf, 
sell to vendors and get money to buy food”. Stories from the experiences of his peers who had 
done well with tobacco and bought assets such as oxcarts, cattle and motorbikes was also a 
major factor pushing him into tobacco. When I asked him what he thought about the low pric-
es other growers were currently experiencing on the market, he replied that as farmers they get 
dismayed and they think about stopping growing tobacco, but when they think about 
eventualities, they still get back to growing tobacco to insure themselves.
 When I interviewed him again the following year he had just sold his first tobacco 
crop grown on half an acre. He got four bales (approximately 400kgs) which he sold to 
vendors. He realized around MK180, 000 and with that money he had rented two more plots 
and was planning to expand his tobacco to one and half acres. He told me he had just bought 
six bags of fertilizer in preparation for the next season. “I’m still building a foundation,” he 
said.
Story # 2: Chimwemwe
 Arnold’s story is typical in the diligence and dedication he applied to his work and the 
preparations for his future. One major difference is that he got a lot of help from his 
grandparents. To be able to produce and sell 400 kgs in his first year shows that he had 
relatively adequate resources. Not every young person is that lucky. At 20, Chimwemwe had 
been farming with his parents for four years. He had access to two acres of land but he did 
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          not have the resources to get married and start his own farmstead. He went to Mozambique to 
work as a tenant to raise resources for farm inputs. When he got back after one season he took 
a wife and spent his savings to buy fertilizer.
 These two stories show what tobacco means for young people. They may be growing 
maize and groundnuts but they don’t consider themselves well positioned on the path to 
financial prosperity until they start growing tobacco.
Mid-Stage Growers
 This was the group with the most tobacco growers in the village. At above 25 years of 
age, growers in this group are well settled in their farming, relatively speaking. They are in an 
accumulative mode and see tobacco farming as a saving mechanism. As tobacco growers, 
they have had several market mishaps along the way but decided to keep growing anyway. 
They were more energetic, had accumulated some assets and were more likely to be on 
contract with one of the tobacco leaf companies.
 
Story # 3: John C.
 Mr. John C has a household of five plus one worker. At the time of the first interview 
he worked on five plots; two of which were rented. He grew maize (two acres) groundnuts 
(one acre) and tobacco (two acres). In addition, he was also into produce trading. He bought 
textiles in town and exchanged them for groundnuts in the village. He then sold the 
groundnuts in bulk to other vendors from town. John started farming in 1998 soon after he got 
married. Initially he started with maize and ventured into tobacco two years later. Surprising-
ly he said it was the famine in 2001 that made him start growing tobacco. He had too much 
maize, but no money. He sold the maize to get money and ended up joining the ranks of 
famine victims. After initial teething problems in tobacco (he had joined a club and for a 
number of years he ended paying for club members who had defaulted on their loans, losing 
his own money in the process), things started to look up. In 2011 he got his own registration 
number and since then things have gotten better. John has gradually accumulated assets 
including farm plots. He is contracted with Alliance One and ever since he went on contract 
he thinks that prices have changed for the better. He has a brick and iron- roofed house, and 
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          granaries with plenty of maize; all hallmarks of a successful farmer. On the future of tobacco 
he said he knows tobacco farming is a risky business. When I asked him if he was planning to 
diversify away from tobacco he replied that he could not diversify right away since he did not 
have enough fertilizer for maize. But he said if he were to stop growing tobacco, he would go 
into maize and groundnuts or go into another business. At the time of the first interview
in September 2014 he was planning for the next season. He planned to dedicate two acres to 
tobacco even though in his words, tobacco had failed in the previous growing season.
Story # 4: Mr.Willie D’s Story
 Willie is contracted with Limbe Leaf Tobacco Co and his story is identical to John 
C. With the most rudimentary of education (four years of primary school), he started out as a 
ticket seller at Mitundu market and then became a laborer at a nearby farm. He got married 
in 1993 but only started farming on his own in 2009. 2015 was only his third year growing 
tobacco as previously he did not have capital. From an initial 1.5 acres inherited from his 
parents, he now works on 5.5 acres rented long term. When I asked him about his thoughts 
on the future of tobacco he was quick to reply that the future is bright, according to messages 
from the company he was contracted with. “ It is especially bright now that the companies are 
providing assistance” he said. “I can now follow recommendations from extension workers 
which allow me to get a good crop”. He has done well with his tobacco farming. He recently 
bought cows (3), and he was molding bricks for a new house.
 John C and Willie D represent the majority of mid-stage tobacco growers in the 
village. They have experienced success with tobacco, .they have accumulated assets and 
they have built good houses. Also typical of growers in this category, despite stories of bad 
prices and rejected tobacco bales, they swear by tobacco and have never given much thought 
to diversifying away from tobacco. They are also typical in that to be able to grow tobacco 
successfully these days, you have to be on contract. This is what every farmer in the village 
wants, which contributes to the popular appeal of tobacco.
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          Late Stage Farmers
 These were older heads of households who had grown tobacco all their lives and had 
acquired assets. They have seen the glory days of tobacco and even given resources to their 
children to grow tobacco. For those who still had resources and energy to grow it, they could 
count on some help with labor from their grown children.
Story # 5: Mr. Derrick’s Story
 Mr. Derrick is a frail old man with five adult children all with their own families, three 
of whom are successful tobacco growers in the village. He was born in the early 1940s, and 
started growing tobacco with his parents until he got married. He initially started with growing 
NDDF but went into Burley as soon as it wasliberalized. He related that he used to be wealthy 
and at some point he had accumulated assets including cattle but they were stolen from him. 
This marked the beginning of his descent into poverty. In 2015 he grew tobacco on a quarter 
acre and realized MK130,000. His experience with tobacco is mixed; he has done well in 
some seasons and lost out in others. The fact that he can only grow tobacco on a quarter of an 
acre is because he has given out most of his land to his children, but also because he does not 
have enough labor to grow more than that. Asked about the future of tobacco, he said he was 
not sure as it all depended on what the President decided to do.
 In recent years tobacco farmers experience tobacco as a game of chance. It’s about 
withstanding losses one season and making gains in the other. Of all the growers in the case 
study households, only two indicated that they have never suffered loss because of low prices 
at the auction market. The rest of them have had to deal with bad prices and loss. But it is also 
clear that tobacco remains a popular cash crop with all stages on the life cycle maintaining 
unwavering support for tobacco. Most growers see fluctuating prices as part of life in the risky 
business of farming. Others see fluctuating prices and declining incomes as a result of 
uncompetitive trading practices, compromised state regulatory powers and a lack of voice 
for the grower. With a steadfast dedication to tobacco, most growers treat these uncertainties 
as the fate of marginalized rural growers abandoned by the state to deal with vagaries of the 
market the same way they deal with uncertainties of weather. However, it is also clear that bad 
tobacco market events are becoming common, and that these events are stressing the house-
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          holds and the community. With the background above, it is now time to begin a discussion 
about the real cost of this dedication to tobacco for the households.
Recovering From Market Shocks
 The stories of people like John C and Willie D above are a snap shot in time. In reality, 
the story of most smallholder tobacco farmers is a cycle of prosperity and impoverishment. 
Interviews turned up stories of once prosperous tobacco farmers who ended up losing 
everything after suffering low prices at the auction. The process of how farmers get back on 
their feet after a being made destitute by low prices is particularly interesting and it points to 
the enduring beliefs around tobacco. It also helps explain the paradox of why farmers stick to 
tobacco even if it doesn’t make sense economically in the long-term. To get back on their feet, 
most smallholders are compelled to sell assets accumulated over an entire farming career in 
order to settle debts with laborers, financial institutions, neighbors and family.
 
Story # 6: Alick
 Alick used to be a big tobacco farmer- at one point employing 13 farmers (tenants) 
to work on his farm. He is now a vendor. He buys tobacco from farmers in the village to sell 
to other vendors from town. He estimated that once a tobacco grower is devastated by poor 
prices at the auction it takes no less than five years to recover. When he received low prices 
in 2011 he had to sell a lot of his assets including his oxcart and three of his four bicycles. He 
says he is very much impoverished and he can’t even begin to think about growing tobacco, 
let alone hiring tenants. He joked that he couldn’t even maintain the one bike he has left which 
helps him with his tobacco vending. In a separate group interview his sentiments were 
repeated. A participant related that there were people who suffered poor prices in 2011 and 
stopped farming on their own to become laborers. They had not been able to recover and 
re-establish their farming. Alick observed that due to the cyclical nature of farming and 
tobacco farming in particular, growers were either stuck in one position or were actually 
getting poorer. Speaking about the aftermath of the disastrous 2011 season, he said the com-
ing in of Limbe Leaf and other companies is the only reason some people were able to grow 
tobacco in 2012. It is no coincidence that most stories of success about tobacco farming in this 
study came from contracted farmers.
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          Interestingly, in the process of getting back on their feet, some growers turn to 
livelihood activities that could be considered more lucrative and provide more stable income 
than tobacco. But the irony is that adherents of tobacco only undertake these activities just so 
they can return to growing tobacco.
Story # 7: Michael’s Story
 Michael started farming in 1991 with 4 acres of maize later added groundnuts to his 
portfolio. He ventured into tobacco in 1994 following advice from his friends. He recalls that 
1996 was a tough year. The tobacco crop was good (he got 34 bales), but prices were poor; 
averaging 65-80 cents/kg. To cover his loss, he sold two of his three cows and 50 bags of 
maize to help with feeding workers. Furthermore, he had to borrow money to pay workers and 
debtors. All this was in addition to the 26 bags of fertilizer he had sunk into growing the 
tobacco. He tried growing tobacco again in 1997 and owing to his now sharply reduced 
resources, he only realized 14 bales. He again received low prices and he briefly stopped 
growing tobacco and sold his remaining cow . Ironically, this marked the start of a successful 
cattle trading business which enabled him to open a grocery store and eventually, to return to 
tobacco. He restarted tobacco farming in 2000 and got 6 bales. Between 2000 and 2013 this 
story of falling and bouncing back would replay itself at least twice, the last time being 2011. 
In 2013 he went back to tobacco. I asked him why he kept going back to tobacco, foregoing 
opportunities for a stable income. He replied that he does what everyone else is doing. 
“Everyone wants to grow tobacco,” he said. He hinted at local discourse that promotes 
tobacco production. “There is pressure to grow tobacco. The older you are the more the 
pressure to expand your tobacco acreage to match with your stature. When you have a good 
tobacco shed your friends call you ‘a bwana-boss’” (Michael, 3rd Jan 2015). Such is the 
dedication to tobacco in the village that another respondent hinted that there is actually 
something wrong with anyone who is not growing tobacco. “Price fluctuations? It’s the same 
as if you were sick. You only worry about next time. You stop growing tobacco - your head is 
not working. It’s a huge mistake” (Josiah, September 2015).
 Michael’s story is quite illustrative because it plays out frequently, quite often in less 
dramatic ways. Other people who get their fingers burnt with tobacco go into more modest 
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          enterprises with lower returns but a steady income with lower risks. However, the story is 
similar. Once they get back on their feet, they venture back into tobacco only for the cycle to 
repeat itself.
 An investigation into this puzzling trend points to the role of tobacco in the household 
and in the broader economy as well as the strong influence of two different, but related strands 
of discourse on rural life in Malawi. The first discourse is about what it means to be a man of 
status in the village. There is a salient narrative that says a man needs to grow tobacco to be 
respected. The older one gets, the more pressure they have to expand their acreage. It is at this 
expansion stage that most burn their fingers. Those who fail to grow tobacco for financial 
reasons feel inferior and the few who have made the decision to quit tobacco farming are 
asked by perplexed neighbors why they quit.
 There is another narrative that speaks to how both government and rural people 
approach their livelihoods. The former President of this country, Dr Hastings Banda, used
 to tell rural people to concentrate on farming. His favorite saying was “chuma chili 
m’nthaka” (“your wealth is in the soil”). This framed how his administration approached 
agriculture and subsequently shaped the orientation and activities of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Even today, the Ministry of Agriculture commits a large part of its resources to 
crop production (close to 50% of the Ministry’s total budget) to the neglect of other potentially 
lucrative sectors like livestock production, and other critical functions like research and 
extension. You don’t hear this maxim spoken publicly as much these days but you only have 
to scratch the surface to realize that it remains powerful. Some interviewees told me outright 
that they were meant to be farmers. “Business is not in a Chewa man’s blood” one told me 
(Limbani, October 2015). As a result of internalizing these narratives, people faced with 
unstable and declining tobacco incomes don’t seriously consider opportunities outside 
farming as dependable livelihood activities. And when, by chance, they find themselves doing 
any other non-farm livelihood activities, their chief concern is to get as much money as they 
can, and return to the land. And by this they mostly mean going back to tobacco.
Responses to a Changing Tobacco Economy
 Common perception among active tobacco growers and those who want to join them 
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          is that the current instability in the industry is one of the risks they are exposed to as farmers, 
and they expect it to pass. Meanwhile they use a variety of strategies to cope with declining 
and unstable incomes, including changing cropping patterns, labor exchange, dimba farming , 
renting out farm plots, and selling firewood and charcoal in town. They do this to survive low 
tobacco prices and resuscitate their tobacco farming in the short-term. For the long-term some 
seek to secure their future by engaging in contract farming.
 A few respondents feared that the glorious days of the ‘green gold’ are in the past. 
They have taken a long term view to go beyond merely coping, and have crafted long- term 
adaptive strategies away from tobacco. These include economic diversification such as 
starting a new business enterprise, and crop diversification such as venturing into cash crops 
other than tobacco, such as soy and beans. Another strategy is to change from a farming 
system based on field crops to wetland (dimba) farming where horticultural produce is the 
main cash crop.
 
Contract Farming as a Guarantee of Future Tobacco Livelihoods
 For keen tobacco growers, the most common adaptive action to livelihood insecurity 
is to join contract farming. Growers are flocking to tobacco companies because they see the 
benefit of working with them. Most of the well-established growers among the case study 
households were on contract with one of the three companies operating at Kumala. Only a 
few of growers not on contract were doing well with their farming, and most related that their 
goal was to become a contract farmer. Contract growers have access to financing, inputs and 
technical support from their companies. They also get to sell their tobacco on the contract 
market where average prices are generally higher as compared to the auction market. Contract 
farming is barely five years old in the area, but it is now possible to hear farmers experiences 
to determine if this is the best adaptive strategy, one that really improves incomes, reduces 
vulnerability and enhances the capacity of growers to deal with future changes to global agri-
culture.
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          Experiences with contract farming
Story # 8: Felix’s Story
 Felix is a poster boy of contract growers, one tobacco companies like to use to tout 
the successes of contract farming. He is a self-made man having endured a rough start to his 
farming career. He started farming while in school in 1997. Initially he started with growing 
maize in the dimba for sale so he could raise money to buy inputs for tobacco. His brother 
used to get loans from MRFC and he used to access inputs through him. Starting out with no 
farm plot of his own, he now works a total of six acres, all of them rented for the long-term, 
on which he is growing maize, groundnuts and tobacco. A risk taker and a shrewd business 
man, he started getting input loans from Alliance One in 2012 and he has never looked back. 
In addition to growing tobacco, he also buys the tobacco leaf from other farmers for resale. 
When I asked him about the future of tobacco farming he emphatically replied that tobacco 
has a bright future because it brings in more money than any other crop he could think of. He 
related that he had tried growing maize and groundnuts in 2011 but he came back to tobacco. 
On the low and fluctuating prices he has experienced in the past, including the one in 2011, 
he stated that if things didn’t go well at the tobacco market, problems were his own, not the 
tobacco companies’. On the benefits of contact farming, he noted that he now has access to 
credit and he can now grow on a bigger scale. He also likes the security that comes with 
working with a big company, should things go wrong. “Being in a group with the company, 
you have somewhere to complain. A company may still advance you inputs, while if you were 
on your own you would have to go to Mozambique to be a tenant.” He said tobacco allows 
him to build assets while his kids were still young.
 In 2015, his loan amounted to MK350, 000.With this he grew 1.5 acres of tobacco 
and got 12 bales which amounted to 1200 kgs. Total proceeds from the sale amounted to 
MK970,000 which means he came out with MK620,000 profit. He was very happy with the 
outcome, saying this was his best season ever. The following season he planned to reduce 
his loan. At the time of the interview he had already bought 11 bags of fertilizer with his own 
money so he could get a smaller loan. He planned to increase his tobacco acreage from 1.5 to 
2 acres. In addition, he also wanted to advance fertilizer to other farmers so that in return they 
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          would give him a share of their tobacco.
Story # 9: Faustin’s story
 Faustin is well educated by most standards, having attained the secondary school 
certificate. He got married in 1998 but that year he farmed with his parents, only standing on 
his own in 1999. He previously belonged to a tobacco club (which he joined in 2001) through 
which he got loans from MRFC. “Back then tobacco farming used to be profitable” he said. 
He used proceeds from his tobacco to build a good brick and iron roof house and bought goats 
and chickens. With his money and assets, he took care of his siblings after the death of their 
father. In 2006 he stopped dealing with MRFC after his club failed to repay a loan as a result 
of low prices. Between 2006 and 2010 he used to grow maize and groundnuts but he didn’t 
make as much money so in 2010/11 he went back to growing tobacco using his own resourc-
es. The next year he joined Limbe Leaf as a contract farmer. His first impression working with 
Limbe Leaf was that it was a cheap loan as compared to other companies but the problem was 
that the company failed to provide cash for growers to hire and pay for casual labor at peak la-
bor times. As a result he did not make profit.28 He made a decision to stop dealing with Limbe 
Leaf because he was convinced that tobacco companies had set a limit on how much they can 
pay the farmer. “They give 15% to the farmer and 85% is shared between tobacco companies 
and the banks.” In addition he said he was let down by Limbe Leaf because they did not help 
him with marketing arrangements. But largely, he stopped working with them because he felt 
it was not a fair agreement. Prices were not stipulated in the contract, and there was no actual 
written document. The first time he grew tobacco with Limbe Leaf on contract he invested 
MK386,000 of his own resources, but after selling his tobacco he made less than MK200,000. 
He noticed that people who grew tobacco with their own resources
that year made more money than contracted farmers.
Story # 10: Mr. Willard
 At the time of the interview he had been with Limbe Leaf for three years. He belonged 
28 At the peak of the growing season in January and February smallholder farmers need money to pay 
laborers to weed and harvest the leaf. Failure to hire enough labor in a timely manner can lead to 
deterioration of the leaf in the field resulting in low prices.
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          to a club with nine other members. As a club, they got a package of inputs enough for 3 
hectares. He related that there was no contract document signed with Limbe Leaf. “It is just a 
verbal agreement,” he said. From the loan package extended to his club the company expected 
100 bales, amounting to approximately 10,000kgs of tobacco. When I asked him how much 
he owed Limbe Leaf, he replied that he did not know yet. He did not have the forms 
documenting his loan at the time of the interview in March, a month before the tobacco 
market was due to open. All he knew was that the previous year it was $956.
 On his experiences as a contracted farmer with Limbe Leaf Mr. Willard lamented that 
prices are not disclosed prior to the season, and the company does not help with transport 
although it provides extension services. He argued that the advantage of being on contract is 
that you know the buyer and he claimed that prices were negotiable. The disadvantage, 
according to Willard, is that if a grower presented poorly cared for tobacco, they lose 
everything. In a follow up interview after the sales were closed, he indicated that he had 
grown 1.5 acres of tobacco and got 7 bales. From his loan of $548 he claimed to have made 
MK200,000 ($430 in 2015, $=K465) as net proceeds. He was not satisfied, as the previous 
year he earned  MK350,000 in profits. Nevertheless, he planned on getting another loan the 
next year, again with Limbe Leaf.
Downsides of contract farming
 The coming of contract farming has injected belief in many growers that tobacco 
farming has not reached a dead end. Growers who in recent years had trouble sourcing inputs 
and technical assistance to grow tobacco have been quick to realize that going on contract is 
a way to secure their future livelihoods.  They believe that in leaf companies they have found 
partners who are willing to help them produce the crop and also defend their interests on the 
market. Nevertheless, contract farming as it is practiced currently has some downsides. There 
is lack of transparency on the part of leaf companies. They fail or neglect to provide terms of 
loans and the amounts growers actually owe at the outset of the agreement. Regulators from 
TCC and labor migrants returning from Mozambique note that these are the same companies 
that operate in neighboring countries where they are able to provide contracts that stipulate 
prices prior to the beginning of the growing season.
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          In addition, leaf companies have been known not to honor the agreements with 
growers as well as with government. In the past, tobacco companies have routinely ignored 
prices set by government, and they have even refused to buy tobacco from their own 
contracted growers once they achieved their planned volumes. Furthermore, there are 
suspicions that leaf companies manipulate prices by offering good prices on the first shipment 
of tobacco grown on contract to recoup their loans. Upon recovering their loans they have 
no problem giving their own contracted farmers low prices, just like all the other growers. A 
contracted farmer related that in the previous season, prices for his first shipment of tobacco 
ranged from 2.30-2.40/kg which is a range that growers yearn for. With these prices his loan 
was taken care of. The next batch of bales prices averaged $1.60- $1.70. It must be noted that 
growers first send bottom leaf which is poor quality and send high quality leaf in subsequent 
shipments.
Exiting Tobacco Farming
 There are a few farmers who have intentionally chosen not to grow tobacco. These 
come in two groups. The first group are those in formal employment and for the most part 
they have no time for tobacco. They prefer growing maize and other low- resource crops. 
But even where they are still growing tobacco, they have more options for diversifying their 
incomes that those who are not employed. The second group are those farmers who have had 
painful experiences with tobacco, and came to the realization that it is not worth the trouble.  
There are only three families among the case study households who fit this description, but 
they share the characteristic of being, on average, more educated than the typical village 
resident. One had 10 years, the other 12 years of education, and the other had gone to a 
technical college.
Story # 11: Gibson’s Story
 Gibson used to be a tobacco grower. He even grew tobacco on contract with Alliance 
One in 2011 but he was disillusioned by low prices and by the way the contract scheme was 
run. He had no actual document signed by Alliance One, and to him this contract was not a 
valid legal agreement. Now he rents dimbas and grows horticultural crops. He emphasized 
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          that going into horticultural crops was a response to the bad tobacco prices he received, even 
when he was on contract. In 2015/16 he got a loan of MK130, 000 to grow chilies on 0.3 acres 
of land on contract for a neighboring farm. He got MK400,000 profit. “Tobacco has no future” 
he told me. “Everyone is just growing for the sake of it.” His biggest challenge was lack of 
enough capital to grow more vegetables. “I need money to buy land and motorized pumps,” 
he said. He cited currency fluctuations and frequent export license bans as obstacles to farm 
income diversification. He stated that having learnt to grow chilies, there was no way he was 
going back to growing tobacco. He is a well-spoken, and self-made man. He researches and 
teaches himself many things about growing vegetables.
Story # 12: Wongani’s Story
 Wongani is a young man who runs arguably the most successful business in the 
village, baking scones. He tried tobacco after leaving school in 2010 but the prices were bad. 
From that time he only grew groundnuts and maize, until 2012 when he went into baking. He 
used money from sale of groundnuts to start his baking business. To him the key is for one to 
invest tobacco income into other areas. He argued that the biggest obstacle to income 
diversification is the mindset. “Older tobacco farmers don’t diversify because it is all they 
know- they don’t go into other enterprises,” he said. He observed that he was now getting 
more maize and groundnuts yields as he puts more effort in than them than when he used to 
grow tobacco.
Story # 13: Manfred’s Story
 Manfred and his twin brother grew up in a tobacco growing household. “I saw the 
troubles my father was going through when he was growing tobacco,” he began. After 
finishing his education at a Technical College his father set him up with two bags of fertilizer 
to grow tobacco which fetched MK80, 000. Next season he used that money to buy tobacco 
from other farmers to sell on auction but he didn’t do well. He tried to grow tobacco again 
the following year but he found the cost to be enormous. That was when he decided to try 
something else. He says tobacco farming favors those who are already well established. It 
costs a lot, and its hard work with little profit. He now grows soy, maize and beans. “Beans is 
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          my money spinner. I was mentored into this type of farming by a man from Wyson (a neigh-
boring village)”. In 2015 he grew beans on one acre and got eight 50 kg bags which fetched 
MK200,000 on the market. He built an iron roofed house from the proceeds of his sale. One 
acre of beans requires 5kg fertilizer and one liter bottle of Cypomethrin (a pesticide), a small 
investment as compared  to tobacco which requires no less than 100kgs of fertilizer for an 
acre. “Many people grow tobacco because they want to compete with others. They want to 
be famous. They just can’t see that there are other ways to make money other than through 
tobacco,” he added.
 In addition to these three who exited tobacco farming, there are others who have given 
serious thought to exiting tobacco but have not come around to actually implementing their 
plans. I include a story of one such respondent to show that adaptation is not a straight forward 
process, and that perception of risk does not always lead to adaptation.
Story # 14: Mr. Timothy’s Story 
 Mr. Timothy works for a government department at Mitundu but he also runs a 
business, a tea room and a grocery at his home. He started growing tobacco in 2001 when he 
got a loan from SACA to grow tobacco. Starting with one acre, he started buying other plots 
with profits from tobacco farming. His experience with tobacco these days is that things are 
not going well because of poor prices at the tobacco auction floors. “In fact things are actually 
going downhill” he said. I asked him why he was still growing tobacco and he replied that that 
year (2015) could be his last year growing tobacco if things didn’t improve. He was already 
making a business plan for that eventuality. He had had to stop growing tobacco before, in 
2010, when he received poor prices, but he went back after his business plan failed to 
materialize. His business plan which entailed exiting tobacco and going into raising chickens 
failed after all his chickens were wiped out by disease. During the follow-up interview after 
the end of the 2015/16 growing season he said he had done well with his tobacco that year and 
spent his profits buying more land. It was clear that he would not be exiting tobacco that year. 
But still he is an example of those who have seriously thought about exiting tobacco with a 
solid plan of action plan.
 This study started out with a hypothesis that linked perception of risk to adaptation. 
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          Findings show that growers’ responses depend on their understanding of the current state of 
the tobacco market and the causes of market fluctuation. The majority who think that the 
current market instability is temporary are using coping means to survive declining incomes 
for the short-term, with the intent to build capital reserves and go back to tobacco farming. 
Those who are able, hope to secure their future livelihoods by throwing their lot with the 
tobacco companies and joining contract farming. Those who fear that tobacco days are over 
are a small minority, and even a smaller minority is diversifying away from tobacco. These 
people tend to have above average education, but they are also entrepreneurs who like to learn 
new things. These findings show that farmers who associated long term tobacco farming with 
risk did not always adapt - perhaps further pointing to the complexity of adaptation and the 
tenuous link between perception of risk and adaptation.
     7.6 Impact of Tobacco Market Instability on the Rural Landscape
 Rural livelihoods are affected and influenced in various ways by shifts in economic 
and political processes that link them to national and global markets (Sick 2014). Having 
described how rural residents at Kumala experience and respond to market instability, this 
section describes the specific ways in which unstable markets and declining tobacco incomes 
are impacting the rural landscape through two trends centering on movement of labor and 
increasing inequalities in land ownership. This section will put in context the shape and form 
of rural transformation processes currently in motion.
     7.6.1 Migration
 Fieldwork revealed that in recent years there has been a growing trend where villagers 
migrate to Mozambique to work on tobacco farms there. Migration has been exhaustively 
discussed in livelihoods literature either as a rational economic diversification strategy that 
can provide economic stability and investments for agriculture, but also as a coping strategy 
for people trying to survive a livelihood shock (King 2011; McDowell and de Haan IDS n.d ). 
This section provides a description of the migration trend at Kumala, and provides a framing 
of what it means for household livelihoods and also for the rural economy. All kinds of 
people; young, old, men, women, single and married are joining this labor migration. Usually 
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          one or two members of a household make the trip, but in some cases whole households; a 
couple and their children, have uprooted themselves and gone to work as tenants in 
Mozambique. Oral historical accounts relate that at the height of tobacco farming, Kumala 
tobacco growers attracted tenants from within Lilongwe and from surrounding districts. As 
tobacco incomes started to decline, growers could not afford tenants anymore, preferring to 
hire direct labor. Down the line people from the area began to migrate to work as tenants in 
other major tobacco growing destinations like Mchinji, Kasungu, and Mzimba; and in rice 
estates in Salima (all in Malawi). Now the migration trend is to cross the border into 
Mozambique, a country that is also establishing itself as a major tobacco producer. My 
fieldwork began close to the beginning of the growing season in 2014/15 when labor migrants 
had already left for their work places which made it difficult to get a good estimate of num-
bers. But local accounts indicate that migration is a big phenomenon in the village. Among the 
case study households only two respondents did not have a relative or friend who had gone 
into labor migration. All the other respondents related that they had cousins, brothers, uncles 
and aunties who had left to go and work in Mozambique. The village headman suggested that 
during the growing season less than half of the residents remain in the village.
  Workers are recruited directly by Mozambican farm owners. A farm owner usually 
shows up in the village with a truck to recruit workers. Word spreads through the village, 
and willing bodies jump into the truck to make their way to Mozambique. Sometimes a farm 
owner will send some of his Malawian workers to go back to their villages to recruit workers 
for him. Chimwemwe, a returned migrant in story # 2 above, related that a Mozambican farm 
owner came in 2015 and recruited him together with seven other boys from Kumala and three 
from the adjacent village (Chimera). They went to a farm in Makanga in Tete Province. Once 
there he estimated that he found over 50 people from Kumala and surrounding villages that 
had migrated to that area. Some are settled there while others return home every year. Out of 
his group of ten, four came back after the first growing season. He was employed as a 
seasonal worker after agreeing to a fixed wage of MK75, 000 at the end of the season. He 
ended up receiving MK60, 000, exclusive of food and lodging. For comparison, a seasonal 
tobacco laborer in Malawi gets between  MK20,000 and MK32,000. “People migrate to other 
tobacco growing areas because they have the skills and they know they can do the job,” he 
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          told me. According to Chimwemwe, young people want to go because they want to lay a 
foundation. They want to upgrade from growing maize and groundnuts to tobacco. Another 
respondent reiterated that to get a good foundation you need to be a tenant.” If you are not 
paid well at the end of the year (in Malawi), then you go to Mozambique” (Manfred, 
September 2015). Many are attracted by stories of good conditions and possible riches. One 
related that nostalgia for the good old days is a push factor towards migration-”these boys, 
they sell their farm plots and go to Mozambique because they want motor bikes - what they 
used to get here, they are now getting it from Mozambique” (Finickey, September 2015). A 
key informant who also happened to be a village headman related that good working 
conditions are a big draw for growers from the village.
 “There are good conditions in Mozambique. Tenants are paid good money there. A 
 tenant typically makes MK200, 000 a year. (In Malawi the best paid tenants on small 
 estates is MK31, 693 (Kanyongolo and Mussa 2015) some have been rewarded with 
 motor bikes by their bosses and a significant number has settled permanently in 
 Mozambique” (Michael, October 2014).
 
 Stories from returning migrants show a different reality. None of the returning 
laborers indicated getting anywhere near MK200,000 but they were still paid high wages as 
compared to earnings of tenants in Malawi. For mid-stage and late-stage respondents, joining 
labor migration was a way to lay a second or third foundation after losing money or land and 
accumulating debts. Of the few migrants interviewed most tended to relate this migration to a 
dysfunctional rural economy in general but only one tied this to bad tobacco prices. He cited 
failure to pay tobacco loans to his old club as his reason for going into labor migration. He 
related that if someone doesn’t repay their loan, others are forced to pay for him. Club mem-
bers then grab his farm plot and sell it. The debtor is then forced to go to Mozambique. Even 
when respondents did not always tie migration to bad tobacco prices, the tobacco crisis is 
implicated in the sense that people are unable to build a solid farming foundation in a tobacco 
economy as they used to do in the past. It is also worth noting that the road to impoverishment 
from bad tobacco prices is gradual. A grower who makes losses in one season will dispose 
of his assets first and put together resources to try again. Or they may grow groundnuts and 
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          maize in the hope of raising capital to go back into tobacco. Down the line, when all fails, is 
when they decide to join the labor migration. One respondent, a tobacco grower who is on 
contract, related that he is on contract with his company to ensure that he will get help in the 
event his tobacco fetches a low price. If he were to make a loss and he was not in an 
arrangement with the company he would be forced to go to Mozambique to become a tenant 
to raise capital.
 Those who have gone and returned were quick to praise the marketing system in 
Mozambique. Mozambique does not operate under the auction marketing system as all their 
tobacco is grown under contract. Leaf companies set up seasonal markets where growers 
bring their tobacco and company buyers pay on the spot using rates specified in contracts. 
Returning migrants cited this as the most impressive feature about tobacco marketing in 
Mozambique. “The marketing arrangement is good - farmers are able to negotiate with 
buyers. And if a grower doesn’t fetch a good price at least they are told what is wrong with 
their tobacco” (Maxson, August 2015). Furthermore, growers in Mozambique are not 
subjected to a multitude of deductions as they are on the auction floors in Malawi.
 
Experiences on the Migration Circuit
 Locals do not always view labor migrants in positive terms. For the most part local 
perceptions portray people who go Mozambique to work on farms as lazy, unsettled and 
irresponsible. People view this as a lifestyle and not a means to cope with a faltering rural 
economy. If one really wanted to raise money one trip was enough, one man suggested. These 
are some of the comments by non-migrants to describe their perception of labor migrants:
 “It’s a life style. They claim to be looking for money but money is right here at home. 
 They have become regulars on this migration circuit. They should have built their 
 foundations by now” (Likanga, September 2015).
 “People who go to Mozambique, you can tell by the way their houses look. They are 
 not settled.”(Manfred, September 2015).
 Others insinuated that their lack of resources is caused by laziness to begin with.
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          “ They go there because of poverty and laziness. They lack of fertilizer yes, but that’s 
 because they spend their money on beer” (Derrick, September 2015).
 Others noted that labor migration is the beginning of sliding down the path of ultimate 
impoverishment.
 “It forces you into a circuit. You go there and when you come back you have no food 
 and no land. You are forced to go back to Mozambique” (Gibson, September
 2015).
 There were some migrants who were drunk and didn’t seem to know what they 
wanted, but there are others who were serious about what they are doing. Chimwemwe, the 
young man in story # 2 above, had a plan to go to Mozambique, earn money, come back, get 
married and go into farming. And that is exactly what he did.
 Returned migrants report poor working conditions including hard labor, isolation and 
exploitation.  Workers on tobacco farms are expected to work from 6am to 5pm non- stop 
with no days off and without reliable access to medical care when they fall sick. They also 
report conditions of enslavement through indebtedness. At recruitment, if a potential laborer 
has debts in the village, the recruiter pays the debts on behalf of the tenant; especially those 
owed to tobacco clubs. The laborer is then indebted to the farm owner. These debts are 
deducted at the end of the season. Some farm owners have taken advantage of workers by 
charging interest on the debts. Other farm owners promise higher wages only to pay less at the 
end of the season. John C, a case study respondent in story # 3 above reported that his friend 
had gone to Mozambique the previous year but when he came home he refused to go back. 
He was promised a decent wage by the farmer when he signed up, but he was paid less at the 
end of the season. Migrants also report harassment at the borders where agents demand bribes 
to let them in and out.
 Key informants related that even though migration has been a feature of the 
socioeconomic dynamics in the area, it was mostly local. They noted that cross-border 
migration into Mozambique has picked up in recent years and could plausibly be linked to 
the troubles in the tobacco industry.  The migrants interviewed do not fit the local generalized 
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          profile of migrants as lazy and irresponsible. No lazy person wants to be subjected to working 
conditions that exist on the Mozambique tobacco farms.
 Ultimately, this migration trend will change the social and physical landscape of 
Kumala in significant ways. First, it may turn many of these migrants into displaced, unsettled 
people. Those who come back home after unsuccessful labor migration and again fail to find 
resources at home will keep moving, unable to settle anywhere. Secondly, this trend is helping 
create and perpetuate land ownership inequalities as I elaborate in the section below. Before 
they migrate, some of the migrants rented out or pawn their farm plots to family members or 
non-relations. Mr. Willard, a late stage farmer in story # 9 above had six of his family 
members leave to join migrant labor in 2015. His niece and two of her daughters used to grow 
maize and groundnuts. A female cousin also left because she had family problems. His 
brother and a grandson to his sister who he described as an alcoholic and a thief also left. They 
all pawned their farm plots before they left. I discuss the impact of an ailing tobacco economy 
on land ownership inequalities in the next section. 
 African migration, both rural-urban (Cliggett 2005; Falkingham et al 2012; Potts 
2006) and rural-rural migration (Cliggett 2014; Potts 2005) has been well documented. 
Studies have revealed the phenomenon of circular or return migrations as a manifestation of 
rural-urban linkages oiled by economic, social and political factors. In contemporary Malawi 
migration has been studied from different vantage points. While studies show livelihood stress 
as the cause of migration, the effects are ambivalent. Potts (2005) discusses the rural-rural 
migration from the over-populated south to the north in Malawi, citing land shortage as the 
push factor while Mtika (2009) has documented how migration is common feature in 
agriculture in Malawi, but it is also fueled by a fragile business economy and was implicated 
in the spread of HIV/Aids. Elsewhere, other studies have shown that besides environmental 
and economic factors an understanding of community and household power structures is 
required in order to understand the nature of migration and what it means for both the migrat-
ing and the remaining parties (Cliggett 2000, 2005). I take all this into account as I make sense 
of this complex process and recognize that besides the failing tobacco economy, household 
and individual dynamics influence the motives and the effects of migration decisions.
 From a livelihood perspective, the migration undertaken by residents from Kumala 
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          can be evaluated from two vantage points, as this migration seems to encompass both season-
al migration and permanent migration. A study on the people who undertook permanent 
settlement in Mozambique would reveal if they established a foundation and ventured into 
farming on their own. As for those who come back every year, a systematic evaluation of 
return migrants’ ability to save earnings and invest at home one would offer better knowledge 
about how cyclical migration will impact households and the community more broadly. 
Stories from respondents in this study paint pictures of bad experiences with migration. It 
could be a matter of a bad boss or bad working attitude or just the jitters of being away from 
home. What if they found the right conditions? Would they stay there? At present, the shape 
and circumstances of migration from Kumala point to precarious future livelihoods for the 
migrants because they leave their land behind, with no guarantee of success in Mozambique 
and thus the possibility of permanent land alienation.
     7.6.2 Land Alienation and Stratification
 Another trend resulting from a devastated rural tobacco economy is the rapidly 
developing vernacular land market, which points towards increasing social differentiation 
based on land access. For sure, not everyone is becoming impoverished with the erratic 
tobacco economy. Those who are able to get contracts with tobacco companies are actually 
doing well and they are acquiring more and more plots of land. It is instructive that the three 
most successful tobacco growers in Kumala do not own all the land they work on. They are 
into long-term rent agreements and every year they add more plots. There are at least three 
types of land-use arrangements:
Use for-a- Period Agreement
 The renter uses a farm plot for a season or two. This fetches a very low price and is 
mostly the preferred arrangement for older people with no energy or resources to work their 
own fields but intent on keeping ownership of the farm plot. Through this arrangement 
landowner lets the renter pay between MK7000-MK15, 000 to use one acre for one season.
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          Rent- to-Redeem (Pawn)
 The user pays out money which renter is required to pay back to redeem their land. 
The renter is free to use the plot until the land owner comes up with the money. This 
arrangement is popular with land owners with no resources to buy inputs. It is also popular 
with people who go on labor migration. It costs anything between MK20,000- MK80,000 
to rent one acre under this arrangement. This is the arrangement that is likely to disrupt the 
norms around land transfer and cause land inequality as I elaborate below.
Outright Land Sales
 Outright sales are rare, but they are happening despite informants’ insistence that land 
is not for sale. People directly involved in selling land did not admit to selling land and it was 
only those who bought who talked about it. Family members talked in hushed tones about 
land sales. A female respondent in one of the case study households reported that her father 
in-law had sold half an acre of his land, albeit, quietly. In interviews people would let slip that 
they actually bought and not rented a plot. Timothy, a case study respondent in the story about 
growers exiting tobacco let slip that he had bought one acre of land for MK300,000.
 Rose and her husband are among the most successful growers on contract with Limbe 
Leaf. They started out with just half an acre of land in 2007 given to them by the husband’s 
parents. In the 2015/16 growing season they worked on eight plots, four of which were rented. 
Considering that they started out with only one plot, then the other three they must have either 
bought outright or the  original owners simply never came back to redeem their plots. Felix, 
the poster boy for contract farming, works on six plots of various sizes, none of which are his 
own. The story of Rose and Felix also give an indication of how land inequality is playing 
out in the village through the rent-to-redeem arrangement. The resource constrained farmer 
offers use of his/her plot to a relatively wealth individual for a number of years in return for an 
agreed amount of cash. The hope is that in the given period, the land owner will find money 
to repay the money and redeem his land. However, the trend is that as time goes, the land 
owner is finding it difficult to repay the money and the land remains under the control of the 
wealthy individual. For the lucky ones the land stays in the family. Rick’s two cousins left the 
village to go to Mozambique and they pawned their farm plots to him. He gave them MK20, 
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          000 but they kept asking for and getting more money from him against the land, which makes 
it unlikely that they will repay. Others are not so lucky. Edward’s two cousins also rented out 
their pieces of land. The first cousin needed deposit money for a loan from Alliance One. He 
got MK60, 000 as rent for 2 acres. The second cousin got MK80, 000 for one acre and left 
for Mozambique. According to Edward, the second cousin is unlikely to get the land back 
because he got too much money for it. However, locals observe that even with the reported 
extra income they earn in Mozambique, none of the migrants who pawned their land has 
been known to redeem their land. Very few are reported to be sending money to improve their 
households in Malawi or to get their farming back on track.
 To put things in context, agrarian political economy literature has documented experi-
ences of local dispossession of land through global and national processes stemming from the 
liberalization of land markets. Large scale land acquisitions, agribusiness involvement in food 
and biofuels production, and major tourism and conservation projects among others have been 
implicated in large scale land dispossession (Mc Michael 2012; White et al 2012; Zoomers 
2010). The dispossession of land at Kumala has taken a different path. At Kumala it is 
smallholders connected to the tobacco value chain who are accumulating resources and 
buying or renting land from non-contracted growers or non-growers. But this dispossession 
must also be placed in context of the internal processes.
 Elsewhere scholars have documented how across the African continent there is an 
ongoing reinterpretation and renegotiation of rules governing customary land - once 
considered outside the realm of the market. The rise of vernacular markets is one 
manifestation of this renegotiation (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2010; Kouame 2009; Colin 
and Woodhouse 2010). In Malawi, Takane (2008) discusses the flexible and changeable rules 
and norms of transfer for familial land in farming communities dealing with population rise 
and identity flux through inter-marriages. Peters and Kambewa (2007) have looked at how 
the development of a new national land policy set in motion competition for land with chiefs 
overriding customary land rights to sell land to outsiders. Even from the perspective of land 
governance, authors question the impact of flexible and negotiable customary tenure rights in 
Africa, although such systems may be celebrated in other places, for encouraging 
productive land uses. Sticko (2010) and Peters (2004) argue that flexible land tenure regimes 
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          end up disadvantaging marginalized groups such as women, youth and the disabled who 
are shut out from land ownership.  In Kumala, renting households will eventually lose those 
lands, and their children will have nothing to inherit. Meanwhile contracted tobacco growers 
will amass more land. In terms of labor, if the tobacco marketing system does not change, 
Malawian growers will not be able to compete with their Mozambican counterparts, leading 
to more labor migration, and subsequent loss of land in Malawi.
     7.7 Conclusion
 The people of Kumala know that their livelihoods are going through a tough time. 
They know that the tobacco market is unstable and that this has been going on for years. They 
see no more iron roofed houses and they see an increase in outward migration. But for now, 
the importance of tobacco still looms large. Young, mid-stage and older growers as well as 
farmers who are not yet growing it all sing praises to tobacco. For most, the current unstable 
market is just a temporary bump on their livelihoods. While others blame themselves for lack 
of diligence with care of the crop which results in lower prices, an equal proportion of 
respondents blames government’s exploitative and inefficient institutions as the cause of the 
crisis. Comments from growers show that the historical relationship between smallholders and 
a heavy handed paternalistic state comes to the fore in a subtle but powerful ways, in the ways 
through which smallholders process change in the agricultural marketing environment. This is 
because growers recall a time when the state controlled and manipulated commodity markets 
at will. For this reason, most growers have not linked the current unstable market to 
possible long-term decline in the fortunes of tobacco farming, and therefore they have not 
taken adaptive actions. This shows that the link between perception and long-term adaptation 
is not as strong and must be mediated by institutions, state owned or otherwise. In so doing the 
historical relationship between institutions mediating for smallholders must be interrogated to 
make sure the interests of smallholders are not sacrificed.
 Discussion in this chapter has also shown the need for better understanding of the 
adaptation process. Livelihoods literature has shown that adaptation is a complex process 
involving dedicating resources and time to develop alternative livelihoods. Fieldwork at 
Kumala has confirmed this by showing that even those employed and with access to resources 
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          for diversification are not diving in head-long to diversify from tobacco. This is in no small 
measure due to the fact that they do not take seriously the possibility of tobacco disappearing. 
A small minority has thought about the long-term viability of tobacco and have diversified 
away from tobacco. But even for these, the government looms large in their livelihoods away 
from tobacco through the management of currency exchange rate and the administration of 
produce trading permits both of which affect their ability to access inputs as well as to sell 
their produce.
 The chapter has also shown that despite the perceptions of respondents, unstable 
tobacco markets, declining incomes and a failing rural economy have set in motion a chain of 
interlinked processes that are shaping the movement of labor and are forcing a reconfiguration 
of land ownership patterns which will change Kumala forever.
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          Chapter Eight: Conclusion
 The study looked at tobacco growers at Kumala in Lilongwe and explored how they 
understand and respond to changes in their farm livelihood context. This context is the ever 
changing tobacco market characterized by fluctuating and declining prices, increasingly strin-
gent quality standards and new institutional arrangements. All  these changes are 
superimposed against a background of neoliberal restructuring that shifted the economic, 
political, and agrarian order resulting in a diminished influence of the state while elevating 
the influence of companies. This chapter summarizes the findings from the study on how 
farmers perceive and respond to a changing tobacco economy, and restates the specific ways 
in which the state, leaf companies and other institutional players operating within a specific 
national agrarian and political context shape smallholders’ perceptions of the tobacco industry. 
With a view towards thinking about how future crises could be managed or even prevented, 
the chapter also provides a discussion on the framing of the tobacco livelihood crisis as a step 
towards about thinking about solutions to the crisis. The chapter also employs the concepts of 
sustainability, vulnerability and human capabilities to discuss how the responses to the current 
market instability do little to enhance capacity to manage or prevent future crises. Finally, the 
chapter offer insights on the broader question of whether and how small farmers and produc-
ers across the globe are going to adapt to future changes in the global institutional and struc-
tural framework of global agriculture and I offer policy recommendations on how this can be 
achieved.
     8.1 Perceptions of Risk Among Smallholder Tobacco Growers
 When I talked to people at Kumala, the long-term risk of tobacco viability was not 
a common topic of discussion. Sure, they talked about fluctuating and declining prices, and 
increased uncertainty in their interactions with the market. But tobacco is still considered king. 
They experience all these uncertainties much like the myriad livelihood risks they normally 
live with, including the uncertainties of weather. For the most part, they are thinking about 
how they can improve the quality of their tobacco in order to improve their chances of earning 
good prices. On the other hand, they also hope for improved efficiency in the institutions that 
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          run the tobacco market. Individually, there are a few people who think in the long-term and 
have taken adaptive actions exiting tobacco farming. For many tobacco growers, mispercep-
tion and underestimation of risk has led to complacency and inability to plan and implement 
well thought out adaptive strategies. For these growers, the idea that one day trade in tobacco 
products could stop or the fact that even at the moment tobacco is a pariah crop, and the im-
plications of this status on the future of their livelihoods not yet registered in their minds. With 
regard to collective adaptation within the tobacco system, studies have shown that perception 
of risk is informed by the social context (Lo 2013; Ostrom 2000).
 Ostrom (2000) notes that social norms and networks generate social capital that gives 
rise to a push for collective action. The government and the tobacco industry in Malawi have 
not given serious attention to what would happen to growers should there be no demand for 
Malawi’s tobacco. Sure they talk about ‘diversification with tobacco’, meaning that growers 
need to grow several crops to ensure food security and cash in the event that tobacco doesn’t 
do well in a particular year. But this is still asking growers to center their lives on tobacco and 
it is different from asking growers to prepare for the inevitable rainy day. This 
complacency (and misinformation) has a lot to do with the political economy of agriculture 
in Malawi through which the profiteering motives of tobacco companies converges with the 
exploitative tendencies of the state.
     8.2 Practices that Shape Perceptions of Risk among Smallholders: Signals from
Government and the Industry
 Government’s role in shaping smallholders’ perception of risk is implicit in the ways 
in which it has handled the smallholder agriculture sub-sector with paternalism, and it is 
explicit through the way it has facilitated, and partaken in the exploitation of smallholders. 
From interviews with growers, the legacy of a heavy handed paternalistic state came to the 
fore in a subtle but powerful manner in the way smallholders process and understand changes 
in agricultural marketing. Growers remembered the state that actively intervened to 
stabilize incomes on behalf of smallholders. They view the fact that the state seems 
unwilling or reluctant to help them get better tobacco prices and help them secure their 
livelihoods where it matters most as something of an act of betrayal. In relation to this, 
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          smallholder growers now increasingly view the state’s role in their livelihoods through corrupt 
institutions that are complicit in their exploitation. In interviews about poor prices the state 
and its institutions were not too far from discussion as the culprits that were making all the 
profits, at the expense of growers.
The Role of Tobacco Companies
 The role of tobacco companies in promoting smallholders’ view that tobacco farming 
is still viable in the long-term has been much more explicit, through messages to promote 
production of agriculture and through incentives including financing and better prices for 
contracted growers. Tobacco companies in Malawi have consistently told growers that 
tobacco consumption will go on forever, and they have encouraged farmers to keep 
growing even when the companies themselves are diversifying. Growers are told to disregard 
the anti-smoking lobby as “anti-tobacco initiatives have always been there” (TAMA 
Interview, October 2013).
 Tobacco companies have also shaped the image of a viable tobacco industry among 
smallholders by providing financing through contract farming, and by offering technical 
support to growers. The tobacco industry’s role in financing tobacco and providing extension 
services offers hope to growers. The thinking among tobacco growers is that things can’t be 
that bad if these companies are coming to their villages to encourage them to grow tobacco. 
Leaf companies come as partners, using the same language of development commonly used 
by nongovernmental organizations and development agencies. By portraying themselves as 
partners who care about the well- being of growers and by offering incentives such as 
financing, extension services and a promise of better prices, tobacco companies cloud-out 
growers’ perception the instability they currently face on the market, and the long-term 
implications on the viability of tobacco farming.
The Political Economy of Tobacco in Malawi: Institutions and the Smallholder
 The analysis of the political economy of tobacco in Malawi (Chapter 5) has shown 
that the interests of the state and those of leaf companies as well as those of other local 
non-state players converge with the aim of extracting as much surplus as possible from 
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          smallholder tobacco growers. The state seeks to exact revenue through taxes, but it also seeks 
to protect the interests of its own companies that are involved in tobacco trading, input 
supply, and tobacco re-handling businesses. To further compound the misery of the state, 
donors’ withdrawal of budgetary support has further undermined the financial position of the 
state, pushing it to increased dependency on tobacco companies who mediate access to 
foreign exchange. As a result, three powerful government sectors - Ministries of Trade, 
Finance and Agriculture - have become cheerleaders of the tobacco industry. In this political 
and economic context, leaf companies have a blank cheque that allows them to get away with 
even the worst forms of exploitation of smallholder growers. The leaf companies undermine 
the regulatory and policy making institutions to their advantage, and they are now pushing 
government to replace the auction system with their preferred contract marketing system. The 
state and leaf companies are not the only ones benefitting from an opaque tobacco 
management and marketing system. Growers’ associations and other players also make 
money selling services that are sometimes not always beneficial to the farmer, raking in 
exorbitant fees in the process.
 The major argument in this discussion is that the exploitative commodity production 
and marketing system originally set up in the colonial era is still in place, only this time the 
state is not the lead actor. I also argue that the powerful interests that operate and manage the 
tobacco commodity system in Malawi have all the incentives not to publicize anything that 
suggests impending doom for tobacco to the growers. These actors have all the incentive to 
continue raking in profits from a pariah crop for as long as they can, by showing the tobacco 
grower a picture of a healthy and vibrant industry that is set to survive into the future.
     8.3 Distinguishing Coping from Adaptation
 Findings from this study have shown that there is a continuum that links short-term 
coping mechanisms with long-term livelihood adaptation, but it is useful to retain the 
distinction between the two concepts. Tobacco growers at Kumala employed several types 
of coping strategies. For example, faced with losses from poor prices, and depending on the 
magnitude of loss, some households sold assets to raise capital to enable them go back to 
tobacco farming. Households also resorted to growing lesser value crops such as groundnuts 
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          and Soy. Depending on the loss this is done for a number of years in order to raise sufficient 
capital in order to go back to tobacco farming. This shows that rural growers employ a 
sequence of coping measures in incremental steps. If, for example, selling assets fails to raise 
the required capital to enable households return to tobacco farming immediately, the 
household would turn to groundnut farming. If both of these fail, households move to the 
worst case scenario where they sell critical productive assets such as farm plots and 
eventually become laborers on neighboring estates or go to Mozambique to become tenants. 
Besides showing that coping activities are not just knee-jerk reactions to welfare failure, this 
study has also shown that there some calculations and trade-off involved when people employ 
coping mechanisms. For example, people who made losses from tobacco start betting the 
value of land and other assets in their possession against future income. They are also 
trading-off the value of close family relationships (which would be broken if they migrated) 
against future income.
 Among respondents from cases study households who eventually made adaptive 
adjustments by exiting tobacco farming to start different enterprises, the ethnographic record 
shows that they also undertook similar coping activities before switching to other enterprises. 
For instance, after making losses in tobacco Gibson grew alternative crops with the hopes of 
returning to tobacco farming but he ended up making horticulture his long time livelihood. 
Manfred grew groundnuts to cope with tobacco losses before eventually diversifying into 
bean farming. Some scholars have pointed at similar scenarios, where the same activity is at 
one point considered a coping mechanism and an adaptation at another, as a source of 
methodological confusion. However, I find it useful to maintain that distinction especially in 
the context of growers’ perception of long-term viability of tobacco farming which shows that 
there is clear difference in intent and outcomes of their actions. For this research there was 
need to separate easily reversible changes such as temporarily growing groundnuts in order to 
go back to tobacco as opposed to long-term commitment to stay away from tobacco and the 
resulting investments into acquiring knowledge and skills to go into other enterprises such as 
bean farming and bread-making. I argue that to sort out the confusion that sometimes arises 
in classifying coping mechanisms vs adaptation, researchers need to complement information 
about the involuntary nature of coping mechanisms forced upon people due to shocks, with 
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          information on the intent of rural producers as they proceed into the future. In addition, 
long-term fieldwork can help researchers separate coping from adaptation by showing the 
effects of such strategies. Through sustained fieldwork, researchers would be able to tell if 
what started as a coping mechanism, if successful, will allow producers to go back to their old 
livelihoods while unsuccessful coping will lead to deterioration of welfare and loss of assets. 
Similarly, researchers would be able to tell if what started as a coping mechanism should be 
categorized as an adaptation if it leads to newer portfolios of activities and increased wealth 
and income security.
     8.4 Framing a Livelihood Crisis. Towards Preventing and Managing Future Rural 
Livelihood Crises
 The livelihood crisis facing tobacco growers at Kumala is largely a result of a 
compromised state with weak bargaining power, but it should also be seen in the context of 
a struggle for meanings attached to tobacco between the tobacco industry and anti- smoking 
advocates led by the WHO. Anthropologists, historians and other scholars have documented 
the changing meanings surrounding tobacco from a symbol of masculinity, freedom, and 
independence, to a symbol of addiction and illness (Brandt 2007, Goodman1994). But these 
changes have been hotly contested as tobacco companies fight back with counter narratives 
which present smoking as a symbol of freedom, whose consumption is an expression of 
individual choice. In the midst of this struggle for meaning, rather than slow down, the 
production and consumption of tobacco is actually increasing. The revenues of tobacco 
companies are also growing. The 2015 and 2016 financial statements from four tobacco 
conglomerates; Philip Morris, Japan Tobacco International, Reynolds American and Alliance 
One, show that individually, these companies reaped healthy profits and that as an industry, 
they are upbeat about the future. The industry expects revenues to grow into the foreseeable 
future owing to population growth, an increase of smokers in Asia, and the expanding 
premium cigarette market in Europe (Philip Morris, 2017, JTI 2015, Alliance One 2016, 
Reynolds American 2016). But these increased revenues are not finding their way into the 
pockets of growers such as those at Kumala. The major reason for this is that the tobacco 
industry has creatively chosen to work with, and around the discourses that malign tobacco, to 
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          entrench their position of power with regard to growers and governments which rely on 
tobacco revenue. Tobacco companies paint a positive picture of growing revenues to some 
audiences such as shareholders. Similarly, they paint an upbeat picture to growers to 
encourage them to keep growing tobacco and disregard anti-tobacco efforts. But where it 
suits them, tobacco companies in Malawi have used the argument of low global demand of 
tobacco, owing to anti-smoking efforts by the WHO, to justify low prices paid to growers. In 
addition, the industry has adopted the Integrated Production System (IPS)/Contract Farming 
approach ostensibly to ensure traceability for all fertilizers and chemicals that go into the 
production of tobacco. This is done to ensure ‘clean’ tobacco for smokers. The traceability 
imperative allows tobacco companies to lock growers in contracts. Through such contracts, 
these tobacco companies become the only suppliers of ‘approved’ inputs and other added 
services including financing to contracted growers. These added services also help boost the 
profits of tobacco companies (See Alliance One Financial Statement 2016).
 Broadly, this dissertation calls for a much more nuanced framing of a crisis. I look at 
the livelihoods crisis among tobacco growers in Malawi, not as an inevitable collateral 
damage of market instability brought about by globalization of agriculture. Rather I locate the 
origins of the crisis through the workings of a shrewd global industry that selectively adopts 
and uses contradictory discourses to marginalize growers and hold them in a constant state of 
crisis. I also trace it to the tobacco establishment in Malawi- the policy making, regulatory and 
marketing institutions that seem to normalize market instability and smallholder losses as ‘part 
of the game’.
     8.5 Employing Evaluative Concepts: Sustainability, Vulnerability/Marginalization, 
and Human Capabilities
 Preventing or ameliorating future rural livelihood crises depends on reducing vulner-
ability, enhancing livelihood (income) security and building human capacities. Drawing from 
the concepts of sustainability, vulnerability and human capabilities in the livelihoods literature, 
I provide an assessment of the possibility of the people at Kumala attaining favorable 
livelihood outcomes and reducing vulnerability to future crises.
 Growers at Kumala remain in a vulnerable position economically and politically. To 
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          begin with, the continued erosion of their incomes by the state and leaf companies leaves them 
with fewer resources to cope and recover from this and future crises. Secondly, as the war on 
tobacco by WHO and other initiatives intensifies, tobacco growers at Kumala and elsewhere 
will more likely be on the receiving end of that war. On its part, the tobacco industry will 
continue to refer to messages from anti-smoking campaigns to undermine their captive 
growers. This is particularly disadvantageous to tobacco growers because unlike other crops 
like coffee where there is possibility of an international framework to manage volumes and 
prices, no such framework would be possible for tobacco at a time when the WHO and 
some countries are working towards the reduction of smoking. This scenario leaves tobacco 
companies in a powerful position in relation to growers and impoverished governments that 
desperately need revenues from tobacco. In this sense tobacco growers at Kumala are highly 
exposed to external market shocks emanating from global processes. Tobacco growers are 
further exposed to locally generated external shocks because they have to deal with multiple 
institutions whose only interest is to perpetuate tobacco growing. These institutions will not 
provide the right signals to promote smallholders understanding of the risks they face. Added 
to that, smallholders face multiple stresses including weather, currency fluctuations and an 
unstable policy environment.
 In terms of building human capability and adaptive capacities for the future, 
growers’ capacity is not in any way enhanced because they do not have the information they 
need to make decisions. I follow Bebbington (2005) to say possession of assets like human 
capital - education, skills etc- is not just about ability to produce more and efficiently, but also 
self-awareness to be and engage meaningfully with and change one’s world. Ultimately this 
points to the ability to access and utilize information to understand changes in your 
environment. Growers at Kumala and others like them have no place and no voice at the table 
within the establishment that drives the tobacco industry. With no political representation, 
and lacking any organizational ability, smallholders have no access to information critical for 
making long-term livelihood decisions. The growers at Kumala are locked in contracts with 
leaf companies with little room for negotiation and they have no information outside what the 
companies give them to make meaningful choices about their livelihoods in the future. 
Looking at all these factors I argue that what is happening among smallholder tobacco farmers 
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          now is the erosion of adaptive capacities.
     8.6 Future Research and Policy Recommendations
 This study started with the broader question asking if farmers are going to be able to 
adapt to future institutional and structural changes in global agriculture. This study and other 
studies on rural livelihoods have shown that farmers and small producers are resilient to a lot 
of changes, be they environmental, demographics, technological. But the question to begin to 
ask now is whether the farmers are going to thrive as they adapt to future changes. The goal is 
not just to have farmers adapt but they need to secure their livelihoods and 
enhance wealth as they adapt. This dissertation has shown that there is need for more research 
on how rural producers and farmers perceive risk and make decisions to adapt.  There is need 
for nuanced investigation into risk and culture, especially the link between identity and the 
perception of risk. This study has shown that the persistence of tobacco farming is partly tied 
to notions of masculinity among some men. The notion that growing tobacco fulfils 
expectations of what it means to be a man of status in the village has implications on how 
some men may or may not perceive long-term risk to their tobacco based livelihoods. 
 Conversely, this research has shown that in some cases people are prepared to 
forgo opportunities for stable and sometimes higher income for risky options that have been 
known to fail time and again. There is need for further research on why rural producers stick 
to economic options that do not necessarily give the highest returns (from a rational choice 
perspective). This line of research could further delve into specific nature and social context in 
which some crops are grown (or enterprises undertaken) that ensure that some rural 
producers do not think of diversifying into crops or enterprises not within their traditional 
purview. The kinds of research I propose here would add knowledge to our collective 
understanding of global change by shedding light on how specific groups of people perceive 
and react to different kinds multiple risks including climate change and market shocks.  It 
would also produce knowledge that would inform policy on how governments and 
development agencies could best support livelihood diversification at the local level.
 The government of Malawi and development partners need to enhance resilience and 
support viable livelihood adaptation among smallholder tobacco growers. For this to happen 
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          here is what is needed.
 
i. Government that Prioritizes Small Producers
 Government needs to prioritize the needs of smallholder farmers. This means 
providing conditions in which smallholders thrive and providing critical information, not just 
on technical production matters, but also on the changing institutional and structural changes 
in the sector. To this end, the Malawian government needs to take serious stock of the state of 
the tobacco industry and communicate with growers about the effects of initiatives like the 
anti-smoking lobby and the possibility that one day tobacco farming may come to a stop. Such 
a signal would not mean that farmers should abandon tobacco right away, but rather to 
encourage them to explore and invest in alternative livelihood options for the future. In 
addition, government must act on behalf of growers and stabilize the tobacco market. This 
would stop the eroding of resources from smallholders to allow them build reserves to invest 
in other enterprises. Furthermore, the government should provide stable marketing avenues 
for other crops. There is need for transparent marketing avenues such as local commodity 
exchanges, with adequate physical infrastructure where growers are assured of basic 
minimum prices.
ii. Independent Farmer Driven Institutions
 The most notable farmer cooperatives and associations including tobacco clubs 
currently operating in Malawi have been initiated either by the Ministry of Agriculture or the 
tobacco establishment to facilitate tobacco production and marketing in Malawi. There is need 
for farmer centered and farmer driven institutions. These institutions would have the income 
security and welfare of growers as their chief objective, and not the promotion of a specific 
crop. Free from ties to any specific industries or the government, these institutions would be 
able to provide farmers with accurate information on the prospects of specific crops and they 
would be able to lobby government and confront corporate interests seen to be exploiting 
farmers.
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          iii. Invest in the Farmer of the Future
 Finally, there is need to invest in the farmer of the future that can understand 
changing dynamics of agriculture locally and globally. In this study many respondents related 
that they grew tobacco because everyone else did. This mindset provides a loop hole which 
allows tobacco companies and the state to profit from growers’ blind loyalty to tobacco. There 
is need to change mindsets and the best way to do this is to ensure that farmers are able to 
access and make sense of information. This can be done through providing information on a 
wide range of subjects including agribusiness, commodity pricing and sustainable farming. 
This would require reform of extension services so they are better organized and that exten-
sion agents are well trained to carry out their roles in the 21st century. 
Appendix 1
Interview Guides for Tobacco Farmers
For the tobacco farmers on contract vs tobacco farmers not on contract
General Questions: Life as Tobacco Farmers
Family size - how many kids, adults
Education level - for head of household (# of years of schooling)
Farm size data - how much land holdings? How much is allocated to tobacco? (collect 
quantitative data)
Total land
Total to tobacco
Labor: How much labor did you use this year? Did you have to hire someone?
Assets: What kinds of assets do you have? List type and numbers
Type   How many
Income portfolios: What other activities bring you money? How much?
Agriculture Income
Item   MK
Tobacco
Maize
Groundnuts
Livestock
Non Agricultural Income
Item   MK
Wage
Non Wage
Remittances
Total Income
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Growing tobacco
Recount to me your beginning and your life as a tobacco farmer
What is the role of tobacco in your household economy - (the place of tobacco in the 
livelihood strategy mix)
What are the challenges you face as a tobacco farmer?
How is the market for tobacco working these days? (perception of market instability)
Have you ever lost out due to low prices at the auction floor?
What are your responses to low prices?
What did you do to get back on track/recover your assets etc?
The future of tobacco.
What do you think is the cause of these fluctuating/low prices?
What are the changes you have noticed around farming and marketing of tobacco?
What do you think about tobacco farming in the long term?
Have you heard about efforts in other countries to restrict/ban smoking?
Do you think about quitting tobacco farming? What will you be doing?
Discourse.
What do people say about tobacco growing/growers? About successful/failing tobacco 
farmers? About those who quit growing tobacco?
For those on contract with companies
How long have you been with the company?
Do you have a contract document? What does it say?
What are the expectations of the company? What do you expect from the company?
How does the contract work in reality?
How does the financing work? How much money did you get? What’s in the package?
What are the preferential marketing arrangementts?
How much do you repay?
How much expert advice do you get from the tobacco company?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of being on contract?
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Social differentiation: how were you selected? What factors would make one eligible/
inelegible?
Do you think being on contract has helped boost your incomes?
What assets have you acquired through tobacco farming?
Do you belong to any other clubs/associations/cooperatives? TAMA, NASFAM, etc?
For those not on contract
Why are you not on contract?
Do you aspire to be on contract?
Why or why not?
What is the difference in terms of marketing arrangements?
What has been your revenue from tobacco in the past three years?
What asssets have you acquired through tobacco farming?
Do you belong to any other clubs/associations/cooperatives? TAMA, NASFAM, etc?
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Appendix Two
Tobacco Control Commission Information Guide
1. What types of tobacco are grown in Malawi and in what amounts?
2. Where (districts) are the specific types of tobacco grown in Malawi? What amounts?
3. What have been the production trends for each of the tobacco types over the last ten 
 years (volume for each year)?
4. What has been the price trend for each of the tobacco types for the last ten years 
 (average price for each year)?
5. What is the estimated number of estates, smallholder growers, and clubs that grew 
 tobacco in the last five years, including 2014?
6. What has been the contribution of tobacco to GDP in 2013/14
7. What volumes were sold on Auction vs Contract for each of the tobacco types in the 
 last five years?
8. Who are the major buyers of the different types of Malawian tobacco by volume 
 (3 of kgs purchased by buyer)?
9. What legal and policy framework underwrites the tobacco industry (relevant 
 legislation and policies)?
10. What changes/relalignments are happening in the industry? Sourcing, quality 
 standards, processing, consumer tastes, etc.
11. What investments are taking place (volumes in $m)?
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Appendix Three
Interview Guide for Representatives of Tobacco Companies
Changes in the tobacco environment
What do you consider to be the key changes in the tobacco environment, nationally and 
globally?
How are they affecting your working relationship with farmers, the government?
Coverage
How many farmers did you contract in 2014/2015? How much hectarage?
What factors do you consider when selecting farmers to enroll?
What do you tell them about the future of tobacco in view of uncertain and fluctuating 
prices?
How much of each type of tobacco do you need annually by type? What are your export 
destinations by volume?
How does ISP work?
What package of inputs do you provide?
Why are there no written contracts between the farmer and the company?
Why are some farmers on contract even having difficulties to sell their tobacco?
How does financing work?
Why do you charge growers’ debt in dollars?
Why don’t growers know their loan amounts as soon as they take delivery of inputs?
Why is there preference of contract marketing over auction?
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Appendix Four
Tobacco Final Sales Week 2016
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Appendix Five
Burley Grades and Minimum Prices 2015
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